Pharmaceutical Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: Analyses of Policy Stakeholders and Supreme Court of Canada Interveners by Eldik, Tom T
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 
6-22-2017 12:00 AM 
Pharmaceutical Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: Analyses of 
Policy Stakeholders and Supreme Court of Canada Interveners 
Tom T. Eldik 
The University of Western Ontario 
Supervisor 
Dr. Sandra Regan 
The University of Western Ontario Joint Supervisor 
Dr. Margaret Ann Wilkinson 
The University of Western Ontario 
Graduate Program in Health Information Science 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Master of Health 
Information Science 
© Tom T. Eldik 2017 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd 
 Part of the Pharmacy Administration, Policy and Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eldik, Tom T., "Pharmaceutical Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: Analyses of Policy Stakeholders and 
Supreme Court of Canada Interveners" (2017). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 4633. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/4633 
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca. 
i 
 
Abstract 
Background: Pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) is a controversial form 
of advertising that markets prescription pharmaceuticals to patients and consumers. The 
positions, power, interests and influence of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders shape 
Canadian DTCA policies; however, no focused analysis of DTCA stakeholders has occurred. 
Methods: This study involved a two-pronged stakeholder analysis: First was a broad analysis 
of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders using Canadian publicly available documents and 
websites. The second analyzed interveners on pharmaceutical litigation at the Supreme Court 
of Canada, and the comparisons to a leading tobacco advertising case, RJR-MacDonald v 
Canada (A.G) and a pharmaceutical DTCA case CanWest Media Works Inc. v Canada (A.G). 
Results: There is a broad range of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders, with varying 
positions, power, interests and influence. Positions on DTCA policy ranged from supporting 
less regulation to maintaining current regulations. Stakeholders are often networked with 
each other through participation in self-regulatory groups or membership in associations; 
pharmaceutical industry stakeholders were most highly networked. All interveners identified 
in the second analysis are stakeholders identified in the first analysis. Pharmaceutical 
litigation interveners were either brand or generic pharmaceutical industry stakeholders. 
Public policy stakeholders were notably absent in pharmaceutical case litigation despite their 
participation in RJR-MacDonald and CanWest. Conclusion: Future pharmaceutical DTCA 
policy may be shaped by ‘high’ power stakeholders who favour maintaining the current 
regulations. Those same ‘high’ power stakeholders can be found participating in 
pharmaceutical litigation at the Supreme Court. Indications are that pharmaceutical industry 
stakeholders would be accepted to participate in Supreme Court pharmaceutical advertising 
litigation while public health stakeholders might apply as a coalition to participate. 
 
Keywords: Pharmaceutical Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, Stakeholders, Interveners, 
Policy Analysis, Legal Analysis 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer advertising is explained as “an effort (usually 
via popular media) made by a pharmaceutical company to sell its prescription products 
directly to patients” (Ventola, 2011, p.669). Pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer 
advertising, commonly abbreviated as ‘pharmaceutical DTCA,’ is a controversial form of 
advertising that markets prescription pharmaceuticals to patients and consumers through 
a number of different mediums (television, radio, print, internet, etc.) Pharmaceutical 
DTCA has become an increasingly prevalent practice in Canada; spending on 
pharmaceutical DTCA has increased from $1.2 billion to $4.5 billion, and continues to 
prompt discussion and argument (Ventola, 2011). Harker (2007) summarized the debate 
surrounding pharmaceutical advertising by stating that pharmaceutical advertising is “a 
controversial issue as it operates at the nexus of population healthcare and ‘for profit’ 
enterprise” (p. 76). This study identified the stakeholders operating at this nexus and 
analyzed their influence, power, and position on future pharmaceutical DTCA policy.   
1.2 Pharmaceutical Direct-to-Consumer Advertising 
In 2015, drug expenditure was the second largest category of health spending, 
accounting for 15.7% of total Canadian health expenditure, or $946 per person, and 
constituting an increase in spending of 0.7% over the previous year (Canadian Institute 
for Health Information, 2015). The Canadian Institute for Health Information cites 
increased drug utilization as a major driver of prescription drug spending, which 
experienced average annual expenditure growth of 10.1% from 1998 to 2007 (CIHI, 
2011), and identifies pharmaceutical DTCA as one factor that may influence drug use and 
expenditure (CIHI, 2012). A number of studies have made similar arguments, suggesting 
an association between drug costs and pharmaceutical DTCA, typically citing advertising 
by pharmaceutical companies to consumers through mediums such as television and 
print, and consequent increased pressure from patients on physicians to prescribe drugs 
(Wilkes, 2000; Kravitz, 2005; Law, 2009). This increased pressure on physicians to 
prescribe pharmaceuticals may be a factor driving increased drug use and expenditures 
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(CIHI, 2012).  Concerns about pharmaceutical DTCA have led to calls from prominent 
health groups such as the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) and Canadian 
Pharmacists Association (CPhA), for increased regulation (CMA, 2002; CPhA, 2009). In 
Canada and abroad, pharmaceutical DTCA regulation continues to be a point of debate 
(Auton, 2006; Frosh, 2010). 
The policy positions on pharmaceutical DTCA exist on a continuum ranging from 
completely prohibiting pharmaceutical DTCA to unregulated pharmaceutical DTCA; 
both positions can be found in the literature but most academics and stakeholders hold 
views somewhere in between the two extremes. The position to further regulate and 
restrict DTCA practices argues that pharmaceutical DTCA is driving patients to request 
unnecessary treatment, negatively impacts physician-patient relationships, and increases 
costs on the healthcare system. The argument that pharmaceutical DTCA should be 
deregulated maintains that less restricted dissemination of health information would 
better inform patients about the existence of health conditions and treatments, possibly 
leading to consultations with physicians that might contribute to reducing under diagnosis 
and under treatment amongst the public. The proliferation of pharmaceutical DTCA has 
been found to be financially advantageous to drug producers and manufacturers (Liu & 
Gupta, 2011; Roberts, 2011). Intrinsic to all positions is a set of stakeholders who are 
invested in the regulatory status of pharmaceutical DTCA and who thus may choose to 
play a role in future policy and legal proceedings involving pharmaceutical DTCA. 
1.3 Policy and Stakeholders 
 Public policy, the focus of this research, is “a course of action or inaction chosen 
by public authorities to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems” (Pal, 
2010, p.2).  Policy is typically developed in a non-linear process, but often aligns with 
key stages: problem identification, policy formulation, policy implementation, and policy 
evaluation. Health policy is a subset of public policy, defined by Buse et al. (2012) as 
“assumed to embrace courses of action (and inaction) that affect the set of institutions, 
organizations, services and funding arrangements of the health and health care system” 
(p.4). It includes policy made in the public sector (by governments) and as well as 
policies in the private sector (Buse et al, 2012, p.4). All stages of the policy process are 
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entirely dependent on actors who are participants and have a stake or interest in the 
policy processes that affect policy, including individuals, organizations, and governments 
(Buse et al, 2012, p.4). These actors are often referred to as stakeholders. 
Pharmaceutical advertising policy is an outcome of the legislative process in 
Canada: a function of policy-making at the federal level (as will be explained further in 
Chapter 3). Pharmaceutical policy development often involves stakeholders such as 
healthcare providers, pharmaceutical companies, media companies, and health-associated 
organizations, some of whom may make contributions to the relevant federal legislation 
while it is being considered in either the House of Commons or the Senate. These 
stakeholders should have their policymaking intentions and means understood to better 
understand how pharmaceutical advertising policy may develop.  
  Under the Canadian system of government, while Canada’s executives (its 
cabinets are subordinate to its legislatures, a characteristic of all “responsible 
governments” of the post-1830s British model). The courts are independent of Canada’s 
legislatures (including the federal Parliament) and executives, and can rule both 
legislation and regulations invalid if they find fundamental legal tenets have been 
violated by the legislatures or executives involved (for instance, by violating provisions 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). A Charter case is the type of court 
intervention that occurred in Canada’s leading case of tobacco DCTA and which may 
well, for reasons to be explored in this thesis, can also occur in the context of 
pharmaceutical DTCA.  The presence of interveners, a type of stakeholder, in litigation is 
a relatively new phenomenon in Canada (Kearney & Merrill, 2000) – traditionally only 
the parties to litigation (those who bring the litigation and those who defend against it) 
have been able to appear in Canadian courts or make submissions to court. That Canadian 
courts will now, on occasion, accept interveners into their processes gives those who 
intervene another means of influencing policy.  As will be described in this thesis, when a 
court gives a stakeholder standing as an intervener it is both evidence of recognition of 
stakeholder status in a given policy area and also an opportunity for that intervener to 
influence a completely different aspect of law-making than is available through the 
democratic channels that culminate in legislation and regulation.   
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Thus, two stakeholder analyses are completed in this study to better understand 
DTCA stakeholders and how they may impact DTCA policy: those who attempt to 
influence the democratic processes of law-making and those who attempt to influence 
judicial decision-making.  Neither stakeholder group has been well studied in any context 
in Canada. 
1.4 Relevance to Health Information Sciences 
The World Health Organization states that health information systems provide the 
underpinnings for decision-making and have four key functions: data generation, 
compilation, analysis and synthesis, and communication use (WHO, 2008). At Western 
University, the goal of health information science is partly described as to:  
 Understand the existing and emerging sources of recorded health information in 
 its many forms; understand, through examination of relevant research, the need of 
 particular health user groups (e.g., health policy makers, health professionals, 
 health vendors, patients, advocates and members of the public) (Western 
 University, 2017).  
This policy analysis relies on a series of stakeholder analyses to identify stakeholders 
who could play an important role in shaping Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA policy. The 
intended result of this project is identification of a set of stakeholders who are positioned 
to influence not only legislative and regulatory policy outcomes but also legal 
proceedings that themselves could change legislative and regulatory outcomes. 
Generating and compiling data on pharmaceutical DTCA policy stakeholders, and then 
analyzing that data in order to communicate stakeholder position, power, interests, and 
influence for the purposes of informing government and private organization 
policymaker’s health and healthcare decision making situates this project firmly in the 
domain of the Health Information Sciences. 
1.5 Research Gap 
Although there is research on DTCA, healthcare stakeholders, and interveners at 
the Supreme Court, at this time there is a lack of literature which addresses the specific 
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stakeholders in Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA, and how those stakeholders are 
positioned and functioning in the policy and legal settings. 
1.6 Problem Statement 
As concerns continue amidst increasing costs of drugs and the potential role of 
DTCA on consumers and health providers, pharmaceutical DTCA policy continues to be 
a focus of stakeholders including pharmaceutical companies, health groups, and 
government. Identifying Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders, and their 
positions, power, interests, and influence, and then situating those stakeholders in terms 
of their potential ability to influence legislative or regulatory policy or to play roles as 
future legal intervenors in the Supreme Court provides analysis of two complementary 
but different avenues through which a policy change in pharmaceutical DTCA can be 
achieved. This study employed stakeholder analysis and examined the current 
pharmaceutical advertising environment. It also analyzed the key Supreme Court of 
Canada decision which involved healthcare advocates and addressed key constitutional 
limitations on tobacco DCTA regulation (RJR-MacDonald v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199, 
hereinafter “RJR-MacDonald”) as a prelude to examining current pharmaceutical legal 
proceedings which may key indicators of how the Supreme Court would treat a 
pharmaceutical DTCA case should it come before the Court. The two analyses, taken 
together, identify stakeholders positioned to influence pharmaceutical DTCA policy in 
Canada. 
1.7 Research Questions  
 Stakeholder analysis methods used in conjunction with content analysis methods 
were used to interpret primary and secondary documents. The primary and secondary 
documents were retrieved from publicly available websites and a small set of primary 
documents were retrieved from the Supreme Court of Canada archives. These methods 
and documents were used to answer the following research questions: 
1. Given that there is a literature gap on Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA 
stakeholders, what can be learned about these stakeholders? This overall 
question leads to a number of subsidiary questions: 
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• Who are the direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising 
stakeholders in the Canadian policy environment, and what are their 
interests, positions, power, and influence?  
• what is the potential for these stakeholders to shape future DTCA 
policy? 
This first set of questions is explored in Chapter 2. 
2. Given the relatively recent rise of interveners in the Supreme Court process in 
Canada and the presence of interveners in the landmark advertising case in the 
Supreme Court of Canada, RJR-MacDonald, are the stakeholders identified in 
Research Question #1 found as interveners in current pharmaceutical related 
Supreme Court litigation?  
• If so, which and to what extent?  
• For those interveners found in answer to Research Question 1 and also 
found present in Supreme Court of Canada litigation, do the interests, 
positions, influence, and power parallel those found in the broader 
policy environment of Research Question 1?  
This second set of questions is explored in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will discuss the 
stakeholder and intervener findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 respectively.  
1.8 Format 
This thesis has begun with this introductory chapter briefly outlining the concepts 
of pharmaceutical DTCA, policy, stakeholders, and interveners. Problem statements, 
relevance to Health Information Science, and the research questions explored in the next 
two chapters have been explained.  
Chapter 2 explores the positions, power, interests and influence of Canadian 
pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders and answers Research Question #1. Chapter 3 
answers Research Question #2 by reviewing and analyzing recent pharmaceutical court 
cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada and involving interveners at the Supreme 
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Court. The final chapter discusses these two investigations and draws conclusions drawn 
by examining and comparing the two sets of findings from Chapters 2 and 3.  
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2 Chapter Two: Analysis of Policy Stakeholders 
2.1 Introduction 
A report by the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) found that 
prescription drug expenditures were the second largest category of drug spending as a 
proportion of the national gross domestic product (GDP), accounting for 15.7% of total 
Canadian health expenditures; a share of health spending that has been increasingly since 
the 1980s and is now only behind hospital spending in health expenditures (CIHI, 2015). 
CIHI identified increased drug utilization as a major contributor and driver of the 
increase in prescription drug expenditures, and names direct-to-consumer advertising 
(DTCA) as a potential catalyst for increased prescription drug utilization (CIHI, 2015; 
CIHI, 2012; Law, 2008). Supporting the claim that DTCA contributes to increased drug 
utilization is a cross-sectional study by Mintzes et al (2002) that found that patient 
requests for prescription pharmaceuticals are a driver of physician prescribing 
behaviours.  Kravitz et al. (2005) similarly found that DTCA could increase prescription 
drug utilization, but added that it could mitigate underuse and promote overuse of drugs 
for major depression and adjustment disorders. 
  Pharmaceutical DTCA is defined as “an effort (usually via popular media) made 
by a pharmaceutical company to promote its prescription products directly to patients” 
(Ventola, 2011, p.669). Canadian spending on DTCA has risen sharply since 1999, from 
$2 million in 1999 to $22 million in 2006. American spending on DTCA increased from 
$340 [US] million in 1995 to $4.5 [US] billion in 2009; which is notable because 
American advertising likely affects Canadian pharmaceutical drug utilization (Law et al., 
2008; Mintzes, 2009; Pharma Marketing, 2010; Ventola, 2011). The reach of American 
pharmaceutical DTCA into Canada has contributed to a discussion and debate 
surrounding the effects, benefits, and detriments of the practice. Harker (2007) 
summarized the debate surrounding pharmaceutical advertising by stating that 
pharmaceutical advertising is “a controversial issue as it operates at the nexus of 
population healthcare and “for profit” enterprise” (p. 76).  
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There is a potential for harm in misdiagnosis by patients, over-prescription, and 
misinformation about prescription pharmaceuticals; all concerns prompted by the 
introduction of DTCA (Health Council of Canada, 2006). The pharmaceutical industry is 
largely located in the private sector, where the primary developers and manufacturers of 
prescription drugs are found.  These companies are incentivized by profit to proliferate 
the sale of these drugs to make a return on investment and further the financial standing 
of their corporations. Pharmaceutical DTCA has both the potential to spread essential 
health information about drugs and diseases that may benefit populations who may not 
otherwise receive this information, but also the risk of advertising campaigns incentivized 
by profit that contribute to misdiagnosis, over-prescription, and misinformation about 
certain drugs and diseases (Health Council of Canada, 2006).   
 In Canada, and internationally, there are two predominant perspectives on the 
effects of pharmaceutical DTCA. The first perspective suggests that there is a 
relationship between pharmaceutical advertising and increased pressure on physicians to 
prescribe drugs from patients who have been influenced by television, print, or electronic 
advertisements, a relationship which has resulted in a broad increase in prescription drug 
utilization (CIHI, 2012; Wilkes et al., 2000; Law, 2009; Wilkes et al., 2000;). Mintzes 
(2002) identified a perceived change in the prescribing behaviour in the physician-patient 
relationship with the introduction of DTCA: ‘Patients’ requests for medicines are a 
powerful driver of prescribing decisions. In most cases physicians prescribed requested 
medicines but were often ambivalent about the choice of treatment” (Mintzes, 2002, 
p.279). This perceived change in prescribing behaviour and the physician-patient 
relationship has prompted concern among prominent health groups who have taken a 
stance against the practice, often articulated as a policy statement expressing support for 
increased regulation of pharmaceutical DTCA. The second perspective on the effects of 
pharmaceutical DTCA is that the pharmaceutical advertisements serve as a vehicle for 
communicating health information about health ailments and their remedies to potential 
patients. These advertisements may be encouraging patients to seek out their physicians 
for consultation, thereby addressing issues such as under-diagnosis and under-treatment 
of the patient population. This perspective suggests that the deregulation and proliferation 
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of DTCA should be advantageous to both patients and the pharmaceutical companies that 
manufacture and develop the drugs (Liu & Gupta, 2011; Roberts, 2011). 
The positions to further regulate and to deregulate pharmaceutical DTCA are 
located along a spectrum of regulation, ranging from completely unregulated to 
completely prohibited DTCA. Canada’s current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations are 
best interpreted as being closer to complete prohibition than they are to completely 
unregulated DTCA (Gardner, 2003); this spectrum of regulation and positions informs 
the study going forward. The positions to further regulate pharmaceutical DTCA and the 
positions to reduce regulation are supported and advanced by sets of stakeholders, 
individuals, and groups who have an interest in policy, who are invested in the regulatory 
status of DTCA and may choose to assume a role in future policy or legal developments 
involving pharmaceutical DTCA. Stakeholders may have a role in pharmaceutical DTCA 
policy, may particularly influence any legislative or regulatory developments, and are 
important to understand in the broader context of developing policy for DTCA. 
The aim of this aspect of the study was to identify Canadian pharmaceutical 
advertising stakeholders, their positions, power, interests, and influence to influence 
future Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA policy, either through legislative or regulatory 
change or through influence upon judicial outcomes in legal proceedings.  
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Stakeholders and Stakeholder Analysis 
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) is used as the framework and lens through 
which this policy analysis was conducted. All stages of the policy process are dependent 
on stakeholders, who are described by Freeman as those that “can affect or be affected by 
the achievement of the organizations perspectives” (Freeman, 1984, p.46). Adapted to a 
policy context, it is more appropriate to use the description posited by Buse, Mays, and 
Walt (2012), who defined policy stakeholders as “those individuals and groups with an 
interest in an issue or policy, those who might be affected by a policy and those who may 
play a role in relation to make or implementing a policy” (p.4).  Stakeholders can be 
individuals, groups, organizations, or governments. On the topic of stakeholders, Guba 
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and Lincoln add that “…interest may be measured in terms of money, status, power, face, 
opportunity or other coin, and may be large or small, as construed by the groups in 
question” (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p.52).  
Policy and stakeholders can often be referred to as operating within a policy 
network, defined as “inter-dependent organizations involved in an area of policy that 
exchange resources and bargain to varying degrees to attain their specific goals” (Buse et 
al., 2012, p. 106). A more focused policy network, focusing on a single issue, are often 
referred to as an ‘issue network’ (Buse et al., 2012). Within these networks there are 
competing individuals and organizations, who may themselves form smaller networks 
and communities to advance policy objectives.  
Stakeholders can be organized into a number of categories, and one means of 
doing this is to organize them according to their interests. Stakeholders organized 
according to their interests can be divided into “sectional” groups and “cause” groups. 
Sectional groups are “groups whose main goal is to protect and enhance the interests of 
their members and/or of the section of society they proclaim to stand for” (Buse et al., 
2012, p. 111): an example of sectional stakeholder groups in pharmaceutical DTCA 
policy are unions (e.g Canadian Autoworkers Union) or the Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association, whose focus is, in-part, to represent the views of their 
respective members. Cause groups are described as “groups whose main goal is to 
promote a particular issue or cause and whose membership is open to anyone who 
supports the cause without necessarily having anything to gain personally if the case is 
successful” (Buse et al, 2012, p. 111). The Canadian Health Coalition is one example of a 
cause group stakeholder because it is a public advocacy organization dedicated to the 
preservation and improvement of public healthcare in Canada, which includes advocating 
in a number of DTCA policy areas (Canadian Health Coalition, 2016).    
Another common categorization of interest groups is that of ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’ groups. Insider groups are those groups which are well connected within 
government, considered legitimate by policymakers, and will often be able to consult 
policymakers or advance their policy agendas (Buse et al., 2012). Outsider groups are 
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described as the contrasting set of groups to the insider groups, are often seen as 
illegitimate groups by policymakers, and either reject the processes of government or 
have been unable to gain legitimacy (Buse et al., 2012). Insider and outsider groups will 
have varying levels of public policy influence; typically, insider groups will have more 
influence than an outsider group. Understanding which stakeholders have insider or 
outsider status contributes to our understanding of the pharmaceutical DTCA policy 
landscape. An insider group, BIOTECanada, is a member of the Pharmaceutical 
Advertising Advisory Board, a self-regulatory pre-clearance DTCA group, and so has 
more potential to influence change to the policy landscape than the Consumer 
Association of Canada, which was identified in this study only as a witness on the 
Standing Committee on Health report (2004) but may be interested in pharmaceutical 
DTCA policy nonetheless. 
2.2.2 Pharmaceutical DTCA Legal Regulation 
Health Canada, the federal Ministry of Health, is mandated with regulating 
pharmaceutical DTCA and enforcing pharmaceutical advertising legislation: the Food 
and Drugs Act (RSC 1985, c F-27), originally enacted in 1920 (and most recently 
consolidated in 1985),, is the Canadian federal statute that governs pharmaceutical 
advertising in Canada. Alongside the Act are the Food and Drug Regulations (CRC, c 
870), which Health Canada describes as: “…regulations [which], where applicable, set 
the standards for composition, strength, potency, purity, quality, or other property, or the 
other property of the article of food or drug to which they refer” (Health Canada, 2007, 
p.1). Together, these set out the policies for pharmaceutical DTCA in Canada. 
Specifically, Section 9(1) of the Food and Drugs Act prohibits false, misleading, 
deceptive, or erroneous advertising of products. Section 20(1) states that “no person shall 
label, package, treat, process, sell, or advertise in a manner that is false, misleading or 
deceptive, intended use, quantity, character, value, composition, merit or safety”. Section 
3(1) prohibits consumer-directed advertisements for health products that make claims to 
treat, prevent, or cure any diseases listed in Schedule A to the Act. The Food and Drug 
Regulations contain sections C.01.044 and C.08.002(1). Section C.01.044 prohibits 
consumer directed prescription advertising beyond the drug’s name, price, and quantity. 
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Section C.08.002 (1) prohibits the advertising of new drugs that have not been approved 
for sale by Health Canada. Canada’s legislation and regulations on pharmaceutical DTCA 
frame the policy discussion around it, as different stakeholders adopt various policy 
positions that may be intended to alter the current legislation and regulations. 
In the absence of specific pharmaceutical DTCA definitions and categorization of 
advertisements in the relevant Canadian legislation and regulations, the U.S Food and 
Drug Administration (US FDA) provides information that may be relevant to 
understanding different types of pharmaceutical DTCA. The US FDA recognizes three 
types of pharmaceutical DTCA: 1) product claim advertisements, which are the only type 
of ad to feature both the name of the drug and explain its benefits and risks; 2) reminder 
advertisements, which provide the name of the drug, but not the uses, benefits, or risks of 
the drug;  and 3) help-seeking advertisements (sometimes referred to as disease-oriented 
ads) which describe a disease or condition but do not recommend or suggest a specific 
drug treatment (FDA, 2015).  
Health Canada’s policy on pharmaceutical DTCA, in accordance with its Food 
and Drugs Act and the Food and Drug Regulations, does not have a permitted category 
for the first category of advertisements above, those that feature both the name of 
pharmaceutical and the use of said drug: such ads are prohibited in Canada (Health 
Council of Canada, 2006).  The second and third types of ads, reminder advertisements 
(as defined by the US FDA) and help-seeking announcements are permitted in Canada 
(Health Council of Canada, 2006). Help seeking announcements, as defined by Health 
Canada, cannot mention a specific drug, cannot imply that a drug is a sole treatment for 
any disease or ailment, can make no mention of a drug manufacturer, and can be 
considered an advertising if other factors indicate that the purpose of the announcement is 
to promote sale or disposal of a drug (Health Canada, 2005) 
Although Health Canada is the federally mandated regulator of pharmaceutical 
advertising in Canada, industry body stakeholders, such as the Pharmaceutical 
Advertising Advisory Board (PAAB) and Advertising Standards Canada (ASC), have 
become prominent in the Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA regulatory environment. In 
particular, PAAB provides pre-clearance services to assist advertisers in meeting federal 
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regulatory standards and ASC provides regulatory advice on the compliance of 
promotional messages (Vakratsas & Kolsarici, 2014). However, as Health Canada is the 
only legally recognized regulator, all complaints about pharmaceutical advertisements are 
handled by Health Canada. 
2.2.3 Policy Context for Direct-to-Consumer Advertising 
A 2004 report by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health (“the 
Standing Committee”) explored the role of prescription drugs in the health care system in 
terms of the potential of those drugs to improve the lives of Canadians and reviewed the 
costs of those drugs on the healthcare system. One area of focus of the report was 
pharmaceutical DTCA (Standing Committee on Health, 2004). The committee’s mandate 
is described as follows by the Federal Government: “The House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Health … is empowered to study and report on all matters relating to the 
mandate, management, and operation of Health Canada.” (HESA Standing Committee on 
Health Mandate, 2015, p.1) 
 In its 2004 report, the Standing Committee expressed concern about both the 
rising costs of health expenditures (of which drug expenditures are a sizeable share), and 
the evidence that suggests a relationship exists between DTCA and growing costs. The 
Standing Committee agreed with the original rationale for prohibition of pharmaceutical 
DTCA and rebuffed calls for legislative changes to allow wider public advertising of 
prescription drugs. In regards to the DTCA pre-clearance services offered by the PAAB 
and Advertising Standards Canada, the Standing Committee was concerned with the 
voluntary approach to pre-clearance of prescription drug advertisements. PAAB’s process 
of reviewing advertisements prior to submission of advertisements to Health Canada, and 
Health Canada’s evident dependence on these agencies for regulatory oversight, was 
described as a “feeble mechanism”, and the Standing Committee found that Health 
Canada has disregarded its responsibility to enforce existing regulations (Standing 
Committee on Health, 2004).  
The Standing Committee’s recommendations included the following:  
18 
 
1. Health Canada immediately enforce the current prohibition on all industry 
sponsored advertisements on drugs to the public;  
2. Health Canada ensure the provision of independent, unbiased and publicly 
financed information on prescription drugs to Canada;  
3. Health Canada should dedicate specific resources to Health Products and Food 
Branch Inspectorate for vigorous enforcement of the DTCA regulations on 
prescription drugs include active surveillance of all relevant media, identification 
of potential infractions, appropriate corrective action, and production of annual 
public reports; and  
4.  Health Canada should ensure that all DTCA complaints about prescription 
drugs received by Advertising Standards Canada or the Pharmaceutical 
Advertising Advisory Board are forwarded to Health Canada for investigation and 
action (Standing Committee on Health, 2004, p. 14).  
Following upon this 2004 report, the now defunct Health Council of Canada, a federal 
council that was mandated to monitor the progress of health care renewal in Canada 
(Health Council of Canada, 2006), again examined the issue of pharmaceutical DTCA in 
2006. Its report, titled: “What are the Public Health Implications? Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising of Prescription Drugs in Canada” (Health Council of Canada, 2006), 
described the legislative and regulatory state of pharmaceutical DTCA in Canada, United 
States and New Zealand, summarized research evidence examining the effects of DTCA, 
looking at pharmaceutical DTCA policy developments in countries where the practice 
was prohibited, proposed legislative changes in Canada to introduce some pharmaceutical 
DTCA into the country, and made a number of recommendations in that light (Health 
Council of Canada, 2006). The Health Council of Canada report elaborated on 
recommendations in the Standing Committee report (Health Council of Canada, 2006; 
Standing Committee on Health, 2004). The recommendations from the Health Council of 
Canada report included [recommendations are paraphrased]:  
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1. Independent, publicly financed, information and education on drugs and other 
medical treatments;  
2. Better enforcement of regulations governing both physician-oriented drug 
promotion and DTCA;  
3. Given the lack of justification for allowing reminder advertising from public 
health perspective, clause C.01.033 of the Food and Drugs Act should be 
repealed;  
4. Canada’s approach to cross-border television broadcasting should be reviewed 
(Health Council of Canada, 2006).  
Despite the policy recommendations that were made by the Standing Committee 
on Health (2004) and the Health Council of Canada (2006), the regulations on 
pharmaceutical advertising have not been changed (Health Council of Canada, 2006; 
Standing Committee on Health, 2004). The lack of change to pharmaceutical DTCA 
regulation by the Government of Canada has been described as a “stalemate…in 
initiatives for legislative change” (Mintzes et al, 2005, p.326). The authors are referring 
to the absence of new DTCA which uses the recommendations from the reports, which 
mainly call for improved enforcement on the current regulations and legislation, and that 
Health Canada’s interpretation of the Food and Drugs Act by Health Canada in 1996 and 
2000 softened the restrictions on pharmaceutical DTCA (Health Canada 1996; Canada, 
2000) instead of increasing regulation. 
 The Standing Committee Report (2004) also addressed post-market surveillance 
and clinical trials, the importance of attracting a wide range of stakeholders in the 
pharmaceutical, pharmaceutical advertising sector, and health sectors as witnesses before 
the Standing Committee or inviting them to submit policy briefs to the Standing 
Committee with intentions of contributing to and informing the report with respect to 
their positions and interests. It is important to identify and understand these stakeholders, 
and the policy networks they operate in, to better understand the broader pharmaceutical 
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advertising policy environment as they shape the policy discussions and debates 
regarding pharmaceutical DTCA. 
2.3 Literature Review 
To establish an understanding of the current state of the research pertaining to 
Canadian pharmaceutical advertising policy and stakeholders, a literature search was 
conducted. CINAHL, PubMed, Scopus, Google Scholar, and Western’s Library 
Catalogue were all accessed in a database search for research that addressed Canadian 
pharmaceutical advertising policy and stakeholders that was published between 2000 and 
2016 in English. Search terms used in each database included “Canada” or “Canadian” 
combined with “direct-to-consumer advertising”, “DTCA”, or “pharmaceutical 
advertising”, and “stakeholder” or “stakeholders”. A search with all three main search 
terms combined (Canadian, DTCA, and stakeholders) yielded no results. The use of 
“Canada” (and Canadian) with “DTCA” (and Pharmaceutical Advertising” search terms 
was next used, titles and abstracts were reviewed to determine if they included content on 
Canadian DTCA appropriate for this review. This search produced 38 works on Canadian 
DTCA. Of the 38 works, 35 were peer reviewed journal articles, two were journal 
published commentaries on DTCA, and one was a graduate major research project. 
A search using only “pharmaceutical advertising” and “stakeholders” search 
terms produced one study: “Marketing and societal welfare: A multiple stakeholder 
approach” (Matear & Dacin, 2010). Although the study is relevant to DTCA and 
stakeholders, the authors do not focus on Canada or policy. However, the study provides 
insight on the relationship and scope of business strategy, societal welfare, and consumer 
behaviour in relation to DTCA (Matear & Dacin, 2010), and broadly describes groups of 
stakeholders in the DTCA environment. The study is a secondary literature review of 86 
published works pertaining to DTCA, stakeholder theory, societal welfare, consumer 
behavior, or business strategy; which intersects with this project, with our shared interests 
in DTCA and stakeholders. The study aimed to “help identify the nature, scope and 
domain of the business strategy-consumer behaviour-societal welfare link, and ways to 
explore the trade-offs between individuals and societal gain” (Matear & Dacin, 2010, 
p.1173) while using stakeholder theory as a lens to examine DTCA. The authors briefly 
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described pharmaceutical DTCA, the link between DTCA and societal welfare (including 
a summary and list of arguments for and against DTCA), and identified groups of 
stakeholders involved in pharmaceutical advertising: consumers, physicians, insurance 
companies and formularies, pharmacists, and the government.  
Matear & Dacin (2010) identified stakeholder groups but did not engage in any 
search for specific stakeholders or seek to understand the stakeholder groups outside of 
their interests in DTCA through the perspective of societal welfare, business strategy or 
consumer behaviour. The study did not name many specific stakeholders within each 
broad grouping, or explore specific stakeholder position, power, interests, and influence, 
or the nuances between stakeholders in each grouping. The authors do not acknowledge 
that stakeholders of similar type (or within the same grouping) are not homogenous in 
their positions, power, interests, and influence, and this study does not provide sufficient 
granularity to understand the differences between stakeholder groups or between the 
constituents of each stakeholder groups – necessitating further research. 
Once the literature search was broadened to include all Canadian works on 
pharmaceutical DTCA, and not just those specific to DTCA stakeholders (this was 
necessary to broaden the search, as no Canadian DTCA literature involving policy 
stakeholders is currently available), one master’s research project was identified: 
Addressing the health system impacts of domestic and international DTCA in Canada 
(Roberts, 2011). Roberts’ problem statement is that DTCA has negative impacts on 
health and increases inappropriate use of the healthcare system, which echoes concerns 
with DTCA expressed in other literature (Roberts, 2011), and the study addressed four 
research questions: 
What range of impacts does DTCA have on the health system in British 
Columbia?; What strategy is British Columbia employing with the goal of 
addressing the negative impacts of DTCA on the health care system? If the 
province employs any strategy, how effective is it at addressing the negative 
impacts of DTCA? What strategies have been employed in other jurisdictions to 
address negative impacts of DTCA on their health system? (Roberts, 2011, p. 4). 
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 Roberts (2011) conducted a thematic content analysis of government documents, case 
studies, ministry interviews, and expert interviews. Roberts’ analysis produced a number 
of themes and the identification of a number of regulatory loopholes and flaws. Four 
policy options are evaluated: 1) funding a working group on DTCA in Canada; 2) 
improving public discourse on DTCA; 3) using financial penalties to encourage DTCA 
compliance; 4) relieving pressure on the health care system through education. To discuss 
possible policy options, Roberts introduces a criterion of ‘Stakeholder Acceptability’ for 
four policy options, where Roberts hypothesizes whether certain stakeholder groups 
would be accepting or rejecting of the policy recommendation. After analyzing the policy 
options, Roberts (2011) suggests two policy recommendations: funding a working group 
on pharmaceutical DTCA in Canada, and relieving pressure on the healthcare system 
through education on pharmaceutical DTCA.  
The literature review suggested an absence of research investigating the role of 
stakeholders on Canadian pharmaceutical advertising policy.  This study sought to 
address this gap.  
2.4 Research Aim 
The aim of this study was to identify and conduct an analysis of the stakeholders 
relevant to DTCA in terms of their positions, power, interest, and ability to influence or 
affect future pharmaceutical policy and legal proceedings that pertain to pharmaceutical 
advertising – and thus to better understand pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking. 
2.5 Methods 
2.5.1 Study Design 
This study is guided by a stakeholder analysis approach (Brugha, 2000; 
Varvasovszky, 2000). Stakeholder analysis is described as: “one of a number of different 
but closely related policy research or strategic tools now found in the health policy 
literature.” It is said that “the usefulness of the tool, along with other-nonlinear policy 
analysis approaches, is that stakeholder analysis highlights the importance of actors and 
interest groups in the policy making process” (Brugha, 2000, p.243). Stakeholder analysis 
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is a versatile tool used to describe stakeholders, and is a method that is commonly used in 
policy circles. Understanding the role of stakeholders in Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA 
policy informs our broader understanding of how and why certain DTCA policies exist, 
what the pharmaceutical DTCA policy positions are, and how pharmaceutical DTCA 
may continue to evolve. 
 Varvasovszky (2000) states that a stakeholder analysis is “a tool or set of tools 
for generating knowledge about actors – individuals and organizations – so as to 
understand their behavior, intentions, interrelations and interests; and for assessing the 
influence and resources they bring to bear on decision-making or implementation 
processes” (p.338) and describes how one might conduct a stakeholder analysis. A 
stakeholder analysis is a snapshot of a context that is always changing and there are limits 
to the data that can be accessed about stakeholders. Some considerations must be made 
for the validity and of the analysis, mainly, the researcher must recognize that public 
stakeholder positions, or those collected in an interview, may change over time. Also, the 
position of a single member of an organization may not always represent the position of 
the organization as a whole. (Varvasovszky, 2000).  
This stakeholder analysis is purposefully broad and does not focus on any one 
interest group but rather on a range of interest groups (Wu et al, 2013). The stakeholder 
analysis focused on describing the position, power, interest, and influence of stakeholders 
relative to Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA policy.  Researchers should also be aware of 
their biases during the research process (Varvasovszky, 2000). Buse, Mays, & Walt 
(2012) suggest that a stakeholder analysis should identify policy stakeholders, their 
political resources, and understand their positions and interests. 
2.5.2 Data Collection 
Both primary and secondary documents were accessed and analyzed for this 
study:  1) primary documents, in the form of policy documents and websites that describe 
each stakeholder’s position, power, interests, and influence; and 2) secondary documents 
in the form of government documents and reports which address DTCA policy that met 
the inclusion criteria. Inclusion criteria were 1) documents and websites that listed 
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Canadian pharmaceutical advertising stakeholders, 2) were written in English, 3) were 
published in the years between 2000 and 2015, and 4) were publicly available.  
Identifying Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders meant first identifying 
documents that were relevant to pharmaceutical advertising. Collecting documents that 
met the inclusion criteria involved database searches (CINAHL, PubMed, Scopus, 
Google Scholar, and Western’s Library Catalogue) and a Google search engine search 
with the search terms “DTCA” or “Pharmaceutical Advertising” and “Canada” or 
“Canadian”, and from the year 2000 onwards.  
The website of the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada 
(“Romanow Commission”), a federal government commission mandated in 2002 to 
review Canada’s Medicare and recommend policies and measures to improve the system 
and long term sustainability including pharmaceutical policies (Commission on the 
Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002), was accessed. A number of submissions by 
stakeholders were made to the Romanow Commission, submissions were either requested 
by the Commission, or received in an “open” call. Documents were screened for 
pharmaceutical advertising content by using the text search feature available on all pdf 
viewers, Microsoft Word, and web browsers. The terms: “DTCA”, “pharmaceutical”, 
“advertising”, “pharma”, “advert”, and “direct” were used to find pharmaceutical 
advertising content in the documents. If the document included content that pertained to 
pharmaceutical advertising then it met the inclusion criteria, and the individual or 
organization that produced and submitted the document was recorded in Microsoft Excel. 
The relevant text was then excerpted and organized in a Microsoft Excel document for 
coding. A total of 10 documents were identified, and 10 excerpts were included in this 
analysis. A google search for the website of stakeholders identified in the documents 
produced 10 websites, from which the constituent members of each stakeholder 
organization found in the Romanow Commission submissions were also identified, 
totaling 63 constituent organizations. ‘Constituent organizations’ are the individuals or 
organizations which constitute or form the member base of each association or 
organization identified, and are stakeholders themselves.  
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The Health Canada main website page search bar was searched to identify 
pharmaceutical advertising documents. Entering “DTCA” or “Pharmaceutical 
Advertising” produced a publicly available list of complainants, those who had submitted 
a formal complaint about a breach in pharmaceutical advertising law was identified. The 
individuals or organizations that submitted the complaint, the law that was breached, and 
the category of the complaint, and the details of the complaint were recorded in an Excel 
spreadsheet for analysis. This data was collected to gather insights about the individuals 
and organizations who express interests in DTCA regulations and policy.  Two policy 
documents by the Food and Drugs branch of Health Canada interpret the Food and Drugs 
Act and Regulations on behalf of the Federal Government were also identified (Health 
Canada 1996; Health Canada 2000).  
The Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board (PAAB), a pre-clearance 
regulatory agency composed of high-interest stakeholders, website was accessed and its 
16 constituent members identified (many of whom are themselves associations or 
coalitions comprised of several organizational members). The webpages of those 
constituent members were also accessed to find position papers or pages on 
pharmaceutical advertising, and the members that make up the organizations in PAAB. 
As can be seen in Table 2.1, the websites of 12 constituent members, and one Linkedin 
profile (The Association of Medical Advertising Agencies does not have a website and 
Linkedin is the only online resource with a description of the organization) were 
reviewed for position papers, and eight position papers were identified and downloaded. 
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Table 2.1: Data Collection of Documents Relevant to Pharmaceutical DTCA Policy 
Stakeholders 
Source Number of 
Documents 
Number of 
Stakeholders 
identified 
Number of 
Websites 
Found 
Number of 
Constituent 
Stakeholders* 
Identified 
Romanow 
Commission 
10 10 10 63 
Pharmaceutical 
Advertising Advisory 
Board 
1 13 
 
12 375 
Standing Committee 
Report 
1 1 13 127 
Health Canada – 
Health Product 
Advertising 
Complains 
1 1 1 56 
Note: * Constituent Stakeholders are members of other organizations or associations, 
and may belong to multiple organizations associations. 
 
The House of Commons Standing Committee on Health included a list of 127 
associations and individuals who contributed to its report, Opening the Medicine Cabinet: 
First Report on Health Aspects of Prescription Drugs Report (Standing Committee on 
Health, 2004).  Factoring in the report’s significant focus on pharmaceutical advertising, 
those participants in the Standing Committee consultations were informing decision-
making (and the potential policy-making, should recommendations be implemented) on 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy. These stakeholders were likely to have a position on 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy, have interests that concern pharmaceutical DTCA, and 
may continue to attempt to influence future pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking. It was 
important to include these stakeholders in the study to better understand their role in 
pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking. The website of each association or individual was 
accessed (if available) and searched for references, pharmaceutical DTCA policy 
documents or, in lieu of a position document, the website was searched for references to 
pharmaceutical DTCA. Similar stakeholders were grouped into different categories along 
with available information on each stakeholder. Following the collection of the 
stakeholder webpages, policy documents, and government documents, the analysis of 
each document began. Stakeholders from each document were first identified. The 
ensuing analytic process consisted of coding text for stakeholder power, position, 
interests, and influence. 
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2.6 Data Analysis 
2.6.1 Coding 
Excerpts of text and stakeholder names found in the documents and website texts 
were organized in Excel files for analysis in terms of position, power, interests, and 
influence. The stakeholders identified in the documents were coded for positions, power, 
interests, and influence using specific criteria and coding definitions. Stakeholders were 
then categorized by position, power, interests, and influence.  
2.6.2 Criteria & Coding Definitions  
Qualitative and quantitative content analysis of all documents was conducted to 
identify the position, power, interests, and influence of each stakeholder. Vasismoradi et 
al. describe the purpose of a content analysis as “to describe the characteristics of the 
document’s content by examining who says what, to whom, and with what effect” 
(Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013, p. 399). The analytic process of qualitative 
content analysis is considered a “description and interpretation, both inductive, and 
emphasizing context, integration of manifest and latent contents, drawing thematic map, 
non-linear analysis process, no peer checking” (Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013, 
p. 399). The qualitative analysis was used to situate pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders 
in terms of position, power, interests, and influence by interpreting the text collected from 
policy documents and websites with context to pharmaceutical DTCA and policy; 
keeping in mind that the source of the document or website, the context in which that 
specific document was drafted, and the stakeholders involved has an impact on the 
interpretation of that text.  
This analysis makes use of quantitative counts, where specific words in a 
document may be counted to the examine position, power, interests, and influence. The 
quantitative content analysis was used for a number of purposes, including: grouping and 
counting stakeholders to understand the size, power, and influence of a stakeholder, the 
number of stakeholders with certain positions, power, interests, and influence, the 
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number of stakeholders who are part of different associations, and the size of different 
groupings of stakeholders (White & Marsh, 2006).   
2.6.3 Code Definitions  
Details of the codes and definitions – position, power, interests, and influences – 
applied to this analysis are presented in this section. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the 
codes and definitions (See Appendix A for examples and excerpts).  
Table 2.2: Codes and Definitions 
Variable Definition Question Codes and  Definitions 
Position  stakeholder’s 
stance on 
DTCA; 
choosing to 
either favour 
more 
restrictive 
regulation, less 
restrictive 
regulation, or 
maintain the 
currently 
regulatory 
scheme 
What is the policy stance 
of the stakeholder? 
Less regulated DTCA – policy 
statement or policy involvement in 
favour of less regulated DTCA. 
More regulated DTCA – policy 
statement or involvement in favour 
of more regulated DTCA. 
Maintain current regulation – 
policy statement or involvement in 
favour of maintaining the current 
regulations. 
What is the strength of that 
position? 
Low - A weak policy statement 
with respect to their position or that 
the position had to be inferred, and 
that there was few or no 
policymaking involvement to 
advance their position. 
Medium - strength suggests either 
a strong statement on DTCA policy 
or policymaking involvement to 
advance their position. 
High – a strong statement on 
DTCA policy and policymaking 
actions that further their position.  
Power  The quantity of 
resources that 
a stakeholder 
has within his 
or her 
organization or 
area and the 
ability to 
mobilize those 
resources 
How many resources does the 
stakeholder command? 
Low – very little financial resources 
or organizational capital 
Medium – Some financial 
resources or organizational 
capital 
High – significant and obvious 
amounts of financial resources or 
organizational capital 
Interests   What an actor 
or group stands 
to gain or lose 
What are the interests of 
the stakeholder?  
Loss - stakeholder losses in a 
financial or influential capacity as a 
result of the current regulations 
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Variable Definition Question Codes and  Definitions 
from a policy 
change 
Neutral - stakeholder does not gain 
or lose in a financial or influential 
capacity as a result of regulations 
Benefit - stakeholder benefits in a 
financial or influential capacity as a 
result of the current regulations 
Influence  influence is the 
measure a 
stakeholder’s 
perceived 
ability to 
impact 
regulatory and 
legal events 
regarding 
DTCA, and the 
stakeholder’s 
desire to do so 
How much is the 
stakeholder ready to 
initiate changes in more or 
less restrictive DTCA 
regulation? 
Low - readiness infers that the 
stakeholder has participated few or 
no policymaking functions 
Medium - readiness infers the 
stakeholder participated in some of 
the policymaking functions. 
High - stakeholder participated in 
most or all policymaking functions. 
How much is the 
stakeholder able to assert 
their position on a national 
level?  
Little to none - low amount of 
policymaking participation and low 
or medium resources 
Medium - some policymaking 
function participation and low, 
medium, or high resources 
Greatly - high policymaking 
function participation and high 
resources 
 
2.6.4 Position 
In the context of stakeholder analysis, ‘position’ is defined as “whether the 
stakeholder supports, opposes, or is neutral about the policy” (Schmeer, 1999, p.8). 
Contextualized for this analysis, position refers to a stakeholder’s stance on 
pharmaceutical DTCA regulation; choosing to favour more restrictive regulation, less 
restrictive regulation, or maintain the currently regulatory scheme. Varvasovszky (1998) 
adds that the strength of the stakeholder’s position can and should be measured and 
analyzed; this study adapts Varvasovszky’s work to employ three categories of strength 
with which to label stakeholders: low, medium, and high. To assess the strength of a 
stakeholder’s position, Varvasovszky adds “the strength of support or opposition is 
assessed according to the level of resources committed to the actor’s policy position” 
(Varvasovszky, 1998, p.1820). Stakeholders found to be participating in numerous 
policymaking activities or venues, or showing evidence of using resources to influence 
pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking, were coded as “high, medium, or low” in strength 
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of position with respect to other stakeholders’ allocation of resources towards furthering 
their positions.  
The stakeholder’s position on pharmaceutical DTCA regulation was coded as 1) 
Less Regulated DTCA (in favour of less restrictive DTCA regulation), 2) More 
Regulated DTCA (in favour of more restrictive DTCA regulation), or 3) Maintaining the 
currently regulatory scheme. The strength of each stakeholder’s position on 
pharmaceutical DTCA regulation was coded as high, medium, or low strength. Analyzing 
a stakeholder’s position as less regulated DTCA, more regulated DTCA, or maintain 
regulations was completed by a conducting a textual analysis of each stakeholder’s public 
stance on pharmaceutical DTCA regulation as published in the collected documents or on 
the stakeholder’s website. If a stakeholder had no public stance, then their position was 
inferred from the stance of their constituent members (if available) or their policy-related 
involvement. The strength of the stakeholder’s position was determined both by the 
perceived (subjectively by the researcher) strength of the stakeholder’s position statement 
(as evidenced by the language used by the stakeholder in the policy statement) and by the 
actions taken by the stakeholder to advance its position (e.g. involvement in different 
pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking events). ‘High’ strength suggested a strong 
statement on pharmaceutical DTCA policy and policymaking actions that further that 
stakeholder’s position. ‘Medium’ strength suggested either a strong statement on 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy or policymaking involvement to advance its position. 
‘Low’ strength means that there was a weak policy statement with respect to its position 
or that the position had to be inferred, and that there were few or no examples of 
policymaking involvement to advance its position. 
2.6.5 Power 
Power is defined as “the quantity of resources that a stakeholder has within his or 
her organization or area and the ability to mobilize those resources” (Schmeer, 1999, p. 
17?). Buse and colleagues (2012) explain that power is typically understood as operating 
in a relational sense, where one subject has influence or control over another.  For this 
project, power will be analyzed by assessing the amount of financial or organizational 
resources at a given stakeholder’s disposal which can be used to exert influence on the 
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policy agenda or other stakeholders. Different pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders will 
have varying amounts of power, and that will shape the DTCA policymaking agenda as 
each attempts to use that power to further its position on and interests in pharmaceutical 
DTCA. Understanding the relative power of these stakeholders is important to analyzing 
the stakeholder landscape for policy.  
To measure the power of stakeholders in the pharmaceutical DTCA environment, 
power was defined as the amount of resources at the stakeholder’s disposal in total by 
way of publicly available documents regarding finances or financial status) and compared 
to other pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders, and if an association has constituent 
members. The number of members was factored into coding as “organization capital”, as 
can be determined from the analysis of document text, website text, or the constituent 
composition of the organization. A stakeholder’s organizational capital is dependent not 
just on the number of constituent members but also the perceived size and power of those 
members. ‘Low’ implies that this stakeholder does not wield many financial resources or 
much organizational capital that can be applied to influence policy. ‘Medium’ implies 
that the analysis determined that the stakeholders had some financial resources or 
organizational capital with which to influence policy. ‘Large’ implies that the 
organization had a significant and obvious amount of financial resources or 
organizational capital that could be applied to influence pharmaceutical DTCA policy. 
2.6.6 Interests 
Identifying the interests of a stakeholder is instrumental in triangulating its 
influence. Interests are “what an actor or group stands to gain or lose from a policy 
change” (Buse et al., 2012, p. 213). Interests are distinct from position, as interests are 
derived only the potential for benefit or loss incurred from a policy, not the stance of the 
stakeholder in question on that specific policy. 
The interests of the stakeholder were identified in this study through answering 
one question, “what are the interests of the stakeholder” relative to pharmaceutical DTCA 
policy. The codes used for this criteria were: benefit, neutral, and loss. ‘Benefit’ means 
that the stakeholder benefits in a financial or influential capacity as a result of the current 
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pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. ‘Neutral’ means that the stakeholder does not gain or 
lose in financial or influential capacity as a result of the current regulations. ‘Loss’ means 
that the stakeholder loses in a financial or influential capacity as a result of the current 
regulations. 
2.6.7 Influence 
Stakeholder influence is considered to be the extent to which the views of a 
particular stakeholder are reflected in initiatives for change, in agenda setting, in the 
drafting of regulations and legislation, and in the major national forums (Varvasovsky, 
1998). For the purposes of this project, influence was the expression of a stakeholder’s 
position within the context of its interests, and through the application of its power. More 
succinctly, influence is the measure of a stakeholder’s perceived ability to impact 
regulatory and legal events regarding pharmaceutical DTCA, and the stakeholder’s desire 
to do so. Adapted definitions from Varvasovsky were used in this study (Varvasovsky, 
1998, p. 1821). Adapting Varvasovsky’s approach to Canadian pharmaceutical 
advertising policy, the criteria for measuring pharmaceutical advertising were: how much 
is the stakeholder ready to initiate changes toward more or less restrictive DTCA 
regulation; how much is the stakeholder able to assert its position on the national level; 
how much power does the stakeholder have on the outcome of a policy debate.  
Influence was measured by coding for two questions: How much is the 
stakeholder ready to initiate changes to more or less restrictive DTCA regulation (high, 
medium, or low readiness); how much is the stakeholder able to assert its position on the 
national level (high, medium, or little to none);  how much a stakeholder was ready to 
initiate change to more or less restrictive pharmaceutical DTCA regulation was measured 
by the amount of participation in pharmaceutical DTCA regulatory functions (whether 
that be PAAB, the Standing Committee, the Romanow Commission, or Health Canada 
advertising complaints). ‘Policy-making functions’ in this study refers to any event, 
report, commission, meeting, or similar policymaking event in which a stakeholder could 
participate. ‘Low’ readiness indicates that the stakeholder has participated few or no 
policymaking functions. ‘Medium’ readiness indicates the stakeholder participated in 
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some of the policymaking functions. ‘High’ readiness indicates that the stakeholder 
participated in most or all policymaking functions.  
How much a stakeholder is able to assert its position on the national level is coded 
by how many policymaking functions it is participating in and the number of resources at 
its disposal. ‘Little to none’ indicates a low amount of policymaking participation and 
low or medium resources. ‘Medium’ indicates some policymaking function participation 
and medium, low, or high resources. ‘Greatly’ indicates high policymaking function 
participation and high resources. 
2.6.8 Thematic Groupings  
In addition to coding documents as described in the previous section, some 
stakeholders were analyzed thematically.  The Standing Committee report included 127 
witnesses - both individuals and groups - who expressed interest in pharmaceutical 
policy. These witnesses were considered stakeholders, however, the Report covers a 
number of issues pertaining to pharmaceutical policy other than DTCA. The lack of 
information on witnesses’ intentions for involvement and the lack of evidence about 
which policy issues they were involved in means they could not be coded for position, 
power, interests, or influence. Instead, these witnesses represent the broad range of 
stakeholders that could potentially be involved in pharmaceutical DTCA; these 
stakeholders were thematically grouped to represent the different groupings, or 
“networks”, that could be involved in pharmaceutical DTCA. Thematic grouping was 
achieved by reviewing the ‘about’ page (or website equivalent) of each organization’s 
website for the organization’s mandate and purpose.  
2.7 Results 
The results of the analysis are presented as follows. A thematic grouping of the 
stakeholders identified in the Standing Committee Report is described (Table 2.3) 
followed by findings of the organizations represented more than once by the 
Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board (Table 2.4). Shared constituent members 
from associations found in the Romanow Commission Submissions and PAAB are 
displayed in Figure 2.1. The positions of stakeholders found in the Romanow 
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Commission Report and PAAB, and the strength of those positions are displayed in 
Figure 2.2 (additional details can be found in Appendices B and C), followed by the 
analysis of the power of those same stakeholders (Table 2.6), their interests (Table 2.7), 
and their influence on pharmaceutical DTCA policy (Tables 2.8 & 2.9).  
The 127 individuals and organizations listed in Opening the Medicine Cabinet: 
Standing Committee Report on Health (2004), were organized into 15 different 
“networks” of stakeholders (see again Table 2.3). The members of each network do not 
necessarily have the same positions, power, interests, and influence, but are similar types 
of organizations; they are the same in having in such common characteristics as similar 
mandate, similar functions, or similar purpose. For example, the Canadian Centre for 
Policy Alternatives and the Fraser Institute are both policy think tanks but hold to 
different political views and may have different positions on policy issues; they perform a 
similar function but would not be coded into the same network. These thematic groupings 
represent the various policy networks that are interested in the broader pharmaceutical 
policy environment, and within these networks are stakeholders with a specific interest in 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy.  
The analysis identified a broad range of stakeholders with an interest in 
pharmaceutical policy and that may be interested specifically in pharmaceutical DTCA, 
providing key insight on the types and number of stakeholders that may be involved in 
pharmaceutical DTCA.  Different thematic groupings of stakeholders have varying types 
and numbers of organizations. For example, ‘Health Interested Organizations’ is the 
largest grouping with 34 members. Universities/Academic Units, Unions, Research 
Groups and Think Tanks, Pharmacists, Other Health Industry, and Government all have 
between nine and fourteen members, suggesting considerable interest from a wide 
spectrum of different stakeholders and groups.   
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Table 2.3: Thematic Grouping of Stakeholders into Networks by Stakeholder Type 
from the Standing Committee on Health Report 
Network  Stakeholders Number of 
Stakeholders 
in Network 
Type 
Universities/Academic 
Units 
Centre for Health Services & Policy Research, 
University of British Columbia; Faculty of 
Pharmaceutical Sciences; University of British 
Columbia; University of British Columbia Therapeutics 
Initiative; Health Law Institute (University of Alberta); 
University of Ottawa; Centre for Emotions and Health, 
Dalhousie University; Dalhousie University; University 
of New Brunswick Faculty of Nursing; University of 
Quebec in Montreal 
10 
Government Patented Medicine Prices Review Board; Government 
of Saskatchewan; Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-
Term Care; Government of Manitoba; Vancouver 
Native Health Authority; Alberta Health and Wellness; 
North West territories Health and Social Services; 
Brunswick Department of Health and Wellness; Nova 
Scotia Department of Health 
9 
Research Groups and 
Think Tanks 
Institute of Health Economics; The Fraser Institute; 
Vancouver Coastal Health Research Institute; Canadian 
Centre for Policy Alternatives; Institute of Health 
Economics; Saskatchewan Drug Research Institute; 
Canadian Institute for Health Information; Canadian 
Coordinating Office for Health Technology; Atlantic 
Institute for Market Studies; Anemia Institute for 
Research and Education 
10 
Unions Canadian Union of Public Employees (Alberta 
Division); Saskatchewan Union of Nurses; Canadian 
Labour Congress; Canadian Union of Public 
Employees; Congress of Union Retirees of Canada; 
National Union of Public and General Employees; 
Canadian Auto Workers Union; United Steelworkers of 
America; Canadian Federation of Nurses Union 
9 
Health Interested 
Organizations 
Better Pharmacare Coalition; British Columbia Health 
Coalition; British Columbia Persons With Aids Society; 
Society for Diabetic Rights; All Nation Hope AIDS 
Network; Canadian Arthritis Patient Alliance; 
Community Health Services (Saskatoon Association); 
Saskatchewan Health Coalition; The Arthritis Society 
(Saskatchewan Division); Addictions Foundation of 
Manitoba; Manitoba Centre for Health Policy; Best 
Medicines Coalition; Womens Health Clinic; Council of 
Canadians; Canadian Health Coalition; Canadian 
Cancer Society (Nova Scotia Division); Canadian 
Mental Health Association; Nova Scotia Citizens Care 
Network; P.E.I Health Coalition and MacKillop Centre 
for Social Justice; New; Atlantic Centre of Excellence 
for Womens Health; Coalition of Physicians for Social 
Justice; Committee of People Living with HIV of 
Quebec; Women and Health Protection, Drug Safety 
Canada, Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada; Canadian 
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Network  Stakeholders Number of 
Stakeholders 
in Network 
Type 
Arthritis Network; Canadian Cystic Fibrosis 
Foundation; Canadian Diabetes Association; Canadian 
Network for Asthma Care; Canadian Treatment Action 
Council; Osteoporosis Society of Canada; Alliance for 
Access to Medical Information; Medical Reform Group 
Consumer 
Associations 
Downtown Eastside HIV/IDU Consumers' Board; 
Pharmawatch; Consumer's Association of Canada 
(Alberta); Union des consommateurs; Consumer 
Association of Canada 
5 
Pharmacists Representative Board of Saskatchewan Pharmacists; 
Saskatchewan College of Pharmacists; British Columbia 
Pharmacy Association; Alberta College of Pharmacists; 
Coalition for Manitoba Pharmacy; Manitoba Society of 
Pharmacists; Manitoba Pharmaceutical Association; 
New Brunswick Pharmacists Association, Ordres des 
Pharmaciens du Québec; Canadian International 
Pharmacy Association; Canadian Pharmacists 
Association; Canadian Pharmacists Association; Ontario 
College of Pharmacists; Ontario Pharmacists 
Association 
14 
HealthCare Workers Canadian Nurses Association; Fédération des 
infirmières et infirmiers du Québec; Canadian Medical 
Association; The Royal College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Canada 
4 
Brand Name 
Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
Kerbapharma Inc.; Biogen Canada; Genzyme Canada 
Inc.; BIOTECanada; Rx & D - Canada's Research 
Based Pharmaceutical Companies; Gilead Science Inc. 
6 
Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association 1 
‘Other’ Health 
Industry 
Market Media International Corp.; Canadian 
Association of Chain Drug Stores, Brogan Inc., Palmer 
D'Angelo Consulting Inc.; Le Groupe Jean Coutu (PJC) 
Inc.; Pharmex Direct Inc.; ESI Canada; Green Shield 
Canada; IMS Health, Montreal International 
11 
First Nations Groups Assembly of First Nations, Indian Council of First 
Nations of Manitoba; Native Council of Canada 
(Alberta) 
3 
Regulatory Groups Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board 1 
Aging Citizenry Council of Senior Citizens Organizations of British 
Columbia; Seniors' Action and Liaison Team; Canada's 
Association for the Fifty-Plus; Canadian Pensioners 
Concerned Inc.; Alliance of Seniors to protect Canada's 
Social Programs 
5 
Individuals John McConnell, John Bury; Kay Schwartzman; 
Michael Rachilis 
4 
Source: Standing Committee on Health (2004) 
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2.7.1 Stakeholder Networks  
PAAB is composed of a number of associations which are themselves networks of 
stakeholders (see Table 2.4). Some of these stakeholders are part of multiple networks 
which constitute the PAAB self-regulatory body. For example, Sanofi, a brand name 
pharmaceutical drug manufacturer, is a constituent of four different associations which 
are, in turn, members of PAAB. Stakeholders who are part of multiple PAAB 
associations may have more power and influence in regulatory decision making as they 
can access multiple networks in pursuit of their agendas. 
Table 2.4: Constituent Stakeholders Represented More Than Once by 
Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board Members 
Number of Times Represented by a PAAB 
Member 
Organization 
4 Sanofi  
3 Pfizer 
2 AstraZeneca, CMA, Pharmascience, Teva, 
Bayer, Boehringer Ingelheim, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson, Procter 
and Gamble, Bristol-Myers Squibb Canada 
Inc, Eli Lilly, Eisai Limited, Roche, Janssen 
Inc, Kalgene Pharma Inc, Merck, Novartis, 
Novo Nordisk, Proeocyte diagnostics, Purdue, 
Sunovian, Shire, Therapure.  
Source: Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board (2016) 
PAAB is composed of a number of associations which are themselves networks of 
stakeholders (see again Table 2.4). Some of these stakeholders are part of multiple 
networks which constitute the PAAB self-regulatory body. For example, Sanofi, a brand 
name pharmaceutical drug manufacturer, is a constituent of four different associations 
which are, in turn, members of PAAB. Stakeholders who are part of multiple PAAB 
associations may have more power and influence in regulatory decision making as they 
can access multiple networks in pursuit of their agendas. 
Of the 364 stakeholders identified in PAAB, 336 (92%) of the stakeholders were 
represented by one network. (See Appendix B for a full list of constituent members of 
PAAB associations.) There were 23 stakeholders represented by two networks, one 
stakeholder was represented by three networks, and one stakeholder was represented by 
four networks. Notably, of the 25 PAAB stakeholder constituent organizations 
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represented by more than one network, 20 are brand name pharmaceutical drug 
manufacturers, and 24 out of 25 are considered biotechnology companies. Pfizer and 
Sanofi, the only organizations to be represented by more than two networks, are 
international brand name pharmaceutical corporations operating in numerous countries. 
Brand name pharmaceutical corporations may have the most ability to further their 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy agendas or interests through their PAAB representatives as 
they have the multiple networks through which to exercise their influence through 
PAAB. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the connections between stakeholder associations, identified 
in PAAB and the Romanow Commission, and their constituent members. A number of 
associations or organizations may have multiple shared members with each other but 
none with others; for instance, BIOTECanada (depicted in the top-center region of the 
figure) shares three members with Consumer Health Products Canada (bottom-left), but 
none with the Canadian Health Coalition (top-center/right). By examining the prior 
mentioned organizations & associations we can note that Sanofi, Johnston & Johnston, & 
Pfizer have at least two means of advancing their interest or positions (through either 
BIOTECanada or Consumer Health Products Canada). Consumer Health Products 
Canada and BIOTECanada both support maintaining current pharmaceutical DTCA 
regulations while the Canadian Health Coalition supports more regulated pharmaceutical 
DTCA. 
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Figure 2.1: Shared Constituent Stakeholders Between Stakeholders in Romanow 
Commission Submissions & Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board 
Note: The names around the periphery of this diagram represent associations or 
organizations identified in PAAB and the Romanow Commission. Names positioned 
along the straight lines are members of both organizations on either end of the line.  
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2.7.2 Stakeholder Positions 
The analysis of stakeholders identified in the Romanow Commission submissions 
and PAAB members involved identifying and recording both the members’ positions 
with respect to the regulatory status of pharmaceutical DTCA, and the strength with 
which they held those positions. See Figure 2.2 below for details. Eight stakeholders, out 
of 22 (36%), occupied the “maintain current regulations” pharmaceutical DTCA policy 
position, five of whom held the position with “high strength”, one held the position with 
“medium strength”, and one held it with “low strength.” Nine stakeholders occupied a 
position supporting more regulation of pharmaceutical DTCA, six of which held that 
position with “high strength” and three held it with “medium strength”. Just one 
stakeholder, The Association of Medical Advertising Agencies, positioned itself in favour 
of less pharmaceutical DTCA regulation, and that position was held with “high strength”. 
CARP and the Best Medicines Coalition have no publicly available position on 
pharmaceutical DTCA regulation.    
Of note, most stakeholders occupy the “maintain current regulation” or “more 
regulated DTCA” position with medium or high strength, suggesting that there is little 
policy or political interest in changing the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. 
When examining these findings one should remember that the current regulations are 
quite prohibitive towards many forms of pharmaceutical DTCA, and that these 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy positions exist on a continuum of regulation ranging from 
“not regulated” to “prohibition”. The “maintain current regulations” position occupies a 
space on that continuum nearer to “prohibition” than “not regulated”, as does “more 
DTCA regulation”. In context, these findings infer that most stakeholders favor a 
regulated pharmaceutical DTCA space, and that deregulation is not a popular policy 
position amongst stakeholders. 
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Figure 2.2: Stakeholders DTCA Positions & Strengths of those positions from 
Romanow Commission Submissions & Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board 
Notes:  High = a strong statement on DTCA policy and policymaking actions that further 
their position. Medium = strength suggests either a strong statement on DTCA policy or 
policymaking involvement to advance their position. Low = A weak policy statement 
with respect to their position or that the position had to be inferred, and that there was 
few or no policymaking involvement to advance their position. See Appendix D for 
background information to this diagram represented in a table. 
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2.7.3 Stakeholder Power  
As shown in Table 2.5, from the 22 stakeholders identified from PAAB and the 
Romanow Commission submissions, 17 or 77%, were categorized as “medium” or “low” 
power, with eight (36%) of these stakeholder groups coded as “medium” and nine (41%) 
coded as “low.”   A smaller number of stakeholders, five (23%), were categorized as 
“high” power. 
Table 2.5: Stakeholder Power (Resources) – Romanow Commission Submissions & 
Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board 
High Medium  Low 
• BIOTECanada 
• Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Association 
• Innovative Medicines 
Canada 
• New Democratic Party  
• Canadian Drug 
Manufacturers 
Association  
 
• The Association of 
Faculties of Medicine of 
Canada 
• Canadian Medical 
Association  
• Canadian Pharmacists 
Association 
• Consumer Health 
Products Canada 
• Canadian Association of 
Retired Persons 
• Canadian Health 
Coalition  
• Canadian Labour 
Congress 
• British Columbia 
Nurses Union 
 
• The Association of 
Medical Advertising 
Agencies  
• Canadian 
Association of 
Medical Publishers 
• Best Medicines 
Coalition 
• Federation des 
medecines 
omipracticiens du 
Quebec  
• Canadian 
Autoworkers Union 
• Ottawa Health 
Coalition Canadian  
• Prince Edward 
Island Health 
Coalition 
• Dr. John Bury 
(individual) 
• Women's Health 
Network 
 
Notes: High = significant and obvious amounts of financial resources or organizational 
capital. Medium = Some financial resources or organizational capital. Low = very little 
financial resources or organizational capital 
 
All the high power stakeholders, with the notable exception of the New 
Democratic Party, are pharmaceutical manufacturers associations, and all the high power 
stakeholders have considerable financial resources. The New Democratic Party is one of 
three major federal political parties and, as such, has considerable policymaking ability, 
including the power to advocate for particular issues directly from within Parliament, 
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participating in Parliamentary committee activities (including policy development), and 
supporting and voting on potential legislation. Notably, medium power stakeholders are 
mainly prominent health professional organizations with a mandate to advocate for 
health-related issues and also include an association of medical school faculties that 
produces evidence, the Consumer Health Products Association, and a national healthcare 
lobbying association – all of these organizations have a distinct interest in advancing 
patient or population health. Low power stakeholders are mainly cause or sectional 
groups which are advancing a specific issues. For example, the Association of Medical 
Advertising Agencies, in this low power group, is a single advertising agency which 
holds a membership position at PAAB and may be advancing its own interests in 
pharmaceutical advertising.  
When the power and position of PAAB and Romanow Commission stakeholders 
are considered together there is a concentration of high power stakeholders focused 
towards one position, maintaining the current pharmaceutical DCTA regulations, with no 
high power stakeholders supporting either a more regulated or less regulated position. 
See Figure 2.3 for details.  Four stakeholders are medium power and support maintaining 
the current regulations, while five medium stakeholders support more regulated 
pharmaceutical DTCA. Four low power stakeholders support more regulated 
pharmaceutical DTCA, one supports less regulated pharmaceutical DTCA, and one 
supports maintaining the current regulations. Most of the collective power in this Figure 
is concentrated on the ‘maintain current regulations’ position, suggesting that this policy 
might have the most support in future policy discussions. 
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Figure 2.3: Power and Position of Stakeholders in Romanow Commission 
Submissions & Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board 
Note: The diagram is divided into a number of quadrants, each represented a different 
position and power combinations. Stakeholders in the same quadrant share the same 
position and power.  
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2.7.4 Stakeholder Interests  
Interests were identified based on whether the stakeholders benefit from the 
current regulations, experience loss from the current regulations, or are neutral to the 
current pharmaceutical DTCA regulatory scheme. Whether the stakeholder experienced 
benefit, loss, or neutrality was decided based on finances, power, influence, or any other 
form of capital. Furthermore, if stakeholders had competing interests they were coded as 
“neutral” as were stakeholders who had nothing to gain or lose or were indifferent to the 
current regulations. See Table 2.6 for details. 
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Table 2.6: Interests – Stakeholders identified from Romanow Commission 
Submissions & Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board 
Benefit  Neutral  Loss 
▪ Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Association 
▪ Canadian Drug 
Manufacturers 
Association 
▪ Innovative Medicines 
Canada 
▪ BIOTECanada 
▪ The Association of 
Faculties of Medicine 
of Canada,  
▪ The Association of 
Medical Advertising 
Agencies,  
▪ Best Medicines 
Coalition 
▪ Canadian Association 
of Medical Publishers 
▪ Canadian Association 
of Retired Persons 
Consumer Council of 
Canada Federation des 
medecines 
omipracticiens du 
Quebec 
▪ Canadian Health 
Coalition 
▪ New Democratic Party 
▪ Ottawa Health Coalition 
▪ Canadian Women's 
Health Network 
▪ Prince Edward Island 
Health Coalition 
▪ British Columbia 
Nurses Union 
▪ John Bury 
▪ Canadian Autoworkers 
Union 
▪ Canadian Labour 
Congress 
▪ Canadian Medical 
Association 
▪ Canadian 
Pharmacists 
Association 
▪ Consumer Health 
Products Canada 
▪ Consumer 
Healthcare 
Providers 
Notes: Romanow Submissions refers to submissions to the Commission on the Future of 
Healthcare in Canada during an open call for papers. PAAB refers to the Pharmaceutical 
Advertising Advisory Board. Benefit = stakeholder benefits in a financial or influential 
capacity as a result of the current regulations. Neutral = stakeholder does not gain or lose 
in a financial or influential capacity as a result of regulations. Loss = stakeholder losses in 
a financial or influential capacity as a result of the current regulations 
Most stakeholders from PAAB and the Romanow Commission submissions have 
“neutral” interests with respect to the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations: 14 out 
of 22 (64%) stakeholder groups are coded as having “neutral” interests, four stakeholder 
groups were coded as experiencing “benefit” from current regulations, and four 
stakeholder groups were coded as “loss” from current regulations.  Most stakeholders 
have interests that do not conflict with, but do not necessarily benefit from, the current 
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pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. Although advertising is still partly restricted, brand 
name pharmaceutical manufacturers may benefit from the current regulations because the 
current regulations do not adequately address cross-border advertising from the United 
States and online advertising. Pharmaceutical drug manufacturers may benefit from some 
built-in flexibility in the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations themselves, such as 
allowing reminder ads and help seeking ads, and a reliance on industry self-regulation 
such as PAAB for industry-led pre-clearance services for pharmaceutical ads. A re-
opened policy conversation about pharmaceutical DTCA advertising may lead to more 
regulated DTCA, which is why brand name pharmaceutical companies may not be 
interested in attempting to change the current regulations. The groups that may 
experience loss from the current DTCA regulations are medical professional associations 
which have to contend with the influence of medical advertising on their members’ 
relationships with patients, and consumer health associations which are concerned about 
the impact of the advertising of pharmaceuticals on the public. In general, stakeholders 
may not attempt to prompt pharmaceutical DTCA regulatory change if they are either 
neutral in respect of or benefit from the regulations, as the majority of stakeholders in 
these findings are.  
2.7.5 Stakeholder Influence  
Findings from the analysis of PAAB and Romanow Commission stakeholders’ 
influence, as measured by the stakeholder’s readiness to initiate policy change, suggest 
that most stakeholders (10 out of 22; 45%) had “medium” influence; that is, they 
participated in some policy functions.  A smaller number of stakeholders, six (27%), were 
categorized as “low” influence, and participated in few or no policymaking functions (see 
Table 2.7). 
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Table 2.7: Influence (readiness to initiate changes in DTCA regulation) – Romanow 
Commission Submissions and Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board 
Low  Medium High 
• The Association of 
Medical Advertising 
Agencies 
• Canadian Association 
of Medical Publishers 
• Federation des 
medecines 
omipracticiens du 
Quebec 
• New Democratic 
Party 
• Prince Edward Island 
Health Coalition 
• John Bury* 
 
 
• The Association of 
Faculties of Medicine 
of Canada 
• Canadian Medical 
Association 
• Canadian Pharmacists 
Association 
• Best Medicines 
Coalition 
• Consumer Health 
Products Canada 
• Canadian Association 
of Retired Persons 
• Consumer Council of 
Canada 
• Canadian Labour 
Congress 
• Canadian Autoworkers 
Union 
• Canadian Women's 
Health Network 
• British Columbia 
Nurses Union 
• BIOTECanada 
• Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Association 
• Innovative Medicines 
Canada 
• Canadian Health 
Coalition 
• Ottawa Health Coalition 
• Canadian Drug 
Manufacturers 
Association. 
Notes: High - stakeholder participated in most or all policymaking functions. Medium - 
readiness infers the stakeholder participated in some of the policymaking functions. Low 
- readiness infers that the stakeholder has participated few or no policymaking functions. 
*John Bury is an individual citizen who made a submission to the Romanow 
Commission. 
 
Finally, six stakeholders (26%) were categorized as “high” influence, and were 
found participating in all or most policymaking functions identified in this study. The 
high influence (readiness) stakeholders are ablest to initiate policy change if necessary, as 
they are positioned to do so through their policymaking functions. High influence 
(readiness) stakeholders were the pharmaceutical manufacturers and health lobbying 
bodies, medium influence (readiness) stakeholders were mainly health interested 
associations and unions, and low influence (readiness) stakeholders were groups that 
were either less focused on heath itself (e.g. New Democratic Party), or not participating 
in policymaking functions (e.g. Canadian Association of Medical Publishers). See Table 
2.8 for details.  
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Analyzing for influence on pharmaceutical DTCA policy, as measured by a 
stakeholder’s ability to assert its position on pharmaceutical DTCA at the national level, 
most stakeholders (12 out of 22; 55%) from PAAB and the Romanow Commission 
largely occupied the “medium” influence category. There were four (18%) stakeholder 
associations coded as “little to none” influence on pharmaceutical DTCA policy and six 
(27%) stakeholders were coded as “High” influence. Resources, and therefore power, was 
a consideration in analyzing stakeholders for their ability to influence pharmaceutical 
DTCA policy. Findings suggest that high power stakeholder groups were generally 
aligned with high influence groups (e.g. BIOTECanada), and medium power stakeholder 
groups with medium influence groups (e.g. Best Medicine Coalition). However, these 
findings do not necessarily mean they will choose to use that influence to affect policy. 
Notably, the New Democratic Party has high power and high influence, but low readiness 
to initiate policy change. 
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Table 2.8: Influence (Able to assert position on a national level) – PAAB and 
Romanow Commission Submissions  
Little to none Medium High 
▪ Ottawa Health 
Coalition 
▪ Prince Edward 
Island Health 
Coalition 
▪ Canadian 
Association of 
Medical Publishers 
▪ Best Medicines 
Coalition 
 
▪ Canadian Labour 
Congress 
▪ Canadian Autoworkers 
Union 
▪ Canadian Women’s 
Health Network 
▪ British Columbia 
Nurses Union 
▪ John Bury 
▪ The Association of 
Faculties of Medicine 
of Canada 
▪ The Association of 
Medical Advertising 
Agencies 
▪ Canadian Medical 
Association 
▪ Canadian Pharmacists 
Association 
▪ Consumer Health 
Products Canada 
▪ Canadian Association 
of Retired Persons 
▪ Consumer Council of 
Canada 
▪ Canadian Health 
Coalition 
▪ New Democratic Party 
▪ Canadian Drug 
Manufacturers 
Association 
▪ BIOTECanada 
▪ Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Association 
▪ Innovative Medicines 
Canada 
 
Notes: High – high policymaking function participation and high resources. Medium – 
some policymaking function participation and medium, low, or high resources. Little to 
none – low amount of policymaking participation and low or medium resources 
2.8 Discussion 
The pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment has a number of stakeholders of 
varying power and influence participating in the policy environment. The roles of these 
stakeholders in pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking can be understood in a number of 
ways such as in terms of their position, power, interests, or influence.  The aim of this 
stakeholder analysis was to identify and conduct an analysis of the stakeholders relevant 
to pharmaceutical DTCA in terms of their position, power, interests, and influence to 
impact future policy and legal proceedings pertaining to pharmaceutical advertising. 
Findings from this analysis suggest the following:  
1) There is a wide-range of stakeholders from varying backgrounds in the 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment; 
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2) Many stakeholders are part of policy networks; 
3) Stakeholders have varying positions, interests, and influence; and  
4) There is a concentration of powerful stakeholders interested in maintaining 
current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations.  
Discussion of these key findings follow.  
2.8.1 Range and Number of Stakeholders  
A wide range of stakeholders from varying backgrounds were identified in this 
study. A thematic analysis of the stakeholders found in the Standing Committee on 
Health Report (2004) yielded 127 different individuals and organizations potentially 
operating in the pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment. Those individuals and 
organizations were thematically grouped into 15 different categories of stakeholders. The 
stakeholders in each category may share interests or positions but are not necessarily part 
of the same policy networks.  
In similar work, Robert Alford, in the 1960s and 1970s, identified three structural 
interest groups in health care politics: professional monopolists, the corporate 
rationalizers, and, thirdly (considered as one group), the equal health advocates and 
community health advocates (Alford, 1975). Buse and colleagues (2012) described the 
‘professional monopolists’ conceptualized by Alford (1975) as “the doctors and to a 
lesser extent the other health professionals whose dominant interests are served by the 
existing economic, social and political structures of government and the health system” 
(Buse et al. p.120). Corporate rationalizers often challenge the professional monopolists, 
are interested in modern management methods and healthcare delivery, often in search of 
cost-savings or additional revenues. Examples of such groups are private insurers, 
commercial hospital chains, employers who want to lower the cost of insuring employees 
(Alford, 1975). The third and final group are the ‘equal health advocates’ and 
‘community health advocates’ who are described as sectional and interest groups 
interested in access to healthcare, equal rights and patient rights, attention to the views of 
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patients in population healthcare, and other public health issues. They may often act in an 
activist or advocate capacity (Alford, 1975).  
There is overlap between Alford’s three structural interest groups and the 
stakeholders identified in this study, despite the 42 years separating the studies. The 
thematic category of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders named ‘Health Care Workers’ 
and ‘Pharmacists’ aligns with Alford’s ‘professional monopolists’. The groups identified 
in this study as ‘Other Healthcare Industry’, ‘Generic Pharmaceutical Industry’, ‘Brand 
Name Pharmaceutical Industry’, and ‘Government’ align with the Alford’s ‘Corporate 
Rationalizers’. Finally, the ‘Health Interests Organizations’, and ‘First Nations Groups’ 
in this study are consistent with Alford’s ‘equal health advocates’ and ‘community health 
advocates’.  
However, not all the thematic categories in this study can be neatly described as 
falling into one of Alford’s three structural interest groups (1975). Those categories that 
do not appear to fit into Alford’s groups are: ‘Universities/Academic Units’, ‘Unions’, 
‘Research Groups & Think Tanks’, ‘Aging Citizenry’, ‘Consumer Associations’, and 
‘Regulatory Groups’. This study identified additional groups which do not fit Alford’s 
structural interest groups, and provides more detailed description of stakeholders in the 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment. The stakeholders identified here are those 
whose interests and positions are specific to pharmaceutical DTCA (yet within the 
environment of healthcare politics). 
The identification of a wide range of stakeholders represents a broader and more 
nuanced view of the pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment than has been found in 
previous studies. For example, Roberts (2011) similarly to Alford identified three broad 
categories of stakeholders (referred to as “stakeholder groups”): Industry (representing 
pharmaceuticals), General Practitioners (representing physicians), and the Public 
(representing citizenry). This grouping of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders is very 
similar to the structural interest groups identified by Alford (1975) by way of identifying 
three broad categories of stakeholders. Roberts (2011) did not analyze the specific 
stakeholders within each of his three categories, did not provide a more in-depth 
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understanding of the different positions and interests held by stakeholders in each 
category, and did not sufficiently capture the entire range of stakeholders that have been 
identified in this study to have an interest in pharmaceutical DTCA policy. The present 
study provides a richer and more detailed understanding of the stakeholder groups 
operating in the pharmaceutical DTCA policy area than could be gleaned through 
Roberts’ approach.  
In Matear & Dacin’s study of the American pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders 
they identified five stakeholder groups: 1) consumers, 2) physicians, 3) insurance 
companies and formularies, 4) pharmacists, and 5) the government. Their findings are 
more nuanced than those of Roberts (2011), however they still do not capture the full 
field of stakeholder categories identified in this study, and, like Roberts, do not name the 
specific organizations that would be grouped into each of their categories. One important 
difference in our study is that insurance companies were not found to be a prominent 
group. This may be explained by the differences in American and Canadian healthcare 
systems and funding models, since private insurance companies play a larger role in the 
United States than they do in Canada (where government funded healthcare forms that 
largest part of the healthcare landscape) (Hacker, 1998).  
While both Roberts (2011) and Matear and Dacin (2010) identified broad 
categories of stakeholders or policy networks in their studies of the Canadian and the 
American pharmaceutical DTCA, respectively, our work on pharmaceutical DTCA 
identified more categories and provides details about the specific individuals and 
organizations within these policy groupings. The significance of this finding is that the 
breadth of organizations and individuals with policy interests in Canadian pharmaceutical 
DTCA is larger than the breadth of players reported in those previous studies.  
2.8.2 Policy Networks  
This study also mapped the connections between various stakeholders and how 
they may be connected through shared membership in various networks. PAAB, the 
preclearance agency identified in Roberts (2006), is both an important regulatory 
organization and represents a network of stakeholders with competing positions and 
54 
 
interests in pharmaceutical advertising. The Romanow Commission (Commission on the 
Future of Healthcare in Canada, 2002) was also an important policy event which involved 
a number of stakeholders. A number of members of PAAB and witnesses to the 
Romanow Commission are themselves associations with constituent organizations or 
memberships which they have a mandate to represent. The power, positions, influence, 
and interests of those constituents and members inform the position of each association 
that is part of the PAAB network or made submissions to the Romanow Commission. A 
number of these associations shared constituents or members, and those shared 
constituents had more avenues through which they could advance their agendas. For 
example, Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company, is a member of four associations in PAAB, 
and can work through any of those associations to advance their pharmaceutical DTCA 
agenda. The findings suggest that the associations in PAAB and those making 
submissions to the Romanow Commission are best understood as sectional groups, which 
seek to advance the positions and interests of their memberships. The most powerful and 
influential of these sectional groups have been effective in leveraging their networks to 
support their positions and interests, which has been found in this study to be to maintain 
the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations.  
2.8.3 Positions, Interests, and Influence  
Another finding of this study is that the Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA 
policymaking environment consists of numerous stakeholders and networks who hold 
positions on DTCA regulation that exist on a continuum ranging from no pharmaceutical 
DTCA regulation to completely prohibiting pharmaceutical DTCA. The stakeholders 
identified in this studied can be grouped into three broad positions on pharmaceutical 
DTCA policy (less pharmaceutical DTCA regulation, maintain current regulations, more 
pharmaceutical DTCA regulation). The stakeholders also pursue various interests (with 
respect to whether the current regulations cause benefit or loss to the stakeholder, or 
whether they are neutral), which informs their positions and how they choose apply their 
power and influence. For example, a brand name pharmaceutical company may want to 
maintain the current regulations so that a new pharmaceutical DTCA policy debate 
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doesn’t open and potentially develop into a more regulated (and unfavourable, for this 
brand-name company) policy environment.  
Stakeholders positions on pharmaceutical DTCA policy were focused mainly of 
one of two positions: to either maintain current DTCA regulations, or support more 
regulated pharmaceutical DTCA. Only the Association of Medical Advertising Agencies 
supported less regulated pharmaceutical DTCA. Eight stakeholders supported 
maintaining the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations, and nine stakeholders 
supported more regulated pharmaceutical DTCA. These two positions are directions that 
can be expected to be pursued by stakeholders if pharmaceutical DTCA policy changes 
were to made in the future, it is unlikely that many stakeholders would pursue less 
regulation. 
Most stakeholders, 14 of the 22 (64%), have “neutral” interests in regards to the 
current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations, just four experience benefit, and four 
experience loss from the current regulations. This may help explain why there is a 
clustering of support on maintaining current regulations, but does not explain why a 
number stakeholders support more pharmaceutical DTCA regulation. One possibility is 
that the mandate of the organization (such as a union) supporting more regulation may 
encourage them to support more regulation, even if the organization itself does not 
benefit directly.  
Stakeholder power is usually indicative of the stakeholder’s influence, for 
example Innovative Medicines Canada is a ‘high power’ stakeholder and has a ‘high’ 
ability to assert their position on a national level. However, there are some exceptions. 
For example, the Canadian Health Coalition is a ‘medium power’ stakeholder with a 
‘high’ ability to assert themselves on a national level. For both categories of influence 
(Readiness to initiate change in DTCA regulation, and ability to assert position on a 
national level) most stakeholders had “medium” influence, suggesting that most 
stakeholders alone cannot significantly change the pharmaceutical DTCA policy. Those 
stakeholders “medium power” stakeholders are health professional organizations, unions, 
and health interested stakeholders.  
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By developing a more nuanced understanding of the positions, power, interests, 
and influence of the stakeholders, and therefore the capabilities of each stakeholder and 
how they may choose to apply themselves, our understanding pharmaceutical DTCA 
policy has been enhanced. This stakeholder analysis suggests that the majority of high 
power and high influence stakeholders tend to support the position to maintain current 
DTCA regulation; this finding suggests that there may not be a desire to modify current 
regulations in the near future. Typically, policy change is triggered by a “problem” or 
influenced by stakeholders to get an issue on government’s agenda (Buse et al., 2012). 
Our study findings suggest that there is little desire by stakeholders for government to act 
on DTCA policy at this time. 
2.8.4 Power, Stakeholders, and Maintaining the Status Quo 
A focus of this study has been to understand how power is held and potentially 
exercised by pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders in Canada. Power can be distributed in 
a number of ways: two dominant theories of power distribution in policy-making are 
pluralism and elitism (Buse, Mays, Walt, 2012). Pluralism is the belief that power to 
influence and shape policy should be distributed amongst numerous stakeholders. These 
numerous stakeholders then engage in communication and bargaining to protect and 
further their interests, and influence policy. The contrasting theory to pluralism is elitism, 
which contends that power is centralized on a powerful minority of stakeholders who 
influence policy (Buse, Mays, & Walt, 2012). Understanding DTCA policy through the 
lens of pluralism or elitism can inform our understanding of pharmaceutical DTCA 
stakeholders, and which stakeholders have the most power or influence in shaping and 
advancing pharmaceutical DTCA policy. Findings from this stakeholder analysis suggest 
that there are a broad range of stakeholders – both individuals and organizations - 
participating in the pharmaceutical DTCA policy arena; this is consistent with pluralism. 
A number of stakeholder groups have formed coalitions or utilize networks to better 
communicate their positions and interests on DTCA policy.  However, there were a few 
“high power” stakeholders, predominantly associated with the pharmaceutical industry, 
exercising their position and influence to protect their interests; this is more consistent 
with elitism.  Findings from the analysis suggest that power in the pharmaceutical DTCA 
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policy arena aligns with a mixed pluralism and elitism approach (Buse et al., 2012). 
Power exercised by stakeholders in future pharmaceutical DTCA policy may continue to 
mirror this hybrid of a broad range of stakeholders along with influence from the elites, 
the pharmaceutical industry.  
Those elites, mainly the pharmaceutical industry, have the highest concentration 
of power and currently wish to maintain the current Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA 
regulations. While stakeholders were split in their positions on whether to maintain 
current regulations or increase regulation of pharmaceutical DTCA, all the high power 
stakeholders (e.g, Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association) and 40% of medium-
power stakeholders (e.g, Canadian Association of Medical Publishers) favoured 
maintaining the status quo. Because of the power held by these stakeholders it is likely 
that they would be able to influence policymakers to maintain the current pharmaceutical 
DTCA regulations. The stakeholders whose position is to maintain the current regulations 
(the most powerful grouping of stakeholders) may not agree with the recommendations of 
the former Health Council of Canada, (Health Council of Canada, 2006) or the Standing 
Committee on Health (Standing Committee on Health, 2004), which both called for more 
regulated pharmaceutical DTCA. This may explain why there has been no 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy change since the time these reports were released. 
The majority of low power stakeholders (e.g. Canadian Women’s Health 
Network) and 50% of medium-power stakeholders (e.g. Canadian Medical Association) 
favoured increasing regulation, they may be less powerful and may be less able to 
influence future pharmaceutical DTCA policy. Although equal numbers of stakeholders 
in our study supported increased regulation of pharmaceutical DTCA as supported 
maintaining the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations, it is the stakeholders 
supporting the status quo who are likely more powerful. The diversity of stakeholders 
identified in this analysis suggests a more pluralistic approach to power and 
pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking in Canada. In this case, the pharmaceutical DTCA 
stakeholders have formed formal and informal networks that are able to share views and 
attempt to influence government (as evidenced by submissions to the Senate Standing 
Committee and Romanow Commissions). While the stakeholder analysis did identify a 
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few powerful “elites” (high power and high influence stakeholders), their impact on 
DTCA was either limited or they contributed to current DTCA policy environment 
standstill, which is consistent with their position on pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. 
Findings from this study also suggest there are networks where low-power stakeholders 
(e.g. Canadian Women’s Health Network) may join to network with higher power 
stakeholders (e.g. such as PAAB) to enhance their own power to further their positions 
and interests. 
2.9 Conclusion  
The important contributions of this work are a more detailed and granular 
description of specific Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders than provided in 
previous research, which has tended to describe stakeholders in a limited number of 
broad categories. The mapping of the thematic groupings of stakeholders and the 
networks of stakeholders contributes to our understanding of which stakeholders may 
advance their interests and positions, and the influence they have in pharmaceutical 
DTCA policymaking. Finally, when assessing the power of stakeholders, and analyzing 
that power against their interests and positions, it is clear that the most power is 
concentrated on maintaining the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations in Canada. 
These findings may help explain the current pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment 
and how stakeholders will position themselves in future pharmaceutical DTCA 
policymaking. 
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3 Chapter Three: Analysis of Supreme Court Interveners 
3.1 Litigation Related to Questions Involved in 
Pharmaceutical Advertising 
3.1.1 Background on Pharmaceutical Advertising Regulation 
Recall that research question #1, explored in Chapter 2, was:  
Given that there is a literature gap on Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA 
stakeholders, what can be learned about these stakeholders? The subsidiary 
questions in Chapter 1 were:  
1) Who are the direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising 
stakeholders in the Canadian policy environment, and what are their 
interests, positions, power, and influence?  
2) What is the potential for these stakeholders to shape future 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy? 
This chapter continues the analysis of the pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment by 
employing a narrower analysis of legal pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders. This chapter 
focuses on answering research question #2:  
Given the relatively recent rise of interveners in the Supreme Court of Canada 
processes and the presence of interveners in the landmark 2001 tobacco 
advertising case in the Supreme Court of Canada, RJR-MacDonald v Canada 
(1995), are the stakeholders identified in the response to Research Question #1 
found as interveners in current pharmaceutical-related Supreme Court litigation? 
From the answer to this question there arises two subsidiary questions:  
1) If there are interveners present in pharmaceutical patent litigation before 
the Supreme Court, what are the interests, positions, and influence in the 
broader policy environment; 
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2) If the RJR-MacDonald interveners are present, which stakeholders are 
they and to what extent are they intervening?  
As discussed earlier, pharmaceutical advertising is a core function of 
pharmaceutical companies that intend to take their developed drugs to market, and an 
important source of income for companies whose business model is dependent on 
advertising revenues. Despite the perceived necessity of pharmaceutical advertising for 
these companies, there is debate about the impacts of the practice. Mounting concern 
about the ways advertising may alter pharmaceutical prescribing behavior by physicians 
(Health Council of Canada, 2006), may misconstrue or exaggerate effects of the drugs, 
and may contribute to increasing healthcare costs (Vakratsas, 2014) is prompting a 
conversation about legislative and regulatory action to limit this form of advertising. 
Most developed countries have decided to either comprehensively or partially ban direct-
to-consumer advertising (DTCA), leaving only the United States and New Zealand with a 
far less regulated pharmaceutical advertising environment (Mintzes, 2005).  
Pharmaceutical advertising in Canada is subject to the regulations under the Food 
and Drugs Act (RSC 1985, c. F-27, s 30). The specific parts of the Act which regulate 
pharmaceutical advertising are: 
• Section 3(1), prohibiting consumer-directed advertisements for health products 
that make claims to treat, prevent, or cure any diseases listed in Schedule A to the 
Act; 
• Section 9(1), prohibiting false, misleading, deceptive or erroneous advertising of 
products; 
• Section 20(1), stating that no person shall label, package, treat, process, sell, or 
advertise any device in a manner that is false, misleading, or deceptive or is likely 
to create an erroneous impression regarding its design, performance, intended use, 
quantity, character, value, composition, merit or safety.  
Pursuant to the Food and Drugs Act, the Food and Drug Regulations 
(Consolidated Regulations of Canada [CRC], c 87) have been enacted. Within these 
regulations, two sections of the Regulations, s C.01.044 and s C.08.002 (1), are 
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particularly relevant to this research. Section C.01.044 prohibits consumer directed 
prescription advertising beyond the drugs name, price, and quantity: 
If a person advertises a prescription drug to the general public, the person shall 
not make any representation other than with respect to the brand name, the proper 
name, the common name and the price and quantity of the drug. 
Section C.08.002 (1) prohibits the advertising of new drugs that have not been approved 
for sale by Health Canada. (Note that “person” in the context of these laws and 
regulations includes both individuals and corporations.) 
There are two specific types of DTCA that do not violate the Food and Drugs Act 
or regulations: “help-seeking ads” and “reminder ads” (Health Council of Canada, 2006). 
A help seeking ad is defined as: “announcements that ask patients among the general 
public having a particular medical disorder or experience a given set of symptoms to 
consult a physician for discussion of treatment, or to call a 1-800 telephone number for 
further information” (Government of Canada, 1996, p. v). Help seeking ads may be 
considered non-promotional if a number of specific criteria are met: no specific drug is 
identified, there is no implication that a drug is the sole treatment available for the disease 
or condition, and no drug manufacturer’s name is mentioned. “Reminder ads” feature the 
brand name product but not the condition or treatment, and are less common 
(Government of Canada, 1996, p.v). 
Canada once was perceived to have a more heavily regulated pharmaceutical 
advertising environment. However, Health Canada, the Ministry responsible for this area 
of federal government activity, modified its own interpretation of the Food and Drugs 
Act and Food and Drug Regulations in 1996, and again in 2000 (Government of Canada, 
1996; Government of Canada, 2000). Under this most recent interpretation by Health 
Canada, the new regulatory environment can best be described as partial prohibition.1  
                                                 
1 Health Canada’s interpretation of the Food and Drugs Act provides guidance for pharmaceutical 
advertisers but is not law itself.  
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Although there has been no legislative or regulatory change in Canada, and 
Health Canada made public their policy statements on advertising in 2000, there has been 
a pervasive advance of advertising in the online sphere, and the increasing presence of 
cross-border American advertisements in Canada. This has effectively created a scenario 
where pharmaceutical advertising in Canada is, in effect, less2 regulated than it was in the 
past (since these new forms of advertising distribution (online and cross-border) remain 
to be addressed by updated regulations and regulatory enforcement mechanisms). This 
situation has not gone unnoticed by government: in 2004 the House of Commons created 
a Standing Committee on Health (Government of Canada, Parliament, 2004), and, 
separately, in 2006 the Health Council of Canada3 produced a report on direct-to-
consumer advertising of prescriptions drugs in Canada which drew heavily on the report 
by the Standing Committee on Health (Canada, Parliament 2004). Both the Standing 
Committee on Health and the Health Council of Canada independently produced 
recommendations to strengthen the regulations on pharmaceutical advertising 
(Government of Canada, Parliament, 2004, p 13; Health Council of Canada, 2006, p 11).  
In the patent area, the pharmaceutical industry which are invested in DTCA are still 
active but the brand and generic pharmaceutical companies are clearly divided (See Table 
3.1). The pharmaceutical industry can be grouped into two different factions: The 
“brand” name pharmaceutical industry and the “generic” pharmaceutical industry. The 
primary difference between them is that the “brand” industry is more often involved in 
the development of new pharmaceutical drugs. “Generic” pharmaceutical players will not 
usually develop a drug but will “copy” a brand-name drug after its patent expires, when 
                                                 
2 An important distinction should be made between ‘less regulated’ and ‘deregulated’. ‘Less 
regulated’ is a more apt description of the Canadian pharmaceutical advertising environment 
because although Parliament and Health Canada have failed to address new forms of 
pharmaceutical adverting distribution, the Act and Regulations have not been modified to create a 
friendlier advertising environment (which would constitute a ‘deregulation’ consistent with free-
market principles). In short, a legislative action would be required to ‘deregulate’, and none has 
been taken since the re-interpretation of the Act and Regulations by Health Canada in 2000.  
3 The Health Council of Canada (2003-2014) was a federal council formerly mandated to monitor 
the progress of health care renewal in Canada as outlined in the 2003 Health Accord, Romanow 
Commission. 
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the brand company loses market exclusivity, and the “generic” can begin to distribute its 
“copy” free from patent infringement concerns. 
Table 3.1: Pharmaceutical Companies at the Court as Parties to Pharmaceutical 
Litigation 
Number of 
Appearances 
Pharmaceutical Company 
Brand Generic 
1 Pfizer, Merck, AstroZeneca, 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Celgene 
Teva, Nu-Pharm, Biolyse 
2 Sanofi-Aventis/Synthelabo, 
GlaxoKlineSmith 
NA 
3 NA NA 
4 NA Apotex 
Source: Reviewing the decisions to identify litigants. 
3.1.2 Background on the Supreme Court of Canada its Processes 
Recognizing the Supreme Court’s own policy-making potential, the Supreme 
Court Rules (Rules of the Supreme Court, SOR/2002-156) provide for applications to 
intervene. This is a process through which an applicant can apply to join ongoing 
litigation in order to express its arguments, positions, and relevance to the questions and 
issues in the legal proceedings (Rules of the Supreme Court, ss 55-57). Intervening is a 
relatively new phenomenon in Canada: traditionally in Canada it is only the parties 
involved in litigation who participate4. The tradition of intervening is common in 
American legal proceedings (Kearney & Merrill, 2000, p. 756.). 
The introduction of interveners into the Canadian judicial process creates another 
venue in which stakeholders may influence policymaking. Canada’s Constitution Act 
1867 divides power between the courts and the legislatures, keeping them independent, 
each having the ability to act as a “check” on the other if it was ever to exceed its 
constitutional powers (Waddams, 2010). Given the independence of the judiciary, it may 
be of concern if certain stakeholders who have had policy-making influence on the 
                                                 
4 The definition of a party is: plaintiff or applicant and defendant, in an initiating action and, on 
appeal, appellant or defendant.  
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legislative side and with the executive branches also have influence on challenges made 
in the courts to the same policies of the legislative and subordinate branches of 
government.  
These concerns multiply if the Supreme Court expands stakeholders’ ability to intervene. 
In pharmaceutical advertising, there are powerful industry groups whose positions and 
interests, as demonstrated elsewhere in this thesis, are likely to be factors in legislative 
actions - the presence and power of these groups (if they exist as interveners in the 
courts), should be scrutinized to fully understand what the impact could be is of these 
stakeholders on judicial proceedings, and therefor policy. 
The 1980s marked an increase in the number of interventions occurring in the 
Canadian judicial system, an acknowledged move towards American court procedure, 
where third parties have traditionally provide input to the courts (Dickens, 1977).5 In 
1989, Michael Mandel labeled the newfound influence of interest parties in the Canadian 
courts as the “legalization of politics” (Mandel, 1994).6 
The relevant Canadian Supreme Court Rule states that: 
The affidavit in support of a motion for intervention shall identify the person 
interested in the proceeding and describe that person’s interest in the proceeding, 
including any  prejudice that the person interested in the proceeding would suffer if the 
intervention were denied (Rules of the Supreme Court, s 57). 
The Rule (Meehan, 1994) describes the potential intervener in a way that, prima facie, 
means an intervener must be a “stakeholder”, the latter being an individual, group or 
organization interested in influencing the aims and actions of another organization or 
policy-direction (Brugha & Varvovszky, 2000). In combination with identifying the 
                                                 
5
 Bernard Dickens, “A Canadian development: non-party intervention” (1977) 40 MLR 666-676 
6
 Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: 
Wall & Thomson, Inc.) 71 
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intervener applicant’s interests in the proceedings, the application for intervener status 
must identify the position that the applicant intends to take with respect to the questions 
in the proceedings, the applicant’s relevance to the proceedings, and reasons why 
submissions will be useful to the Court and different from those of other parties (Rules of 
the Supreme Court, s 57(2ab)). An intervener may not raise new issues, but at the judges’ 
discretion, may be permitted to make an oral argument in court in addition to submitting 
a factum7 (The judge deciding whether to grant intervener status imposes length limits on 
both the duration of the oral argument and the length of the factum) (Rules of the 
Supreme Court, ss 58-59). The length of that factum, as determined by the judge hearing 
the application for intervener status, may contribute to the impact that the factum may 
have on the ultimate decision. An oral argument may have more impact on the parties and 
judge than the written argument; the impact of the oral argument and the impact of the 
written argument be affected by its allowed length (Ring, 1980). 
The process of intervening begins when any interested person8 makes a motion 
for intervention to a judge. The Court cannot accept non-applicants as interveners (with 
the exception of attorney generals); if the health-interested stakeholders do not apply they 
will not receive intervener status. In the case of an application for Leave to Appeal, the 
motion to intervene must be submitted within 30 days after the filing of the application 
for Leave to Appeal. In the case of the appeal, the motion to intervene must be submitted 
within four weeks after the filing of the Appellant’s Factum. In the case of a Reference9, 
the appeal must be filed within four weeks after the filing of the Governor in Council’s 
factum (Rules of the Supreme Court, s 56). Further, the Supreme Court Rules state that  
The affidavit in support of a motion for intervention shall identify the person 
interested in the proceeding and describe that person’s interest in the proceeding, 
                                                 
7 A factum is a written document, submitted to the court, which like the factums of the parties, 
describes the intervener’s positions and arguments. 
8 The legal term “person” encompasses both individuals and corporations as persons. 
9 A reference raises certain issues in the Court.  
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including any  prejudice that the person interested in the proceeding would suffer if the 
intervention were denied (Rules of the Supreme Court, s 57(1)).  
The motion must also identify the position the interested person intends to take 
with respect to the questions in which it is intended the intervener, if accepted, will 
intervene, and the proposed intervener’s reasons for believing the submissions would be 
useful to the court and different from the other parties (Rules of the Supreme Court, 
57(2)). The judge then reviews the motion, either granting or rejecting the intervention 
application. The decision is announced but no oral or written reasons are provided for 
granting or rejecting intervener status. If the judge chooses to grant the intervention, 
limitations on the length of the factum that the intervener will submit may be imposed. 
The judge may also choose or decline to grant the intervener time to make an oral 
argument in the court. 
This study is investigating the hypothesis that although there has been no 
pharmaceutical advertising case that has reached the Supreme Court, the very same 
stakeholders who would have a vested interested in acting as interveners on a prospective 
pharmaceutical advertising case at the Supreme Court will have already identified 
themselves as interested intervener parties in other pharmaceutical litigation before the 
Supreme Court. This current analysis will attempt to predict which stakeholders will 
attempt to become interveners in pharmaceutical advertising cases should be there be 
litigation that reaches the Supreme Court of Canada and will predict whether, if they 
apply, each stakeholder will be successful or unsuccessful in becoming interveners. 
3.1.3 The Current Leading Health-Related Advertising Case in 
Canada: RJR-MacDonald v Canada 
RJR-MacDonald v Canada [1995] involved the Tobacco Products Control Act 
(S.C, 1985, c. 20) that broadly prohibited all advertising and promotion of tobacco 
products unless the packaging included health warnings and a list of toxic constituents 
(Parliamentary Research Branch, 2013). RJR-MacDonald Inc., a leading tobacco 
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company, sought a declaratory judgment that the whole Act was ultra vires10 (RJR-
MacDonald v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199) Parliament and invalid as an infringement of 
freedom of expression as guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (1982); separately Imperial Tobacco Ltd sought the same relief.11 The 
motions were heard together in the Quebec Superior Court which declared the whole Act 
ultra vires the Parliament of Canada and an unjustified infringement of s.2(b) of the 
Charter (RJR-MacDonald v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199). The decision was appealed by 
the Attorney General (Canada) to the Quebec Court of Appeal where the decision was 
reversed (RJR-MacDonald v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199). RJR-MacDonald and Imperial 
Tobacco appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which, like the Quebec Court of 
Appeal, ruled in their favour (RJR-MacDonald v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199).  
Two questions were addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada: (1) the 
legislative competence of Parliament to enact the legislation under the criminal law 
power or for the peace, order, and good government of Canada; and (2) whether the Act 
infringed on section 2 of the Charter and, if so, whether that infringement was “saved” 
under s.1. The Supreme Court found both that there was an infringement of s. 2(b) and 
that it did not constitute a reasonable infringement justified under s.1 of the Charter. The 
Act was stuck down. (See Figure 3.1 for diagram). 
                                                 
10 Ultra vires is the Latin term for “outside the powers of”. 
11 Imperial Tobacco sought the same order but only in sections ss.4 and 5 of the Act, and 6 and 8 
of the Act (advertisement of tobacco products and promotion of tobacco products, respectively). 
The Quebec Superior court heard the two motions together. 
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Figure 3.1: RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199 
There were six interveners to the Supreme Court in RJR-MacDonald v Canada, 
five formed a coalition. All five stakeholders either have an interest or mandate 
pertaining to health issues, and successfully applied for intervention. The sixth intervener, 
the Attorney General of Ontario, asked for and received leave to intervene without 
applying nor submitting a factum.12 No interveners were rejected in RJR-MacDonald, 
                                                 
12 The Attorney General does not submit a factum or make an oral argument.  
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clear evidence that the judges were interested in hearing the opinions of the health-
interested stakeholders. The interveners in the case were:  
• Canadian Cancer Society,  
• Canadian Council on Smoking and Health 
• Canadian Medical Association 
• Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada 
• Canadian Lung Association 
• Attorney General of Ontario 
The five interveners in the coalition (all the interveners except the Attorney General of 
Ontario) applied in unison for intervener status and submitted a single factum. 
Interestingly, each intervener was granted fifteen minutes for oral argument; from this it 
may be inferred that they together had an influential voice in the proceedings. These five 
interveners also had the support (although the nature of that support is unspecified) of 
twenty-two other prominent health organizations that are listed in the factum (Brief for 
Intervener Coalition, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199). These twenty-
two organizations were (Brief for Intervener Coalition, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada, 
[1995] 3 SCR 199, para 10):13  
• Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada  
• Canadian Nurses Association 
• Canadian Public Health Association 
• Allergy Foundation of Canada 
• Canadian Association of Medical Oncologists 
• Canadian Association of Occupational Therapists 
• Canadian Association of Pathologists 
• Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse 
• Canadian Chiropractic Association 
                                                 
13 The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, the Canadian Nurses Association, 
and the College of Family Physicians of Canada are also present in Chapter 2. 
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• Canadian Dental Association 
•  Canadian Hospital Association 
• College of Family Physicians of Canada 
• National Cancer Institute of Canada 
• Non-Smokers' Rights Association 
• Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada 
• Canadian Centre for Drug Free Sport 
• Canadian Thoracic Society 
• Canadian Nurses' Respiratory Society 
• Canadian Physiotherapy Cardio-Respiratory Society 
• Canadian Haemotology Society 
• Canadian Urologic Oncology Group 
• Canadian Pharmaceutical Association 
Since pharmaceutical advertising and tobacco advertising are both scrutinized from a 
public health perspective, one might expect similar (or the same) stakeholders to involve 
themselves in any health-related legal case of importance as interveners.  
3.1.4 The Only Pharmaceutical Advertising Litigation 
While there has not yet been pharmaceutical advertising litigation before the Supreme 
Court, RJR-MacDonald may be expected to provide evidence of what will occur when 
such litigation does arise because the issues in the RJR-MacDonald case concerned 
advertising related to a health topic. Prior to RJR-MacDonald, tobacco advertising was a 
contentious form of marketing, just as pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer advertising is 
today. As has been established above, all the interveners in RJR-MacDonald were health-
interested stakeholders. 
An unsuccessful attempt to challenge the stipulations in the Food and Drugs Act that 
prohibit pharmaceutical advertising reached the Ontario Superior Court, CanWest Media 
Works Inc. v Canada (Attorney General) (Court File Number 05-CV-303001PD2; 
mentioned in Women and Health Protection, 2007).  
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CanWest MediaWorks Inc. also filed a motion for judicial review in the Federal 
Court (CanWest MediaWorks Inc. v. Canada [2007] FC 752). The Respondents in the 
Federal Court action (Health Minister and Attorney General of Canada) sought to have 
this application either dismissed or stayed until the final outcome of the action, 
mentioned above, brought by CanWest in the Ontario Superior Court was known. In the 
result, in fact, no decision in the Ontario Superior Court case was ever rendered because 
the case was adjourned, and never returned to court, due to the bankruptcy of CanWest 
Media Works Inc.14 Before that adjournment, a coalition of stakeholders successfully 
applied to intervene in the Ontario Superior Court case. Those interveners were:  
• Canadian Federation of Nurses 
• Canadian Health Coalition  
• Canadian Union of Public Employees 
• Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada  
• Society for Diabetic Rights  
• Medical Reform Group  
• Drug Safety Canada 
• Women and Health Protection 
In deciding to dismiss the judicial review application brought in the Federal Court, 
Justice Snider noted: 
 
The fact is that a coalition of a number of interested parties has already 
successfully sought intervener status in CanWest’s Charter challenge in 
opposition to CanWest [in the Ontario Superior Court action]. It seems evident 
that there are individuals and groups in Canada who are supportive of the DTCA 
prohibitions and who may have public interest standing to bring an application for 
judicial review in this Court to determine the issues (assuming that there are 
reviewable issues). There may be many reasons why there has been no pursuit of 
an order of mandamus in our  Court by any other party. Failure, to date, by other 
parties (with, for example, no commercial interest or with broader health 
concerns) to seek mandamus does not elevate CanWest’s interest to one of 
“public interest”. 
                                                 
14 There is no decision text available for the CanWest Media Works Inc. v Canada (Attorney 
General) because the proceedings were indefinitely adjourned. 
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Justice Snider’s decision was unsuccessfully appealed by CanWest to the Federal Court 
of Appeal (CanWest Mediaworks Inc v Canada (AG), 2008 FCA 207). The Federal Court 
of Appeal said:  
 [t]hese interveners (members of a coalition of organizations representing, among 
 others, the interests of consumers of pharmaceuticals products, patients, a trade 
 union, and those who rely on employer-provided health benefit plans) are more 
 appropriate representatives of the public interest in the due enforcement of the law 
 than CanWest (at para 5).  
Justice Snider, in the first instance in the Federal Court, did not accept that CanWest had 
a public interest to present in the Federal Court. On the other hand, the members of the 
intervener coalition in CanWest at the Ontario Superior Court were a diverse group of 
health-interested and public-interest stakeholders (all of whom are identified in the 
previous chapter of this thesis).  
The interveners in the CanWest litigation were not the same stakeholders as the 
intervener coalition in RJR-MacDonald. The CanWest interveners were more diverse 
than the interveners in RJR-MacDonald, who were strictly interested in health, but they 
were nonetheless similar because of the overlap in their public-interest mandates. 
3.2 Previous Related Research 
3.2.1 Background Research About Decision Making in the 
Supreme Court of Canada 
Some context for the current pharmaceutical patent litigation can best be 
understood by reviewing “The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases” by 
Margaret Ann Wilkinson (Wilkinson, 2013). Prior to this research on copyright decisions, 
there had been no study of intellectual property litigation decision patterns in the 
Supreme Court (both copyright and patent are considered aspects of intellectual property 
law): the studies either did not include copyright cases in their samples at all – or the 
numbers of copyright cases heard by the Court were so minute in comparison with the 
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scope of the study that it would be impossible to discern how the copyright cases fit. In 
her seminal work, Wilkinson focused on the ten copyright-related decisions of the 
Supreme Court between 2002 and 2012 and asked how these copyright decisions fit 
patterns previously identified in studies of other jurisprudence of the court (Wilkinson, 
2013). In particular, Wilkinson reviewed four major studies about the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence: 1) Songer & Siripurapu (2009), who studied unanimous decisions of the 
Court between 1970 and 2003; 2)  Emmett Macfarlane, who also focused on the 
unanimous decisions of the Court (Macfarlane, 2010); 3) Peter McCormick focused on 
analysis of concurrent reasons rendered by the Court between April 1984 and the end of 
December 2006 (McCormick, 2008); and 4) Christine Joseph focused on solo dissents 
and examining all 133 solo dissent judgments rendered in the Court between 1974 and 
2003 (Joseph, 2006).  
Wilkinson studied all the copright cases heard by the Supreme Court between 
2002 and 2012.Wilkinson’s conclusions were that there had been a demonstrable increase 
in interest by the Court for hearing copyright cases during those years, as compared to 
any previous period in the Court’s history (Wilkinson, 2013). Moreover, in every case 
heard after the first in the study, in 2002, the Court chose to sit as the full Court of nine 
judges. There were three unanimous judgments – far fewer than the 63% of cases other 
researchers had found – which Wilkinson attributes to the unique nature of copyright 
making it harder for the court to achieve consensus (Wilkinson, 2013). Contrary to the 
expectation set by Songer and Siripurapu’s work (2009) in other areas where unanimous 
judgments occurred, the unanimous judgments in copyright did not occur in cases with 
few issues involved but in the more complex ones (Wilkinson, 2013). The study found 
that six of twenty-two sets of reasons for judgment delivered across the eleven cases were 
written concurring with other judgments in the same decision (Wilkinson, 2013) and in 
McCormick’s study of 1716 judgments between 1984 and 2006, he found 600 concurring 
judgments – but found that their frequency had peaked in 1995-6. This, he noted, was 
because the “dynamic period of flux and change [generated by the creation of the 1982 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms] has come to an end … and few policy-
divergent responses need to be generated to prepare the field.” (McCormick, 2008 p. 
166). He noted this propensity to multiple judgments, concurring in the result but putting 
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forward difference reasoning, was important because “divided decisions demonstrate a 
court that is both open to a variety of arguments… and willing to change its mind over 
time.” (McCormick, 2008 p. 166) Of the eleven cases in Wilkinson’s study, five of the 
courts were divided into a majority and minority dissents. In light of this, Wilkinson 
finds, based on McCormick’s patterns, that there is still high level of uncertainty in 
current Canadian copyright law. In looking the question of solo dissents raised by 
Joseph’s research, Wilkinson observed that there were no solo dissents across the eleven 
cases she studied. She further determined that the pattern in copyright decisions, where 
there is a lack of solo judgments, a relatively large number of concurring judgments, and 
a low number of unanimous judgments, differs from the overall pattern of the current 
Supreme Court found in the earlier studies (Wilkinson, 2013). Wilkinson’s conclusions 
will be returned to later in this manuscript where this study will examine how the patterns 
discovered in the Supreme Court pharmaceutical patent litigation examined here compare 
to copyright.  
In his recently defended Masters of Law (LLM) thesis, “The Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations: An Examination of the Decision Making Patterns in 
these Cases at the Supreme Court of Canada,” Jason Newman identified a number of 
pharmaceutical patent cases which involved a Notice of Compliance [NOC] (Newnman, 
2016). His search produced six cases15 (Merck-Frosst Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of 
National Health and Welfare) (1998), Bristol-Myers Squibb v Canada (Attorney General) 
(2005), AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health) (2006), Apotex Inc. v 
Sanofi- Synthelabo Canada Inc (2008)., Teva Canada Ltd v Pfizer Canada Inc. (2012), 
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc.) (2015) (Newman, 2016). Of the cases he located, Merck-
Frosst Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare) was decided in 
1998 and so falls outside the perimeters of this study on Interveners. Notably, for reasons 
which are unclear, Newman’s study does not include Nu-Pharm Inc. v Canada (2010), 
which is a pharmaceutical patent NOC cases that falls within the timeline of both studies 
and is included in this study’s analysis.  
                                                 
15 The years Newnman used as his search parameters are not mentioned in the thesis text. 
84 
 
Newman found that the levels of volatility in decision-making in NOC intellectual 
property cases is much lower than that found by Wilkinson in copyright intellectual 
property cases (Newnman, 2016). Neither Wilkinson nor Newman examined anything 
about interveners in the Supreme Court litigation they studied in their work. 
3.2.2 Research on the Roles of Interveners in the Supreme Court 
of Canada 
In 2000, Amanda Burgess studied the impact of intervenors in the Supreme Court 
by examining cases for the presence of interveners, and asking whether the presence of 
the interveners’ arguments (or even presence) had an influence on the Supreme Court’s 
decision. Burgess reviewed all the decisions written by members of the Supreme Court in 
253 cases rendered from 1997 to 1999, but only the subset of those cases with interveners 
present were analyzed. Burgess did not include any pharmaceutical cases in her analysis, 
but any intellectual property cases rendered between 1997 and 1999 and included 
interveners were analyzed in her study. Burgess (2000) made fifteen main observations: 
1. interveners were present in approximately one-third of cases; 
2. there were on average four to five interveners per case when there is intervention; 
3. there was a 43% chance that the intervener would be a public interest advocate; 
4. there was a 42% chance the intervener would be a government intervener; 
5. there was a 60% chance the government intervener would be the Attorney 
General of Canada, Quebec, Ontario, or Alberta; 
6. there was a 15% chance that the intervener would be a trade union corporation, an 
aboriginal group or an individual; 
7. there was a 2% chance the intervener would be the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association; 
8. eighteen interveners accounted for 45% of total interventions; 
9. interveners were mentioned in the judgments written in over 40% of the cases in 
which interveners were present; 
10. there was a greater chance of the interveners being mentioned in a decision if that 
intervener was one of two to nine interveners appearing in the case; 
11. Justice Cory was the Justice most likely to mention an intervener;  
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12. Justice Cory was most likely to mention an intervener by name; 
13. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé was least likely to mention an intervener in her written 
decision; 
14. when an intervener was mentioned in the decision, the intervener’s argument was 
linked to an argument put forth by the Appellant or the Respondent approximately 
one-third of time; and 
15. cases which contained a constitutional argument comprised over 40% of the cases 
involving interveners (of these cases, 86% were likely to involve a Charter 
argument. (Burgess, 2000, p.136) 
This study relies on data generated exclusively before Beverly McLachlan became Chief 
Justice of Canada (January 7, 2000): it does not overlap with the period of the present 
study. The cases studied were decided relatively early, during the period of the 
introduction of interveners into the Canadian legal system.  
In “Interventions at the Supreme Court of Canada: Accuracy, Affiliation, and 
Acceptance” (Alarie & Greene, 2010). Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Greene examined 
interveners in the Court from January 2000 to July 2009. The researchers examined 
decisions and published intervener material. Alarie and Green did not include intellectual 
property (or patent) in their study. Their data set included only “Charter”, “criminal”, 
“labour”, “tax”, and “aboriginal rights” categories of cases. They identified at least three 
functions (accuracy, affiliation, and acceptance) that the practice of intervention can 
perform:  
 The first possibility is that hearing from interveners might provide objectively 
useful  information to the court (i.e., interveners might promote the “accuracy” of the 
Court’s decision making). A second possibility is that the practice of intervention allows 
interveners to provide the “best argument” for certain partisan interests that judges might 
want to affiliate with. A third possibility is that interventions are allowed mainly (if not 
only) so that intervening parties feel they have had their voices heard by the Court and 
the greater public (Alarie & Green, 2010, p. 386). 
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Alarie and Green found 674 appeals in their categories were decided by the 
Supreme Court between January 1 2000 and December 31 2008, and, of those, 330 
included submissions by interveners (Alarie & Greene, 2010). Interventions in the 
different areas of law studied were compared, and a finding was made that intervention in 
Charter cases was the most common, at 90% of Charter cases (Alarie & Greene, 2010). 
The authors also found that Charter cases had the highest average number of 
interventions per case (Alarie & Greene, 2010). The study found that the proportion of 
appeals with interveners rose more quickly over the eight years than the average number 
of interventions per appeal (Alarie & Greene, 2010). The study found that appeals with 
interventions had an average of 4.1 interveners, and that interveners (excluding Attorneys 
General) had an average acceptance rate of 90% when applying. However, Alarie & 
Green found that success in attaining status to intervene did not ensure that the intervener 
succeeded in impacting the decision. 
3.3 Design of Research on Interveners in Pharmaceutical 
Cases 
As noted earlier, litigation about pharmaceutical advertising, specifically, has not 
reached the Supreme Court of Canada. However, patent litigation involving 
pharmaceuticals has become common patent litigation at the Supreme Court, and as 
discussed above, stakeholders who produce, manufacture and distribute pharmaceuticals 
have a vested interest in pharmaceutical advertising. When litigation does arise in the 
Supreme Court regarding pharmaceutical advertising, as in the single lower court case 
already concluded (Women and Health Protection, 2007), these pharmaceutical 
companies will be involved, if not as parties, certainly by intervention. 
This study has only focused on pharmaceutical patent cases that reached the 
Supreme Court, the highest court in the country and the one that ultimately decided RJR-
MacDonald. As established in the Supreme Court Act, a civil case that will reach the 
Supreme Court of Canada is only one that contains an issue of public importance. There 
is only a right to appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal matters, in all civil matters, 
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such as those under discussion in this thesis, parties can only appeal if given leave to do 
so by the Court itself. This permission can be given following an application for leave.16 
It is clear that cases in the lower courts, and therefore the interveners who 
participate in those cases, are less likely to have the same national importance as cases 
and interveners in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court does not hear a civil case 
unless it chooses to: in all other civil cases the highest court are the Courts of Appeal, and 
all cases decided by the Supreme Court can only be heard if first decided by the Court of 
Appeal and then appealed by the parties. Similarly, a case can be heard by the Court of 
Appeal if a decision has been heard by a lower court or tribunal and then appealed.  
It is also the case that it is at the Supreme Court (as mentioned earlier) that 
interveners have the longest history in Canada. For these reasons, only Supreme Court 
cases and applicants for intervention are included in this study. 
 To identify cases relevant to pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court Decision 
database was accessed. A search on the database was performed for “patent” cases. From 
the selection of decisions produced by the Supreme Court online database the short 
descriptions of each case were reviewed for relevance to pharmaceutical advertising. 
Fourteen such cases were produced, and the fourteen cases’ full decision text were then 
reviewed in detail to more accurately determine whether they met the inclusion criteria.17 
                                                 
16 Notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament but subject to subsection (1.2), an application to 
the Supreme Court for leave to appeal shall be made to the Court in writing and the Court shall 
(a) grant the application if it is clear from the written material that it does not warrant an oral 
hearing and that any question involved is, by reason of its public importance or the importance of 
any issue of law or any issue of mixed law and fact involved in the question, one that ought to be 
decided by the Supreme Court or is, for any other reason, of such a nature or significance as to 
warrant decision by it; 
(b) dismiss the application if it is clear from the written material that it does not warrant an oral 
hearing and that there is no question involved as described in paragraph (a); and 
(c) order an oral hearing to determine the application, in any other case. 
17 In some cases, it is difficult to determine whether a case meets the inclusion criteria from the 
short description provided by the Supreme Court of Canada website database. In such situations 
the case was tentatively included and flagged for more in-depth review. 
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Of the fourteen cases, ten were relevant to pharmaceuticals, and therefore the study. Of 
the ten cases that met the inclusion criteria, six of the cases involved interveners. When 
aggregated, the number of interveners from the six cases is twelve, and there are 16 total 
applications for intervention. In none of the cases did interveners join the proceedings 
before the case reached the Supreme Court. 
Of the ten Supreme Court decisions rendered in the select time period involving 
pharmaceutical patent issues,18 Janssen-Ortho v Novopharm (Janssen-Ortho Inc. v 
Novopharm Ltd [2005] SCC 33) (not included in Table 2) has not been included in the 
analysis. The case had to be disqualified from the study because although it appeared to 
meet the inclusion criteria, the case proceedings ended quite early – prior to the 
timeframe in which stakeholders were able to apply for leave to intervene. 
Decisions, dockets, and intervener briefs were collected for analysis in each 
case19. The decision text and dockets were freely downloaded from the Supreme Court 
website, the intervener briefs were retrieved at a cost from the Supreme Court Records 
Center, which is contactable by email or phone call.20 Reasons for accepting or rejecting 
interveners are not provided by the Court in decisions, intervener briefs, or dockets, and 
for that reason we have no record of the Court’s logic in accepting or rejecting an 
applicant for intervention.  
                                                 
18 On February 21, 2017, the author of this study became aware of a case currently (at the time 
this paper is being written) before the Supreme Court, as of March 10, 2016. The case is not 
concluded, and there is no decision yet. For these reasons the case is not included in this study. 
AstraZeneca Canada Inc et al Apotex Inc, 2015 FCA 158. 
19 Litigant factums were not collected, in part, because some were not publicly available. For 
instance, Apotex v Sanofi-Synthelabo (2008) was subject to a "sealing order" For further 
information on sealing order, see Irving & Creighton (2013). 
20 The records centre archives intervener briefs in three formats, offline, on the internal digital 
database, or hosted on the Supreme Court of Canada website. Fees of varying of amount may be 
incurred to access the files hosted either offline or on the records centre internal digital database. 
All records hosted on the Supreme Court of Canada website are free to download.; See appendix 
E for links to decisions and websites where these resources can be retrieved or requested from the 
Supreme Court. 
89 
 
The decisions were used to obtain information about the content of the case, the 
judges involved, the litigating parties,21 and the interveners. The case dockets were used 
to identify applicants for intervener status, which applications had been successful or 
unsuccessful, what submissions the successful intervener applications were allowed to 
provide to the Court during the appeal proceedings (written documents or both written 
documents and oral presentations) and the length of those representations (both written 
documents and oral arguments are limited to a prescribed maximum length by the judge 
who accepted the intervener application). The judge or prothonotary who accepted or 
rejected the intervener application submission was also recorded. 
Intervener briefs were examined for evidence of positons and interests. The 
intervener briefs, when reviewed on their own and without context, are not sufficiently 
comprehensible to understand the stakeholder’s positions or interests: intervener briefs 
are predicated on an understanding of the issues at trial.22 The decisions were studied and 
following that, the intervener briefs were studied. 
3.4 Findings 
3.4.1 Pharmaceutical Cases at the Supreme Court of Canada 
Before a pharmaceutical is able to be part of the market in Canada, whatever its 
patent status (in patent or out of patent), the pharmaceutical company seeking to market 
and distribute the drug anywhere in Canada must obtain a Notice of Compliance (NOC) 
from Health Canada. The NOC is an indication that the manufacturer has met the 
regulatory requirements for the safety, efficacy and quality of the product (Health 
                                                 
21 A “party” in the decision is either the plaintiff or defendant. An intervener is not a party 
involved in the lawsuit but an outside stakeholder who has successfully applied for intervener 
status. 
22 Decision in each case were examined prior to the analysis of Intervener Brief or Docket. 
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Canada, 2014). Three classifications of cases were identified amongst the nine under 
study here: notice of compliance cases,23 general patent cases, and non-patent cases.  
Figures 3.2 to 3.10 each represent, diagrammatically, the pharmaceutical cases 
studied in this research. The progress of each case through the court is indicated. The 
presentation of the Figures is divided into four sections: first, the cases in which there 
were no interveners are shown (Figures 3.2 and 3.3), second the cases where interveners 
did apply but none were accepted by the Court are shown (Figure 3.4), third, those cases 
are shown in which all the interveners who applied were accepted (Figures 3.5 to 3.7) 
and, finally, those cases where interveners were present but only some of those who 
applied were accepted by the Court (Figures 3.8 to 3.10).  Within each of the four 
sections, the Figures of the cases are presented in chronological order 
3.4.1.1 Cases Without Interveners 
3.4.1.1.1 Cases Where No Intervention Was Attempted 
Apotex v Wellcome Foundation [2002] 
GlaxoKlineSmith and Wellcome Foundation found that AZT, an antiretroviral 
medication, could be used as treatment for HIV (Apotex Inc. v Wellcome Foundation Ltd 
[2002] SCC 77, hereinafter “Apotex v Wellcome Foundation”). Following this discovery, 
and after testing by National Institutes of Health (NIH) scientists, GlaxoKlineSmith and 
Wellcome Foundation filed for a patent in the United Kingdom from which the Canadian 
patent claimed priority right.24 Apotex and Novopharm, generic drug manufacturers, 
challenged the validity of the Canadian patent in the Canadian courts on the grounds that 
(a) necessary utility had not been established as of the priority date of the patent, (b) the 
                                                 
23 Notice of Compliance (NOC) cases are a subset of intellectual property law, as are patent cases. 
NOC cases may involve patent, but the presence of an NOC process in the issues meets the 
criteria for an NOC case, and the exclusion from the Patent or  
24 The priority right is time limited and allows the patent claimant to file a subsequent application 
in a different country for the same invention, design, or trademark effective as of the date of filing 
the first application. 
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claims covered more than the invention, and (c) that the disclosure was misleading 
because the NIH in full was not mentioned. The trial judge rejected these arguments. The 
decision was appealed by Apotex to the Federal Court of Appeal, where the appeal was 
dismissed. The case was by Apotex appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, where the 
appeal was dismissed (See Figure 3.2) (Apotex Inc. v Wellcome Foundation Ltd [2002] 
SCC 77).25 
 
Figure 3.2: Apotex Inc. v Wellcome Foundation Ltd., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153, 2002, SCC 
77 
                                                 
25 In each of the cases below, there is an accompanying figure which is a visual representation of 
the case. The litigants are displayed at the top (plaintiff on the left, respondent to the right) and 
the events are listed chronologically from the top to the bottom of the figure. The text under the 
horizontal indicates what sort of action was taken 
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Nu-Pharm Inc. v Canada (Attorney General) [2010]  
Nu-Pharm unsuccessfully applied to Health Canada for an issuance of an NOC in 
Canada in 1997 (Nu-Pharm Inc. v Canada (Attorney General) [2010] SCR 648, 
hereinafter “Nu-pharm”). That decision was overturned on judicial review, and Health 
Canada issued the NOC, but that decision was again overturned, on appeal to the FCA – 
leaving Nu-Pharm without an NOC. In 2001, Nu-pharm initiated an application to 
Federal Court for judicial review alleging Health Canada was acting unlawfully in not 
authorizing Nu-Pharm to sell its drug, but this application was discontinued. In 2002, Nu-
Pharm filed a statement of claim in Federal Court against the Crown seeking injunctive 
and mandatory relief and damages for various torts. The Crown was successful in getting 
this application dismissed by seeking summary judgment on the grounds that the Federal 
Court did not have the jurisdiction to hear the matter. This was appealed to the Federal 
Court of Appeal, where the court decided in favour of the Crown. The decision was 
appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled in favour of the appellant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
Nu-Pharm (Nu-Pharm Inc. v Canada (Attorney General) [2010] SCR 648)  
 
Figure 3.3: Nu-Pharm. v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 65, [2010] 3 S.C.R 
648 
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3.4.1.1.2 Cases Where Intervention Was Attempted 
Celgene Corp. v Canada (Attorney General) [2011]  
Celgene is a New Jersey (US) based distributor of a pharmaceutical named 
Thalomid, that since 1996 has sold to Canadians through the Special Access Programme 
[SAP].26 Celgene obtained a Canadian patent in relation to Thalomid in 2006 (Celgene 
Corp. v Canada (Attorney General) [2011] SCR 3, hereinafter “Celgene”), at which point 
the Patented Medicines Review Board requested pricing information from Celgene, 
starting from the time it began selling the drug in 1995. Celgene initially complied but 
later refused the requests as the medicine was “sold” in New Jersey and there the matter 
is outside the Board’s authority. The Board responded that Celgene’s sales to Canada 
under SAP were in the Canadian market and subject to its authority. The Board’s 
decision was reversed on judicial review, but an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal 
agreed with the Board. On appeal by Celgene the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the 
Board (Celgene Corp. v Canada (Attorney General) [2011] SCR 3). 
                                                 
26 The Special Access Programme, is described as Health Canada as: “provides access to non-
marketed drugs for practitioners treating patients with serious or life-threatening conditions when 
conventional therapies have failed, are unsuitable, or unavailable. The SAP authorizes a 
manufacturer to sell a drug that cannot otherwise be sold or distributed in Canada. Drugs 
considered for release by the SAP include pharmaceutical, biologic, and radio-pharmaceutical 
products not approved for sale in Canada.” Retrieved from: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/acce 
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Figure 3.4: Celgene Corp. v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 1, [2011] 1 
S.C.R. 3 
 
 
 
96 
 
3.4.1.2 Cases Where Interveners Appeal 
3.4.1.2.1 Cases Where All Who Applied to Intervene Were 
Successful 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada [2005] 
Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) developed a drug containing paclitaxel, marketed as 
Taxol, which had anti-carcinogenic properties (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada 
(Attorney General), [2005] SCR 533, hereinafter “Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.”). BMS 
obtained a number of Canadian patents on the drug, but no on the active ingredient itself, 
Paclitaxel. Working independently of BMS, Biolyse found that paclitaxel could be 
extracted from a species of yew without killing the bush (therefore allowing the company 
to extract the paclitaxel compound in sufficient quantities for commercial distribution). 
Biolyse filed for a Notice of Compliance which BMS sought to quash. On application for 
judicial review, a motions judge found that because Biolyse had neither applied for 
obtained regulatory approval on the basis of bioequivalence, the NOC should be quashed. 
The Federal Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. The Supreme Court reversed this 
decision (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney General), [2005] SCR 533). 
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Figure 3.5: Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 
533 
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health) [2006]  
In 1989, AstraZeneca obtained a NOC for Losec 20 from 1989 until 1996, when 
AstraZeneca removed it from the market. In 2002, AstraZeneca obtained and registered 
two more patents for Losec 20 with the Ministry of Health (MOH), despite the drug being 
off the market (AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health) [2006] SCR 560, 
hereinafter “Biolyse”). Meanwhile, in 1993 Apotex had filed an NOC for omeprazole, a 
generic version of Losec 20. The MOH determined that Apotex did not need to address 
the after-issued patents held by AstraZeneca and granted Apotex the NOC in 2004. 
AstraZeneca filed for judicial review, and the motions judge upheld the MOH’s decision. 
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The Federal Court of Appeal reversed this decision and Apotex’s NOC was quashed. The 
Supreme Court of Canada then reversed the decision of the FCA (AstraZeneca Canada 
Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health) [2006] SCR 560). 
 
Figure 3.6: AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R 
560, 2006 SCC 49 
Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc [2008]  
Sanofi-Synthelabo held the ‘875 patent which discloses a large class of over 250 
000 combinations useful for inhabiting blood platelet aggregation activity (Apotex Inc. v 
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc [2008] SCR 265, hereinafter “Apotex Inc. v Sanofi”). 
Sanofi-Synthelabo also holds the subsequent ‘777 patent which discloses and claims 
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clopidogrel bisulfate, marketed by Sanofi-Synthelabo under the trade name of Plavix as 
an anti-coagulant. In 2003, Apotex, a generic manufacturer, served a notice of allegation 
on Sanofi to obtain an NOC from the MOH to market its generic version of Plavix; 
claiming the ‘777 patent was invalid. Sanofi successfully sought an order from the 
Federal Court to block the NOC on the grounds that Apotex infringed on the ‘777 patent. 
The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision. The decision was appealed the 
Supreme Court which dismissed the appeal (Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc 
[2008] SCR 265). 
 
Figure 3.7: Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R 265, 2008 
SCC 
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3.4.1.2.2 Cases Where Only Some Who Applied Were Accepted 
Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. V Canada [2012] 
Health Canada received an access to information request, from another party, 
related to two new drug submissions made by Merck Frosst (Merck Frosst Canada 
Ltd. v Canada (Health) [2012] 1 SCR 23, hereinafter “Merck”). Health Canada identified 
several hundred pages that could be disclosed by the access to information request. 
Health Canada then notified Merck of the access to information requests and the intention 
to disclose the identified pages to the requestor. Merck was given an opportunity to 
explain which of these pages should remain confidential before Health Canada fulfills the 
FOI request to the requestor. Health Canada agreed to further redactions but rejected 
most of Merck’s objections. Merck filed for a judicial review of Health Canada’s 
decision. The Federal Court found that Health Canada was about to contravene the 
Information Act, and that 200 pages must be exempted from disclosure (while the rest 
could be disclosed to the requestor). The Federal Court of Appeal allowed Health 
Canada’s appeal and ordered all the pages disclosed to the requestor. The Supreme Court 
ruled against the appellants (Merck Frosst) (Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada 
(Health) [2012] 1 SCR 23). 
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Figure 3.8: Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada (Health), 2012 SCC 3, [2012] 1 
S.C.R 23 
Teva Canada Ltd v Pfizer Canada Inc. [2012]  
Pfizer holds the Canadian Patent 2 163 446 for use of a “compound of formula 
(I)” or a “salt thereof” as a treatment for erectile dysfunction (Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer 
Canada Inc [2012] SCR 625, hereinafter Teva). The Patent’s specifications for seven 
cascading claims for successively smaller ranges of compounds. Sildenafil, the subject of 
Claim 7 and the active compound in Viagra, is shown to be, by Teva, effective in treating 
erectile dysfunction. Teva applied for an NOC to produce a generic version of Viagra. On 
appeal by Pfizer, the Federal Court blocked the Ministry of Health from issuing the NOC. 
Teva appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal and the decision by the Federal Court was 
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upheld. Teva appealed this decision to the Supreme Court which ruled in favor of Teva 
(Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc [2012] SCR 625). 
 
Figure 3.9: Teva Canada Ltd. Pfizer Canada Inc., 2012 SCC 60, [2012] 3 S.C.R 625 
Sanofi Aventis v Apotex Inc. [2015]  
Apotex filed with Health Canada for an issuance of NOC for a generic drug and 
received the NOC. Sanofi-Aventis and Bristol Myers Squibb applied to the Federal Court 
against Apotex, and were successful in having the NOC squashed (Sanofi-
Aventis v Apotex Inc [2015] SCR 136, hereinafter Sanofi). Apotex then commenced an 
action in The Federal Court to invalidate Sanofi’s patent. Sanofi then began an 
infringement action in the Federal Court against Apotex. Then simultaneously, the 
Federal Court, in the patent infringement action, decided in favor of Apotex and 
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invalidated Sanofi-Aventis’s Patent. Sanofi appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal, 
where the decision of the Federal Court was upheld. The decision was appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada but dismissed summarily, with the Supreme Court 
unanimously agreeing with the FCA’s reasoning (Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc [2013] 
FCA 209, para 1-10). 
 
Figure 3.10: Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc., [2015] 2 S.C.R. 136 
3.4.2 Interveners Across All Decisions 
Of the nine decisions identified, six involved interveners (see Table 3.2). There 
were a total of sixteen interventions applications (twelve successful, four unsuccessful) 
across the six cases 
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Table 3.2: Cases with and without interveners (Interveners in brackets) 
Cases with Interveners Cases without Interveners 
• Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada 
(Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 
533, 2005 SCC 26 (CGPA & Pfizer)  
• AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada 
(Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 
560, 2006 SCC 49 (CPGA, CRPC) 
• Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo 
Canada Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. 265, 
2008 SCC 61 (BIOTE, CGPA, CRPC) 
• Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada 
(Health), 2012 SCC 3, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 
(BIOTE) 
• Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada 
Inc., 2012 SCC 60, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 
625 (CGPA, CRPC) 
• Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc., 2015 
SCC 20, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 136 (CGPA, 
CRPC) 
• Apotex Inc. v Wellcome 
Foundation Ltd., [2002] 4 
S.C.R. 153, 2002 SCC 77 
• Nu-Pharm Inc. v Canada 
(Attorney General), 
2010 SCC 65, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 
648 
• Celgene Corp. v Canada 
(Attorney General), 
2011 SCC 1, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 3 
Source: Reviewing decisions for intervener participation. 
In the nine decisions involving pharmaceuticals a number of parties appealed 
repeatedly (See Table 3.1).  
There were not attempts to intervene made in all nine cases – and where 
applications to intervene were made, results were mixed (see Table 3.3).  
Table 3.3: Applications to the Court 
 Cases with Interveners  Cases Without 
Interveners 
Total Cases 6 3 
Total Intervener 
Applications Made 
15 1 
Successful Applications  12 0 
Unsuccessful Applications 3 1 
Source: Reviewing case dockets for intervener applications. 
Of the four instances in which an intervention application was rejected, one 
rejection of an application for intervention (that of the Information Commissioner of 
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Canada in Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada, 2012) was due to failure to submit the 
necessary documents by the necessary deadlines. Laboratoire Riva’s application in 
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc (Court Docket, Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc [2015] 2 SCR 
136) was dismissed by Justice Karakatsanis, BIOTECanada’s application in Teva Canada 
Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc. (2012) (Court Docket, Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc 
[2012] 3 SCR 625) was dismissed by Justice Deschamps: the same judge that accepted 
BIOTECanada’s application in Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada (2012) in that same 
year, 2012. Aside from Justice Deschamps, no justice participated in the selection of 
interveners in more than two cases, and Justice Deschamps permitted intervener(s) to file 
a 10-page factums and give oral presentations in both Merck Frosst Canada 
Ltd. v Canada (2012) and Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc. (2012). Because a 
different judge was involved in the selection of interveners in every case (with the 
exception of Justice Deschamps, who is seemingly neutral towards BIOTECanada 
because they were accepted and rejected once by Deschamps) no single judge 
significantly influenced the acceptance or rejection of the intervener applications, there is 
no apparent bias in accepting or rejecting interveners by judges across the cases.  
The majority of interventions were done by the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association and Canada’s Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies, who represent the 
generic and brand name pharmaceutical industries, respectively (see Table 3.4 for a list of 
successful and unsuccessful intervener applications organized by applicant). 
Table 3.4: Interventions Across All Decisions 
Interveners  Frequency  
Successful 
Application(s) 
Unsuccessful 
Application(s) 
Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association  5 0 
Canada’s Research-Based Pharmaceutical 
Companies  
4 1 
BIOTECanada 2 1 
Pfizer  1 0 
Laboratoire Riva Inc.  0 1 
Information Commissioner of Canada 0 1 
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BIOTECanada represented the brand name pharmaceutical industry in one 
intervention, and an unrelated matter to generic or brand name companies in another case 
(Factum for BIOTECanada, Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 
23). BIOTECanada had an application rejected on a case where both the Canadian 
Generic Pharmaceutical Association and Canada’s Research Based Companies 
successfully intervened (Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc. [2012] 3 SCR 625). 
BIOTECanada and Canada’s Research Based Companies have overlapping mandates, 
and the Court has shown that it will accept Canada’s Research Based Companies 
intervener application over BIOTECanada’s in certain instances where the both seek to 
represent brand name pharmaceutical interests. Pfizer, a member of Canada’s Research-
Based Pharmaceutical Companies, held positions which favour the brand name 
pharmaceutical industry during its intervention (Factum for Pfizer Canada, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 533). 
 Unsuccessful applications to intervene fell into three categories: 1) they did not 
have interests or arguments which support the generic or pharmaceutical industry (as is 
the case in Laboratoire Riva Inc.’s application), 2) the argument raised was already 
addressed by another intervener, and did not make the criteria for originality 
(BIOTECanada’s application in Teva v Pfizer), 3) there was no application by the 
opposite pharmaceutical camp (e.g., if a brand name intervener applied, there was no 
application by the generic parallel intervener), and so there would be a perceived 
imbalance in the arguments  (as was the case with Canada’s Research-Based 
Pharmaceutical Companies’ application in Celgene Corp. v Canada ).27 The only case 
with no interveners and but an application is Celgene Corp. v Canada (2011) where only 
Canada’s Research Based Companies submitted an application but was dismissed.  
                                                 
27 The Information Commissioner of Canada initially submitted an application for intervention 
but missed the deadlines necessary to submit the necessary documents.  
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All the successful intervener applicants can be categorized as supporting generic 
or brand name companies, and at least one from each camp is involved if there is 
intervention on a case that might concern certain brand name or generic drugs. 
 In total, there were fifteen separate applications for intervener status, and twelve 
were successful. Six stakeholders were responsible for the fifteen intervener applications, 
and four stakeholders were successful in their applications. In cases with interveners, 
three cases had all intervener applications accepted, and three cases did not have all 
intervener applications accepted. In cases without successful intervener applications, 
there was one case with an application for intervener status, and three with no 
applications. 
Table 3.5: Generics and Brand Name Parties28 
Type of Case Number of Cases with 
Interventions/Total 
Number of Cases 
Number of Successful 
Intervention 
Applications 
Number of 
Unsuccessful 
Intervention 
Applications 
Notice of Compliance 4/5 9 1 
General Patent  1/2 2 1 
Other, non-patent 1/2 1  2 
The majority of intervention applications, ten out of sixteen (62.5%) are NOC 
cases, and 80% of NOC cases have interveners (See Table 3.5). NOC litigation has the 
highest proportion of interveners of the three classifications identified in this study. It 
appears likely that stakeholders view NOC litigation as uniquely important, and are 
willing to intervene. General Patent cases follow the same pattern of intervention (a brand 
name and generic intervener) but in lower numbers; only one of the two cases featured 
intervention, and they received only three out of fifteen total applications for intervention. 
The ‘other’, non-patent, cases only featured one intervener and did not follow the pattern 
of having a brand and generic intervener present. 
                                                 
28 Nu-Pharm is excluded as it does not meet either criteria. 
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Litigants and interveners can be categorized as being representative of the brand 
name or generic pharmaceutical industry, or ‘other’. Table 3.6 lists the parties and 
interveners and their respective affiliations. 
Table 3.6: Generic and Brand Name Parties29 
Classification of Party or 
Intervener 
Litigants Intervener 
Brand Name  Pfizer, Merck, AstroZeneca, 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Celgene, Sanofi-
Aventis/Synetholab 
Canada’s Research-Based 
Pharmaceutical 
Companies 
Pfizer Canada Inc. 
BIOTECanada 
Generic  Apotex, Teva Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Association 
Laboratoire Riva 
Other Wellcome Trust Information 
Commissioner of Canada  
The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association had five successful 
intervention applications and no unsuccessful applications, Canada’s Research-Based 
Pharmaceutical Companies had four successful applications and one unsuccessful 
application, BIOTECanada had two successful applications and one unsuccessful 
application, Pfizer had one successful application and no unsuccessful applications, 
Laboratoire Riva Inc. and the Information Commissioner of Canada each applied 
unsuccessfully. 
3.4.3 Patterns in the Interventions  
When the cases are organized chronologically and reviewed for the presence and 
length of written factums and oral and arguments, it can be seen that oral arguments have 
become more common, but the length of both factums and oral arguments have been 
shortened in more recent cases (See Table 3.7). 
 
 
                                                 
29 Nu-Pharm is excluded as it does not meet either criteria. 
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Table 3.7: Length and Time Allowances for Factums and Oral Arguments 
Case Length of Written Factum 
(pages) 
Length of Oral Argument 
(minutes)  
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v 
Canada (A.G) 
20 15 (for each intervener in 
the coalition) 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v 
Canada, 2005 
20 15 
AstraZeneca Canada Inc v 
Canada, 2006 
20 15 
Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-
Synthelabo Canada Inc, 2008 
15 10 
Merck Frosst Canada Ltd v 
Canada, 2012 
10 10 
Teva Canada Ltd. V Pfizer 
Canada Inc, 2012 
10 10 
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc, 
2015 
10 10 
Source: Intervener factums of each the interveners in the cases listed above 
In all the cases, with the exception of, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada (2005), 
the interveners (if there was more than one) received the same length allowances for 
written factums and time allowances for oral arguments. In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v 
Canada, both the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association and Pfizer were 
permitted a twenty-page factum, but only Pfizer was allowed to make a fifteen-minute 
oral argument in the Court, and the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association was 
not allowed to make an oral argument. Pfizer’s intervention in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 
v Canada is also the only intervention by a company instead of an association. 
Remarkably, Canada’s Research Based Pharmaceutical Companies did not apply for 
intervention on that same case. In every other case the intervention is by an association, 
not a company. 
 Because of the shortening of interveners’ written and oral arguments over time 
found in this study, it appears that each interveners’ influence in the courts is diminished 
as there is less space and time to present a convincing argument. Of the cases with 
interveners, four of the six cases involved a full court and two did not. All three cases 
without interveners had full courts; the presence of a full court, or not, does not seem to 
have an impact on intervention.  
Of the six cases with interveners, four had a unanimous judgments and two had 
majorities with minority dissents (none involved solo dissents). The three cases without 
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interveners all the cases were unanimous. This suggests that the presence of interveners 
may contribute to differing opinions amongst the justices in pharmaceutical patent cases 
and RJR-MacDonald (See Table 3.8). 
In RJR-MacDonald, with a full court of nine judges, there are seven different 
judgments filed. Two dissents to the majority decision written: the dissenting judges 
were: La Forest J, with whom L-Heureux-Dube and Gonthier joined (RJR-MacDonald 
Inc. v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199, para 2-119), and a solo dissent written by Cory (RJR-
MacDonald Inc. v Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199, para 121). There are five independently 
filed judgments which make up the majority: Lacobucci, McLachlin, Major, Lamer, 
Sopinka. The interveners’ positions did not support the position taken by the majority 
judges, but their positions are aligned with the position taken by the dissenting judges (La 
Forrest J and Cory K). 
 
Table 3.8: Judgments and Types of Dissent in Pharmaceutical Cases 
Case Unanimous Split 
Solo 
Dissent 
Joint 
Dissent 
Majority 
Apotex Inc. v 
Wellcome Foundation 
Ltd., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 
153, 2002 SCC 77 
[Full Court] 
  
McLachlin C.J. and 
L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, 
Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, 
Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ. 
0 0 NA 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co. v Canada 
(Attorney General), 
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, 
2005 SCC 26 
[Full Court]  
NA 0 Bastarache 
J. (Major 
and 
Charron JJ. 
concurring
) 
 
Binnie J. 
(McLachlin 
C.J. and 
LeBel, 
Deschamps, 
Fish and 
Abella JJ. 
concurring) 
AstraZeneca Canada 
Inc. v Canada 
(Minister of Health), 
[2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 
2006 SCC 49 
[Full Court]  
Binnie J. (McLachlin C.J. and 
Bastarache, LeBel, 
Deschamps, Fish, Abella, 
Charron and Rothstein JJ. 
concurring) 
0 0 NA 
Apotex Inc. v 
Sanofi-Synthelabo 
Canada Inc., [2008] 3 
S.C.R. 265, 2008 
SCC 61 
Rothstein J. (Binnie, LeBel, 
Deschamps, Fish, Abella and 
Charron JJ. concurring) 
0 0 NA 
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Case Unanimous Split 
Solo 
Dissent 
Joint 
Dissent 
Majority 
[Not Full Court– 7 
Judges] 
Nu-Pharm Inc. v 
Canada (Attorney 
General), 2010 SCC 
65, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 
648 
[Full Court]  
Rothstein J., Binnie, LeBel, 
Deschamps, Abella, Charron 
and Cromwell JJ. concurring 
0 0 NA 
Celgene Corp. v 
Canada (Attorney 
General), 
2011 SCC 1, [2011] 1 
S.C.R. 3 
[Full Court]   
McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, 
LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, 
Abella, Charron, Rothstein 
and Cromwell JJ. 
0 0 NA 
Merck Frosst Canada 
Ltd. v Canada 
(Health), 2012 SCC 
3, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 
[Full Court]3 
NA 0 Deschamp
s J. (Abella 
and 
Rothstein 
JJ. 
concurring
) 
Cromwell J. 
(McLachlin 
C.J. and 
Binnie, 
LeBel, Fish 
and Charron 
JJ. 
concurring) 
Teva Canada Ltd. v 
Pfizer Canada Inc., 
2012 SCC 60, [2012] 
3 S.C.R. 625 
[Not Full Court – 7 
Judges] 
LeBel J. (McLachlin C.J. and 
Deschamps, Abella, 
Rothstein, Cromwell and 
Moldaver JJ. concurring) 
0 0 NA 
Sanofi-
Aventis v Apotex 
Inc., 2015 SCC 20, 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 136 
[Full Court]  
McLachlin C.J. (Abella, 
Rothstein, Cromwell, 
Moldaver, Karakatsanis, 
Wagner, Gascon and Côté JJ. 
concurring) 
0 0 NA 
3.4.4 Content of the Interventions   
The formatting of every intervener factum will typically, loosely, follow the same 
basic format. The factum begins with a statement of the facts, the questions of the case 
(issues), the intervener arguments, a section concerning costs of the intervention, and a 
table of authorities. Depending on the issues in the case other sections may appear in the 
factum.  
Recall that for an application for intervention to be successful the applicant must 
demonstrate:  
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1. The intervener’s interests in the proceedings 
2. The position the applicant intends to take with respect to the legal questions in 
the proceedings 
3. The applicant’s relevance to the proceedings 
4. Reasons why the applicant’s submissions will be useful to the Court 
5. Any prejudice that the applicant would suffer if the intervention were denied 
It is not possible to know for certain how each successful intervener satisfied the judge 
hearing the application for intervention on any or all of these five points: the reasons why 
the judge hearing the application for intervention accepts or rejects the application are not 
delivered in writing and are therefore unknowable. However, from interveners’ 
subsequent factums submitted to proceedings, it may be determined how certain 
arguments made would also have formed a basis on which the judge hearing the 
application for intervention would have been able to find the criteria for intervention 
were satisfied. For instance, a factum which subsequently speaks to the facts and 
questions surrounding the issues in the case demonstrates that the intervener satisfies the 
requirement for intervention of proving the intervener’s interest in the proceedings and its 
own interests.  
The ‘arguments’ section of the factum also demonstrates how the intervener 
would have satisfied, during its application to intervene, the ‘position’ requirement, its 
relevance to the proceedings, and why its submissions would be useful to the Court. The 
interveners do not explicitly state their relevance to the Court in the factums, but 
arguments provided by the interveners are framed as coming from the position of the 
brand or generic pharmaceutical industry, which protect the interests of innovators (the 
brand argument) or represent cost savings and access to pharmaceuticals (the generic 
argument). These are perspectives which may not be represented by the litigants, would 
useful to the Court, and satisfy the question of the intervener’s usefulness to the Court. 
The final question, which asks if the applicant would experience any prejudice if the 
application were denied, is irrelevant by the time the factum is written because the 
applicant has already been accepted as an intervener and can no longer experience the 
prejudice incurred by a rejected application.  
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The majority of each intervener factum is always dedicated to the specific issues 
of the case. For instance, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada, the Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association argued against “evergreening” (Factum for Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association (CGPA), Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney 
General) [2005] 1 SCR 533) which is specific to the issues of the case (evergreening 
refers to a company attempting to extend the length of its patent). The CGPA, throughout 
its factum, sides with the litigant Biolyse and makes an argument in support of Biolyse.  
Similarly, in AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (2006) the CGPA is again arguing 
against the same “evergreening” issue. In Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo the CGPA 
addresses double patenting, which stifles generic development. In Teva Canada Ltd. v 
Pfizer Canada Inc the CGPA support disclosure of information in patents, which 
promotes generics by allowing for emulation. Finally, in Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex the 
CGPA promotes an interpretation of the Patent Act and the Regulations that ensure a 
timely entry of competitive generic products and thereby reduce healthcare costs. There 
is no generic representation in Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada because the issues of 
the case revolved around a freedom of information request, which is not an issue which 
necessitates generic representation.  
Turning again to Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada, Pfizer Canada argues that it 
is interested in protecting its brands and products through patent which, again, is an issue 
discussed in the case (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney General) [2005] 1 
SCR 533). Pfizer Canada’s argument concerns a single issue brought up in the Court:  
Pfizer's submissions are limited to one point only: this Court should make it clear 
in its reasons respecting this appeal that, even if s. 5 (11) of the PM(NOC) 
Regulations can apply to an innovator's NDS, s. 5(1.1) does not apply to a purely 
administrative NDS filed by a drug manufacturer to effect a name change, a 
change of address, and the like (Factum for Pfizer Canada, Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co. v Canada (Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 533, p. 1). 
Throughout the factum Pfizer discusses this issue with respect to innovative drug 
manufacturers, and argues against Biolyse, a litigant in the case and a generic 
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pharmaceutical company.  
In AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada Canada’s Researched Based 
Pharmaceutical Companies was interested in the protection of intellectual property and 
brand. In Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc argued for protecting “selection 
patents” and the patent regime from being changed. In that same case, BIOTECanada 
(another brand industry representative makes a similar argument, stating: “Selection 
patents advance patent law policy by rewarding the fruitful efforts of subsequent 
inventors who discover and disclose to the public the unexpected and advantageous 
properties of compounds in previously identified classes” (Factum for BIOTECanada, 
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc. [2008] 3 SCR 265, para 2). BIOTECanada also 
intervened in Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada, arguing for a non-pharmaceutical 
related issue related to document disclosure during a freedom of information requisition: 
“An innovative company that submits trade secrets, confidential information and 
commercially sensitive information to a government institution is vulnerable to release of 
that information.” (Factum for BIOTECanada, Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada 
(Health) [2012] 1 SCR 23, para 10). In Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc. the 
CRBPC Addressing improper interpretation of AZT case in lower courts and its effect on 
patentees. Finally, in Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc. (2015) argued for an interpretation of 
the regulations what fairly determine what damages and compensation are fair and 
predictable.  
In The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association, another intervener in the 
case, also squarely addressed the questions before the Court. After positioning itself as an 
association of generic drug manufacturers, it describes its interest in the proceedings: 
CGPA submits that the anticompetitive effect of the PM(NOC) Regulations arises 
in large part because first persons can trigger the 24-month automatic stay 
repeatedly in respect of a single second person drug product, by listing multiple 
patents over time (Factum for CGPA, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada 
(Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 533, para 5).  
This argument is expanded on throughout the factum, occupying most of the document. 
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The CGPA also addresses the issue of public policy and health policy in its factum, but 
the public interest argument is far less prominent, occupying less than a tenth of the total 
space in the factum. The CGPA addresses the public interest by speaking to access and 
the cost of drugs:  
The resulting additional cost to the public for this single drug over the four years 
may be in the tens of millions of dollars. There are many drugs which have been 
or are being delayed for long periods of time by litigation under the Regulations at 
great cost to the public (Factum for CGPA, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada 
(Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 533, para 37). 
The pattern observed in the intervener factums in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v 
Canada, where the interveners mainly address the specific issues of the case and where 
the public interest is a minor and secondary argument, repeats itself throughout all the 
intervener factums analyzed for this study. It is also the case in all the factums that brand 
industry pharmaceutical interveners (like Pfizer in Bristol-Myers) will support the brand 
name litigant and generic pharmaceutical interveners (like the CGPA in Bristol-Myers) 
will support the generic litigant.  
Across all the decisions, ten of the twelve interveners make a public-interest 
argument, typically a minor argument. Only in Apotex v Sanofi-Synthelabo did the 
interveners more prominently feature the public-interest issue, and, in that instance, doing 
so is a response to claims by Apotex pertaining to public-policy: thus it is the case that 
the finding that all factums address the issues of the case is consistent across all the cases, 
including Apotex v Sanofi-Synthelabo because the public policy conversation within that 
case is more prominent, and so a more prominent public-policy conversation in the 
intervener factums follows from that focus in the litigation itself (Factum for 
BIOTECanada, Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc. [2008] 3 SCR 265, para 27;   
Factum for Canada’s Research Based Companies, Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo 
Canada Inc. [2008] 3 S.C.R. 265., p. 6; Factum for CGPA, Apotex Inc. v 
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc. [2008] 3 SCR 265, para 47). It is notable that none of the 
interveners are cited or mentioned in the text of the decisions themselves that were 
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rendered by the Supreme Court judges. 
The coalition of interveners in RJR-MacDonald (The Canadian Cancer Society, 
The Canadian Council on Smoking and Health, The Canadian Medical Association, The 
Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada, The Canadian Lung Association) do not follow 
the same pattern of content in their (collective) factum as the generic and brand industry 
interveners. The structure of the factum begins with an introduction of the coalition of 
interveners, followed by the perspective of the interveners on the Tobacco Products 
Control Act, an extended section on the medical facts supporting the legislative objective 
[of the TPCA], a section describing the aims of tobacco advertising, and the level of 
support behind a tobacco advertising ban. The interveners still meet the criteria for 
intervention because they were successful in intervening, and the four criteria for 
intervention present in the brand and generic pharmaceutical intervener factums 
(interests, position, relevance to the issues, usefulness to the Court) are still seen in the 
coalition factum in the “perspectives of the interveners” section and subsequent sections 
which present evidence for the ban that may not otherwise have been mentioned in the 
proceedings. The interveners are explicit in their goal to ban tobacco advertising as a 
matter of public health policy:  
In the representations made to Parliament, the Interveners and other members of 
the Canadian medical and health community provided detailed background 
information concerning the medical consequences of tobacco use. The Interveners 
unanimously supported, and continue to support, the TPCA as part of a multi-
faceted approach to reduce and ultimately eliminate disease and death caused by 
the use of tobacco products. A multi-faceted approach to achieving this objective 
is supported by both the U.S. Surgeon General and by the World Health 
Organization. The compelling medical testimony presented to the committees was 
consistent with the medical evidence which was subsequently adduced at trial in 
the present case (Factum for Intervener Coalition, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v 
Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199). 
The majority of the factum described the medical evidence supporting a ban on tobacco 
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advertising, the benefits to the public, and the broad public support to do so. A short part 
of the factum is dedicated to the facts and issues in the case.  
The final set of interveners, from the CanWest Charter challenge litigation 
(Canadian Federation of Nurses Unions, Canadian Health Coalition, Canadian Union of 
Public Employees, Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, 
Society for Diabetic Rights, Medical Reform Group, Drug Safety Canada, Women and 
Health Protection) did not submit factums because the proceedings never reached the 
point in which they would have been able to do so.  
3.5 Analysis and Questions  
3.5.1 Is There a Relationship Between the Presence of 
Interveners and the Volatility of the Area of Law?  
In her primary analysis of intellectual property cases in the Supreme Court, 
Wilkinson noted, with respect to copyright cases specifically, that based on earlier studies 
there is a level of volatility in the Supreme Court’s decision-making in this the area of 
law that differs from the general level of volatility in Supreme Court decisions; this was 
supported by her findings that there are a large number of dissents and concurring reasons 
in copyright cases during the Chief Justice McLachlin’s term. However, pharmaceutical 
patent litigation does not seem to exhibit the same patterns found by Wilkinson in 
copyright cases. As seen in Table 3.10 reporting on judgments and dissents on 
pharmaceutical patent decisions, there were six unanimous decisions, no concurring 
opinions, and three dissents (none of them solo dissents). In comparison to copyright 
cases there is a low level of volatility in pharmaceutical patent decisions. The decision in 
RJR-MacDonald is more volatile as there was a concurring dissent and a solo dissent, and 
more analogous to the decision-making pattern found by Wilkinson in copyright cases. 
The findings in this study concerning decision-making patterns in pharmaceutical patent 
cases before the Supreme Court are consistent with the findings of Newnman (2016), 
where there was a low level of volatility.  
Litigants before the court in the pharmaceutical patent cases mirror the same basic 
divisions as do the interveners: both litigants and interveners are divided between their 
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belonging to the generic pharmaceutical lobby and the name brand pharmaceutical 
groups, the only exception is the Wellcome Trust who are categorized as “other”. The 
only three litigants who are involved in more than one case are Apotex, a generic 
pharmaceutical company, who was involved in four cases, and Sanofi-
Aventis/Synthelabo, who was involved in two cases, and GlaxoSmithKline, a name brand 
pharmaceutical company, involved in three cases. 
Of the litigants, seven brand name pharmaceutical companies (Teva, Pfizer, 
Merck, Astro-Zeneca, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Celgene) were each involved in one 
case as either plaintiffs or defendants, and Biolyse, a generic company, was only involved 
in one case. In five cases, generics and name brand corporations were litigating against 
one another, all these cases had interveners. One case featuring a generic company 
litigating against a brand name company did not have any interveners. The three cases 
that did not feature generic pharmaceutical companies and brand name pharmaceutical 
companies litigating against each other do not include interveners. For those stakeholders 
also present in the Supreme Court of Canada litigation analyzed in this Chapter 3, their 
interests, influence, and power are demonstrated in this environment of judicial 
proceedings in ways that parallel these demonstrated characteristics in Chapter 2. The 
“positions” of brand and generic companies, on the other hand, are opposed to each other 
in patent litigation whereas in the DTCA context they were found to be the same.30 
3.5.2 Is There a Relationship Between the Type of Issue and 
Those Who Intervene? 
When one analyzes the causes of action that have given rise to pharmaceutical 
cases in the Supreme Court it becomes apparent the majority arise from NOC actions 
(See Table 3.9). Of the nine pharmaceutical cases identified, five were notice of 
compliance cases, two were general patent cases, and two were non-patent cases. Far less 
frequently, the cases arise from matters of pure patent law with two cases rising from 
their own particular circumstance, not related to NOCs or patent. These last two were 
                                                 
30 Referring to the positions, power, interests, and influence found in Chapter 2. 
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classified as ‘other’. There is a pattern of intervention in NOC cases, general patent cases, 
and ‘other’ cases, each of which is different than the others. 
Table 3.9: Cases With or Without Successful Interveners 
 Cases with Only 
Successful Intervener 
Applications 
Cases Which Involved 
Atleast One 
Unsuccessful 
Intervener 
Application 
Cases Without 
Intervener 
Applications 
Notice of Compliance 3 1 1 
General Patent 1 0 1 
Non-Patent 1 1 0 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.10, every time there was an intervention by a generic 
industry association (The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association), there was an 
intervention by a brand industry association or group (Canada’s Research-Based 
Pharmaceutical Companies, Pfizer Canada, BIOTECanada). The significance of this is 
that for each generic industry argument made by an intervener there is a corresponding 
argument by a brand industry intervener. 
Table 3.10: Classification of Cases 
Classification of Case Case  
 
Successful Intervener 
Applicants 
Unsuccessful 
Intervener 
Applicants 
NOC Cases Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co. v Canada (Attorney 
General), [2005] 1 
S.C.R. 533, 2005 SCC 
26 
Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Association, Pfizer 
Canada Inc31. 
None 
AstraZeneca Canada 
Inc. v Canada (Minister 
of Health), [2006] 2 
S.C.R. 560, 2006 SCC 
49 
Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Association, Canada’s 
Research-Based 
Pharmaceutical 
Companies 
None 
Apotex Inc. v 
Sanofi-Synthelabo 
Canada Inc., [2008] 3 
Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Association, Canada’s 
None 
                                                 
31 Pfizer substitutes Canada’s Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney General). 
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S.C.R. 265, 2008 SCC 
61 
Research-Based 
Pharmaceutical 
Companies, 
BIOTECanada 
Nu-Pharm Inc. v 
Canada (Attorney 
General), 2010 SCC 65, 
[2010] 
No Intervener(s) No Intervener(s) 
Teva Canada Ltd. v 
Pfizer Canada Inc., 
2012 SCC 60, [2012] 3 
S.C.R. 625 
Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Association, Canada’s 
Research-Based 
Pharmaceutical 
Companies 
BIOTECanada 
General Patent Cases32  
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex 
Inc., 2015 SCC 20, 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 136 
Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Association, Canada’s 
Research-Based 
Pharmaceutical 
Companies 
Laboratoire Riva 
Apotex Inc. v Wellcome 
Foundation Ltd., [2002] 
4 S.C.R. 153, 2002 SCC 
77 
No Intervener(s) No Intervener(s) 
Non-Patent Cases Merck Frosst Canada 
Ltd. v Canada (Health), 
2012 SCC 3, [2012] 
BIOTECanada Information 
Commissioner of 
Canada 
Celgene Corp. v 
Canada (Attorney 
General), 2011 SCC 1, 
[2011] 
No Intervener(s) Canada’s 
Research-Based 
Pharmaceutical 
Companies 
 
3.5.3 Does the Pattern of Intervention in Pharmaceuticals Mirror 
Intervention in RJR-MacDonald or CanWest?  
RJR-MacDonald and CanWest litigation deal with issues of public-health, tobacco 
advertising and pharmaceutical advertising. The plaintiffs in both cases are challenging 
legislation which limits what advertising they can produce and distribute. In the CanWest 
(Women and Health Protection, 2007) charter challenge on DTCA which Ontario 
Superior Court, the coalition which intervened was entirely composed of health interested 
stakeholders (Women and Health Protection, the Canadian Federation of Nurses Unions, 
the Canadian Health Coalition, the Canadian Union of Public Employees, the 
                                                 
32 General patent cases and non-patent case are collectively referred to as non-NOC cases. 
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Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, the Society for Diabetic 
Rights, the Medical Reform Group, and Terence Young for Drug Safety Canada). These 
stakeholders more closely resemble the interveners in RJR-MacDonald v Canada (The 
Canadian Cancer Society, the Canadian Council on Smoking and Health, the Canadian 
Medical Association, the Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada, and the Canadian Lung 
Association) than they do the interveners in the pharmaceutical patent cases by way of 
being public interest and health interested stakeholders. These health-interested 
stakeholders who are intervened in RJR-MacDonald and CanWest litigation are not 
intervening in pharmaceutical cases before the Supreme Court.  
One hypothesis arising from the finding that the interveners from RJR-
MacDonald are not attempting to intervene in pharmaceutical related Supreme Court 
proceedings is that they were uninterested in patent litigation. This was not unexpected 
because the issues of RJR-MacDonald were concerned with tobacco and tobacco 
advertising, whereas pharmaceutical related Supreme Court proceedings are mainly about 
pharmaceuticals and patent.  
Another possible explanation is that the public interest is already represented by 
the brand name and generic pharmaceutical industry, and so health-interested 
organization are not compelled to intervene. The frequency and success of interventions 
by the generic and name brand pharmaceutical lobbies is evidence that the Supreme 
Court itself sees the arguments they present as geared towards the public interest. The 
name brand pharmaceutical industry often argues in its submissions for innovation, 
science, and medicine, whereas the generic industry will make an argument for healthcare 
costs and accessibility. This can explain why brand name and generic applications are so 
often successful. The absence of applications from a public health body, or health-
interested stakeholders in these cases as intervener applicants may suggest that the public 
interest argument is already being presented by the brand and generic pharmaceutical 
stakeholders. With fewer resources (by comparison to pharmaceutical companies), and 
less available legal expertise they may not see the strategic need to intervene to make 
public-interest arguments.  
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3.6 Conclusions  
Recall that the focus of this chapter is to answer research question #2: 
Given the relatively recent rise of interveners in the Supreme Court of Canada 
processes in Canada and the presence of interveners in the landmark 2001 
advertising case in the Supreme Court of Canada, RJR-MacDonald v Canada, are 
the stakeholders identified in the response to Research Question #1 found as 
interveners in current pharmaceutical related Supreme Court litigation?  
The answer to this question must be contextualized by the fact that pharmaceutical 
advertising, although yet to have a landmark case in the Supreme Court, has a number of 
stakeholders who have interests in pharmaceutical patent. This study has identified 
prominent stakeholders in the pharmaceutical industry who have a recorded history of 
initiating and being involved in high-level cases and have the potential to influence 
DTCA policy on a national level. Most notably, the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association and Canada’s Research Based Companies have established a behavior and 
interest in intervening on such cases but Pfizer and BIOTECanada are also interested 
parties. All these parties were identified as pharmaceutical advertising stakeholders in the 
analysis reported in Chapter 2.  
Most interventions were undertaken by a few stakeholders (see again Table 3.10, 
five of the interventions (33% of successful interventions, 45.4% of total applications) 
were by the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association who are present in 80% of 
cases with interveners. Four of the interventions are by Canada’s Research-Based 
Pharmaceutical Companies [brand] (33% of successful interventions, 26.7% of total 
applications) who are present in 66% of cases. Together the interventions by the 
Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association and Canada’s Research-Based 
Pharmaceutical Companies represent nine of the twelve total interventions. Initially, it 
would seem that the generic pharmaceutical lobby is more successful at intervening than 
the name brand lobby, positioning it as the most powerful network of stakeholders. This 
conclusion however becomes less certain if one organizes interveners by their respective 
mandates and their arguments as they pertain to a case (as presented in their intervener 
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factums). Canada’s Research Based Pharmaceutical Companies, BIOTECanada [brand], 
and Pfizer [brand] all represent the interests and positions of the name brand 
pharmaceutical industry. This rebalances the perception of influence, the name brand 
industry produced seven interventions across the data set, while generics produced five. 
Only two lobbies’ positions, the brand industry and generic industry positions, were 
represented here as there was no evidence of any other successful interventions. The only 
application by an entity that is not in the brand name or generic pharmaceutical lobby 
was by the Information Commissioner of Canada, abandoned.33 
 
Table 3.10: Interventions Before and After December 2008 
Cases Before December 2008 Cases After December 2008  
Cases With 
Interveners 
Cases Without 
Interveners 
Cases With 
Interveners 
Cases Without 
Interveners 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. v 
Canada (Attorney 
General) [2005] 
Apotex Inc. v 
Wellcome 
Foundation 
Ltd.[2002] 
Merck Frosst 
Canada 
Ltd. v Canada 
(Health) [2012] 
 
Nu-Pharm Inc. v 
Canada 
(Attorney 
General) [2010] 
AstraZeneca Canada 
Inc. v Canada 
(Minister of Health), 
[2006] 
NA Teva Canada Ltd. v 
Pfizer Canada Inc. 
[2012]  
 
Celgene Corp. v 
Canada 
(Attorney 
General) [2011] 
Apotex Inc. v 
Sanofi-Synthelabo 
Canada Inc. [2008]  
NA Sanofi 
Aventis v Apotex 
Inc., 2015 SCC 20 
[2015] 
NA 
Source: Case decisions for intervener participation. 
The majority of pharmaceutical cases found in this study have interveners. The 
six to three (66%) ratio of pharmaceutical cases with interveners (against cases without 
interveners) found in this study, between 2002 and 2016, is higher than the average 
proportion of cases with intervention found by Alarie & Green (2010) between January 
                                                 
33 One group of stakeholders not addressed in this study are those who would be willing or are 
interested in submitting applications for intervener status but either lack the financial resources or 
expertise to submit an application. The ability of stakeholders to submit applications to the 
Supreme Court for intervention is a that should further have investigated in the future but is 
outside the scope of this study. 
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2000 and December 2008, which was 49% (330 of 674). However, in this study there are 
cases decided after December 2008. If the number of cases studied here are separated into 
those decided before 2008 (the same timeline as Alarie and Greene) and those decided 
after, three of four, (75%) of the pharmaceutical cases decided before December 2008 
have interveners whereas only three of five (60%) of cases decided after December 2008 
have interveners. Alarie and Green found that rates of intervention in the Supreme Court 
had been rising since 2000, reaching a high of 61.8% in 2007. This may explain why the 
findings in this study are not only higher than that found by Alarie and Greene but also 
much higher than the 33% acceptance rate that Burgess (Burgess, 2000) found in her 
study of the impact of interveners in the Supreme Court between 1997-1999. The very 
small numbers involved in this analysis of pharmaceutical cases may suggest that 
pharmaceutical patent litigation inventions before 2008 are in-line with the rates of 
intervention found in the Supreme Court by Alarie and Greene, although appearing 
somewhat higher.34 However, when it is considered that cases containing a constitutional 
argument constituted over 40% of the 33% of cases involving interveners that Burges 
(Burgess, 2000) found – and that there are no constitutional issues raised in any of the 
nine pharmaceutical cases studied here – the rate of acceptance of interveners by the 
Supreme Court in (non-constitutional) pharmaceutical litigation is high. 
Alarie and Green found that an average of 4.1 interveners (Alarie & Greene, 
2010) were present on an appeal with intervention – and this was consistent with 
Burgess’ finding of four to five interveners per case: in our study, a smaller number of 
interveners per case is found for pharmaceutical patent cases (an average of two 
interveners per appeal).  The smaller number of interveners in each pharmaceutical case 
may reduce the impact of such interventions.  It is certainly the case that no 
pharmaceutical judgments cited any interventions made, whereas, as discussed above, 
Burgess not only found interveners mentioned by the judges in judgments but also found 
                                                 
34 Alarie & Greene’s study ceased data collection in 2008, whereas this study has collected cases 
up to 2015. A more recent analysis of intervention at the Supreme Court of Canada will be 
necessary to determine if the findings in this study are consistent with the broader rate of 
intervention 
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that this was more likely where there were between two and nine interventions in the 
case. 
 In pharmaceutical patent litigation in this study, of the fifteen total applications 
for intervener status, the acceptance of twelve interveners (80%) suggests that most 
interveners can expect to be successful if they choose to apply. However, even this high 
rate of acceptance is slightly lower than the 90% Supreme Court acceptance rate found by 
Alarie and Greene in their study of other types of litigation (Alarie & Greene, 2010). 
Despite the differences in scope between this study and that conducted by 
Burgess, a number of the findings by Burgess resonate with those found in this study. She 
found that a relatively few interveners made up a large portion of interventions: in this 
study there is a very small pool of stakeholders intervening across all the cases. On the 
other hand, the type of intervener reported by Burgess differs completely from the 
predominant interveners found in this study of pharmaceutical litigation:  here there is 
only one unsuccessful or incomplete attempt an intervention by a “government” figure – 
the Information Commissioner in the Merck litigation – whereas Burgess reported a high 
proportion of government-related interventions in her data.  In this study, there are no 
interventions even attempted by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, trade unions, 
individuals, or aboriginal groups found in Burgess’ study. 
A central finding is that the interveners from CanWest litigation and RJR-
MacDonald were not found to be intervening in pharmaceutical patent litigation, which is 
raises the question: why are the Interveners from RJR-MacDonald and CanWest not 
involved in pharmaceutical patent litigation? Can we expect the stakeholders we have 
found intervening in pharmaceutical patent cases to intervene on pharmaceutical 
advertising cases that reach the Supreme Court?  
The interveners from CanWest and RJR-MacDonald may not be intervening on 
pharmaceutical patent cases for a number of reasons. The two most likely reasons are: 1) 
They believe that the public interest argument is adequately represented by the brand 
name and generic pharmaceutical industry interveners or 2) They do not have the 
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expertise or resources to intervene on a growing number of pharmaceutical patent cases 
and prefer to allocate resources to higher impact actions.  
Since there has been clear interest by health and public interest stakeholders to 
intervene in the Supreme Court in RJR-MacDonald, and that there has been demonstrated 
interest by health and public interest stakeholders to intervene on the CanWest DTCA 
case, it can be reasonably assumed that these stakeholders would apply to intervene on a 
pharmaceutical advertising case that reaches the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Pharmaceutical patent interveners, in all cases, only joined the proceedings when they 
reached the Supreme Court. This may explain why they are not present in CanWest, as it 
only reached the Ontario Superior Court. Factoring in these stakeholder’s history of 
intervening on pharmaceutical cases at the Supreme Court, it is likely they would 
continue to intervene, this includes if a DTCA which reaches the Supreme Court of 
Canada. However, the arguments of the brand name and generic pharmaceutical industry 
interveners may change. 
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4 Chapter Four: Synthesis 
4.1 Introduction  
This fourth and final chapter will briefly summarize the studies described in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. These findings will be compared to the findings of prior 
literature on pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders. Finally, a discussion of the implications 
for further research on Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA policy, both advocacy directed 
toward government decision-making and advocacy directed toward influencing outcomes 
in court litigation, will follow. 
4.2 Summary of Findings in Chapter 2: Analysis of 
Canadian Pharmaceutical Advertising Stakeholders  
Recall that in Chapter 2, to address a literature gap on Canadian pharmaceutical 
DTCA stakeholders, a number of questions were posed: who are the direct-to-consumer 
pharmaceutical advertising stakeholders in the Canadian policy environment? what are 
their positions, power, interests and influence? what is the potential for these stakeholders 
to shape future pharmaceutical DTCA policy?  
The findings were:  
1) There is a wide-range of stakeholders from varying backgrounds in the 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment;  
2) Stakeholders are part of policy networks;  
3) Stakeholders have varying positions, power, interests, and influence;  
4) There is a concentration of powerful stakeholders interested in maintaining 
current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations.  
Discussion of these key findings follows.  
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4.2.1 There is a Wide Range of Stakeholders from Varying 
Background in the Pharmaceutical DTCA Policy 
Environment.   
A thematic analysis of the stakeholders in the Standing Committee on Health Report 
(Standing Committee on Health, 2004) revealed 127 different individuals and 
organizations potentially operating in the pharmaceutical DTCA space. Those 
stakeholders were thematically grouped into 15 different thematic categories: 
1. Universities/Academic Units  
2. Government  
3. Research Groups and Think Tanks  
4. Unions  
5. Health Interested Organizations  
6. Consumer Associations  
7. Pharmacists  
8. Healthcare Workers   
9. Brand Name Pharmaceutical Industry  
10. Generic Pharmaceutical Industry  
11. ‘Other’ Health Industry  
12. First Nations Groups  
13. Regulatory Groups  
14. Aging Citizenry  
15. Individuals  
The identification of 15 different thematic categories of stakeholders presents a broader 
and more nuanced view of the pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment and its 
stakeholders than had previously been noted. Previous analyses of pharmaceutical DTCA 
stakeholders have broadly defined the categories of potential stakeholders but did not 
collect the names of the organizations and individuals within each stakeholder category, 
which limits the usefulness of those studies for understanding pharmaceutical DTCA 
policy. Roberts (2011) identified three categories of stakeholders: industry, general 
practitioners, and the public. Matear and Dacin (2010) identified five categories of 
stakeholders: consumers, physicians, insurance companies and formularies, pharmacists, 
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and the government. These are fewer categories of stakeholders than identified in this 
study, and there is no list of stakeholders who might be placed in each category. It is 
important to understand what types of stakeholders may be operating in the 
pharmaceutical DTCA space, and who exactly they are, and this is a major contribution 
of this study. 
4.2.2 Stakeholders are Part of Policy Networks    
The connections between stakeholders identified in this study have also been 
mapped in this study. The Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board (PAAB) was 
identified as an important network, and a number of the stakeholders in PAAB are 
themselves associations with constituent members. A number of the stakeholders who 
made submissions to the Romanow Commission (Commission on the Future of Health 
Care in Canada, 2002) are also associations with constituent members. By cross-
referencing the membership in the associations found in PAAB and the Romanow 
Commission it became apparent that some stakeholders’ associations share members. The 
individuals and organizations who are part of multiple stakeholder associations have 
multiple avenues through which they can advance their agendas. For example, Sanofi (a 
brand pharmaceutical manufacturer) is a member of four associations in PAAB, and can 
work through any of those associations to advance its pharmaceutical DTCA agenda. 
4.2.3 Stakeholders Have Varying Positions, Power, Interests, and 
Influence     
Stakeholders in the pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment are numerous, and 
vary in their positions, power, interests and influence. The stakeholder positions exist on 
a continuum ranging from “no regulation” to “completely prohibited” but can be grouped 
into three positions: less regulated, maintain current regulations, and more regulated. 
Roberts (2011) conducted a rudimentary analysis of her three stakeholder groups 
(industry, general practitioners, and the public) and hypothesized about whether they 
would support or reject four policy options, but this was different from identifying the 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy positions of individual stakeholders as has been done in 
this study. Matear and Dacin (2010), in their secondary literature analysis, examined the 
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prevailing sentiment of categories of stakeholders towards pharmaceutical DTCA, but 
does not provide the positions of individual stakeholders on pharmaceutical DTCA 
policy.  This study identifies both the positions of individual stakeholders on 
pharmaceutical DTCA and the positions of individual stakeholders on pharmaceutical 
DTCA policy. 
4.2.4 Power, Stakeholders, and Maintaining the Status Quo      
Findings from the stakeholder analysis in Chapter 2 suggest that the highest 
concentration of power is held by the stakeholders who wish to maintain current 
pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. Stakeholders in general were split in their positions, 
between maintaining current pharmaceutical DTCA regulation or increasing regulation of 
DTCA, but the all the high-power stakeholders (e.g. Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association) and 40% of medium-power stakeholders (e.g. Canadian Association of 
Medical Publishers) favoured maintaining the status quo. Because of the power held by 
these stakeholders, it is likely that they are able to influence policymakers to maintain the 
current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. The majority of low-power stakeholders (e.g. 
Canadian Women’s Health Network) and 50% of medium-power stakeholders (e.g. 
Canadian Medical Association) favoured more regulated pharmaceutical DTCA, but they 
are less likely to able to influence policymakers to increase the regulation of 
pharmaceutical DTCA. 
4.3 Summary of Findings in Chapter 3: Analysis of 
Interveners in the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Pharmaceutical Litigation 
There has not yet been any litigation in the Supreme Court of Canada involving 
pharmaceutical DTCA.  There was litigation in the mid-1990s in the Supreme Court that 
involved DTCA in the tobacco industry (RJR-MacDonald) -- and the opposition to the 
then regulatory environment for that industry was founded upon health concerns.  It 
involved a number of interveners – all of them active in health policy-making. None of 
these interveners came from the pharmaceutical sector. 
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Just as the tobacco industry advertised in a regulated environment in the mid-
1990s, so too does the pharmaceutical industry in Canada currently advertise in a 
regulated environment.  As established in Chapter 3, this Canadian pharmaceutical 
DTCA environment has remained unchanged by statute or regulation throughout this 
century.  As established in Chapter 2, there are those involved in the pharmaceutical 
DTCA policy environment who would like to see it changed. 
The regulatory environment for DTCA advertising affecting the tobacco industry 
was unalterably changed by the Supreme Court through its decision in RJR-MacDonald.  
The Supreme Court is increasingly allowing interventions such as occurred in RJR-
MacDonald.  Given the interests of the healthcare lobby in outcomes related to 
pharmaceutical DTCA, one might expect those who “lobbied” the Court, through 
intervention in the RJR-MacDonald case, to have a similar interest in “lobbying” the 
Court though intervention in pharmaceutical cases.  However, there have been no such 
cases brought to the Supreme Court and this hypothesis cannot be directly tested.  On the 
other hand, as described in Chapter 3, there has been a good deal of litigation brought to 
the Court involving other issues in the pharmaceutical industry, particularly litigation 
involving patents related to that industry – an industry key to health outcomes in this 
country.  One might expect the same interveners in this litigation as were involved in the 
RJR-MacDonald health related advertising litigation – and if the same interveners had 
been found, this would have been a good predictor, one would have thought, of those 
who would seek to intervene in future pharmaceutical DCTA litigation. These were the 
premises underlying the research reported in Chapter 3.  
It will be recalled that the overall research question posed in Chapter 3 was: given 
the relatively recent rise of interveners in the Supreme Court process in Canada and the 
presence of interveners in the landmark advertising case RJR-MacDonald v Canada, are 
the stakeholders identified in Chapter 2 found as interveners in current pharmaceutical 
related Supreme Court litigation?  
There were two subsidiary questions involved in the Chapter 3 discussion:  if the 
stakeholders identified in Chapter 2 were found as interveners in current pharmaceutical 
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related Supreme Court litigation, which interveners and to what extent? And, for those 
interveners identified in Chapter 2 also found to be present as interveners in Supreme 
Court of Canada litigation, do their interests, positions, influence, and power parallel that 
identified for them in Chapter 2 in the broader policy environment? 
 There were a number of key findings from the stakeholder analysis of interveners 
in Chapter 3.  The interveners in the DTCA case of RJR-MacDonald in the Supreme 
Court were:  
• Canadian Cancer Society,  
• Canadian Council on Smoking and Health 
• Canadian Medical Association 
• Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada 
• Canadian Lung Association 
• Attorney General of Ontario 
The CanWest litigation, the only instance yet where a litigant has attempted to challenge 
the pharmaceutical DTCA law in Canada, saw a similar situation, with respect to 
interveners, at its very earliest court level, to the situation of interveners at the Supreme 
Court level hearing about DTCA law in RJR-MacDonald: although the CanWest case 
(Women and Health Protection, 2007) was indefinitely adjourned prior to the submission 
of the intervener factums (and never returned to court), a coalition of public-interest 
stakeholders applied for intervener status. Those interveners were:  
• Canadian Federation of Nurses Unions 
• Canadian Health Coalition, 
• Canadian Union of Public Employees 
• Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada 
• Society for Diabetic Rights 
• Medical Reform Group 
• Drug Safety Canada.  
• Women and Health Protection 
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The interveners in RJR-MacDonald and CanWest do share a number of features. Despite 
not being the exact same coalition of stakeholders (which is to be expected when 
considering the issues of the case), the interveners are all public interest stakeholders. 
Furthermore, in each case these interveners apply as a coalition, and not as individual 
stakeholders, for intervener status. Both RJR-MacDonald and CanWest are cases where a 
plaintiff challenges restrictive advertising legislation involving health. Unfortunately, it is 
not possible to compare the factums of the interveners in RJR-MacDonald and CanWest 
because no factum(s) were submitted in CanWest. 
On the other hand, in the Supreme Court cases involving pharmaceutical patent 
litigation that were collected and analyzed, four stakeholders have successfully applied 
for intervener status in these cases. Of the 12 successful applications for intervener status 
in these pharmaceutical cases, five were by the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association four were by Canada’s Research Based Pharmaceutical Companies, two 
were by BIOTECanada, and just one was by Pfizer Canada. 
• The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association (in 5 cases),  
• Canada’s Research Based Pharmaceutical Companies (in 4 cases),  
• BIOTECanada (in 2 cases), 
• Pfizer Canada (in 1 case) 
These successful applicants for intervener status can be divided into two distinct groups: 
generic pharmaceutical industry interveners (The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association) and brand pharmaceutical industry interveners (Canada’s Research Based 
Pharmaceutical Companies, BIOTECanada, Pfizer Canada). A pattern of intervention 
was discussed: in most cases, a brand intervener and a generic intervener will appear. 
Only in cases where the issues before the court did not directly concern the validity of 
pharmaceutical patents was there only one intervener.  
The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association is a generic pharmaceutical 
industry stakeholder: a high-power stakeholder whose position on pharmaceutical DTCA 
is to act to maintain the current regulations, who benefits from the current regulations, 
and is a high influence stakeholder.  
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Canada’s Research Based Pharmaceutical Companies is identified as a brand 
name pharmaceutical industry stakeholder:  it has had its named changed to Innovative 
Medicines Canada. Innovative Medicines Canada is a high power stakeholder whose 
position on pharmaceutical DTCA is to maintain the current regulations. It benefits from 
the current regulations and is a high influence stakeholder. BIOTECanada is also a brand 
name pharmaceutical industry stakeholder, though a medium-power stakeholder 
(compared to Innovative Medicines Canada’s high power). BIOTECanada’s position on 
pharmaceutical DTCA is also to maintain the current regulations and it also benefits from 
the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. Like Innovative Medicines Canada, it is a 
high-influence stakeholder. Pfizer is a pharmaceutical company who is represented by 
three associations in PAAB (BIOTECanada, Innovative Medicines Canada, and 
Consumer Health Products Canada), which makes it the organization with the second 
most avenues through which to achieve pharmaceutical DTCA policy change through 
PAAB (surpassed only by Sanofi, which is represented four times in PAAB because 
Innovative Medicines Canada represents two Sanofi subsidiaries).  
These two brand association stakeholders, BIOTECanada and Innovative 
Medicines Canada, and the generic association, Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association, all support maintaining the current regulations on pharmaceutical DTCA, 
are all high-power, and are all associations of other organizations. The finding that they 
are all also interveners on pharmaceutical patent litigation at the Supreme Court both re-
affirms this study’s assertion that these stakeholders are in fact high power, but also 
suggests that to successfully, and individually, apply for intervener status at the Supreme 
Court, a stakeholder may need to be high-power. These high-power stakeholders are best 
positioned to intervene on a pharmaceutical advertising case which reaches the Supreme 
Court of Canada. These stakeholders’ interest in court intervention may also be an 
indication of the policy expertise and resources at their disposal, and the lack of 
applications for intervention by other stakeholders could be explained by a possible lack 
of policy expertise and resources. 
 All the interveners identified in these pharmaceutical patent cases in the Supreme 
Court, and in the CanWest litigation, are among those identified in the stakeholder 
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analysis of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders in Chapter 2. The RJR-MacDonald 
interveners are not found in Chapter 2. It is likely the case that they are not present in the 
pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholder holder analysis because RJR-MacDonald was 
primarily a case about tobacco advertising, and so the stakeholders interested in the 
implications of tobacco advertising policy are different than those interested in 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy. 
In CanWest, the coalition of interveners was different from that in RJR-
MacDonald and yet dramatically similar. The Canadian Health Coalition is a health 
interested organization, medium-power, supports more regulated pharmaceutical DTCA, 
high influence, and has neutral interests (neither gaining nor losing) from the current 
pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. The other interveners in CanWest are not associations 
in PAAB and did not submit documents to the Romanow Commission (2002). However, 
most were found in the Standing Committee Report (Standing Committee on Health, 
2004), and categorized: The Canadian Federation of Nurses Unions and Canadian Union 
of Public Employees are categorized as unions, and the Communications, Energy and 
Paperworkers Union of Canada can also be classified as union (although they did not 
participate in the Standing Committee, they fit the profile of a union). The Medical 
Reform Group, Drug Safety Canada, and the Society for Diabetic Rights, and Women 
and Health Protection are categorized in this study as Health Interested Organizations.  
 The pharmaceutical DTCA positions and interests of these organizations is not 
recorded, but they are a cross-section of health-interested organizations and unions. Like 
those who intervened in RJR-MacDonald, they applied as a coalition. Unlike the 
pharmaceutical patent interveners (discussed further below), with the exception of the 
Canadian Health Coalition, the interveners in CanWest are not associations of other 
organizations.  There are a number of reasons why they may have chosen to apply as a 
coalition: 1) to improve the chances that the application would be accepted; 2) to increase 
the potential impact of the intervention; and 3) to pool financial and legal resources.  
In none of the pharmaceutical cases at the Supreme Court did a coalition of health 
interested stakeholders – or even individual health interested stakeholders – apply to 
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intervene such as had collectively applied and intervened in RJR-MacDonald at the 
Supreme Court, or applied in the more recent lower court action involving CanWest (both 
DCTA cases). The only applicant which qualifies as a public-interest intervener in this 
study of pharmaceutical litigation before the Supreme Court was the Information 
Commissioner of Canada, which was ultimately unsuccessful in its application for 
intervener status.  
 The coalition of health-interested interveners in RJR-MacDonald did not follow 
the same pattern of intervention in their collective factum as was the pattern for the 
interveners in the pharmaceutical cases at the Supreme Court. The structure of the RJR-
MacDonald health-interested interveners’ factum begins with an introduction of the 
coalition of interveners, followed by the perspective of the interveners on the Tobacco 
Products Control Act (Factum of the Intervener Coalition, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v 
Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199), an extended section on the medical facts supporting the 
legislative objective of that Act, a section describing the aims of tobacco advertising, and 
the level of support for a tobacco advertising ban. The interveners are explicit in their 
goal to ban tobacco advertising as a matter of public health policy, and this is the most 
prominent theme throughout the factum.  
The content of the intervener factums in the pharmaceutical patent cases typically 
followed a different pattern: the majority of the factum was always dedicated to the 
specific issues of the case and a small section of the factum discussed public-policy 
issues. Dependent on whether a brand or generic pharmaceutical intervener submitted the 
intervener factum in hand, the arguments made by the intervener reflected those made by 
the brand or generic litigant in the case. The RJR-MacDonald interveners were solely 
concerned about the public health policy implications of the issues before the Court. 
4.4 Conclusions of the Study   
Chapter 2 identified a broad range of stakeholders interested in Canadian 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy, and Chapter 3 identified a small set from within that range 
who have applied and been admitted by the Supreme Court of Canada as interveners in 
recent pharmaceutical patent litigation in the Supreme Court. All the interveners admitted 
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to the lower court litigation involving pharmaceutical DCTA, CanWest, are also 
identified in the Chapter 2 stakeholder analysis of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders. 
To be an intervener in a court action, one must apply.  That all these interveners admitted 
to the actions examined also appear in the Chapter 2 pharmaceutical DCTA stakeholder 
analysis confirms that some pharmaceutical DCTA stakeholders are taking the policy 
step of deciding to apply to intervene in judicial proceedings as well as being active in 
lobbying activities before Parliament and Cabinet. This adds an important new element to 
our understanding of stakeholders in pharmaceutical DTCA policy: at least those also 
directly interested in pharmaceutical policy, as well as pharmaceutical DTCA policy, 
have decided Supreme Court intervention activity is an important part of lobbying for 
change. This contributes an important new dimension to our understanding of 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy going forward. 
It is also important to note that the type of pharmaceutical DCTA stakeholder 
active in previous Supreme Court DTCA litigation, involving not pharmaceutical DCTA 
but tobacco DCTA, has also been involved in the only known pharmaceutical DCTA 
litigation in Canada, though that litigation has never continued or been completed even at 
the trial level.  That type of pharmaceutical DCTA stakeholder is not the stakeholder that 
has decided to become involved in pharmaceutical Supreme Court hearings not related to 
DCTA.  
4.4.1 Pharmaceutical DTCA Stakeholders and Potential DTCA 
Policy and Litigation 
This study is, fundamentally, a “snapshot” in time. However, long after its 
conclusion the stakeholders identified in pharmaceutical DTCA policy and 
pharmaceutical patent litigation will continue operating. Some liberty has been taken to 
anticipate how stakeholders may participate in a renewed discussion about 
pharmaceutical DTCA policy and potential legislative or regulatory change, or if 
pharmaceutical DTCA litigation, similar to CanWest or, in the tobacco context, RJR-
MacDonald, ever reaches the Supreme Court of Canada.  
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The generic and brand industry pharmaceutical patent case interveners have 
opposing arguments on the issues of those cases. However, this research has 
demonstrated that both these types of stakeholders have a common policy position on 
pharmaceutical DCTA: to maintain the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. 
Considering the history of intervention at the Supreme Court by both these 
pharmaceutical stakeholder groups, they are likely to intervene on pharmaceutical DTCA 
litigation if it reaches the Supreme Court of Canada, and would both argue to maintain 
the current regulations. However, given their past patterns of court intervention, they 
would likely only intervene if such cases reach the Supreme Court of Canada.  
There are a number of medium power stakeholders who support more regulated 
pharmaceutical DTCA (e.g, Canadian Pharmacists Association, British Columbia Nurses 
Union, Canadian Health Coalition), which may be likely candidates to intervene in a 
coalition of interveners. Other likely candidates to intervene are any stakeholders 
categorized as health interested organizations, unions, or healthcare workers. These 
stakeholders are likely to argue for more regulated pharmaceutical DTCA.  
The likelihood of a pharmaceutical DTCA case reaching the Supreme Court of 
Canada is reduced, it would seem, because so few stakeholders identified in this study are 
interested in less pharmaceutical DTCA regulation. The situation is the same in terms of 
anticipating legislative or regulatory change to current pharmaceutical DTCA legislation 
or regulation: there is a large number of stakeholders interested in maintaining (with the 
largest number of strong stakeholders in this camp) or increasing regulation, and few 
whose policy position it is to reduce the regulations. This helps explain why there has 
been so little legislation, regulation or litigation concerning pharmaceutical DTCA in the 
past two decades. 
4.5 Limitations 
As is the case in most research, there were some limitations to these studies. In 
the first study (Chapter 2), only publicly available documents were collected and 
analyzed. Pharmaceutical DTCA policy has not been a major focus in recent years, and 
because of this, some of the policy documents available are dated. Further, the 
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assessment of position, power, interests, and influence was limited to information 
available in documents and websites, and, on occasion, some information was not 
available. In the second study (Chapter 3), it was not possible include a study of all the 
factums filed by the parties to each case being examined – although the study which was 
completed here, of all the intervener factums, was possible. The subject matter of patent 
litigation is, by its nature, very valuable information and secrecy is often a key element.  
For this reason, certain of the cases had “sealing orders” which prevented the collection 
or study of litigants’ factums. One other unavoidable gap in available evidence caused the 
study to take form that it has: the Judges of the Supreme Court who hear the applications 
for intervention in cases to be heard in their court do not ever reveal the reasons for their 
decisions to permit or deny an applicant.  For this reason, it is only possible to make 
observations about whether or not an intervener receives leave, not why.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Examples and Excerpts of Coded Text 
Code  Coding 
Category 
Example 
Organization  
Example Quoted Text Source 
Position More 
Regulated 
DTCA 
Canadian Health 
Coalition 
“That a prohibition on 
direct to consumer 
advertisements of 
prescription drugs be 
strictly enforced, given the 
lack of evidence of health 
benefits and the serious 
potential for harm. Federal 
legislation should ban 
advertising, which includes 
both the product’s name 
and indications for use, and 
ban cross-border direct to 
consumer advertising” 
(p.28) 
Standing Together 
For Medicare: A 
Call to Care: A 
Submission to the 
Romanow 
Commission f the 
Future of Health 
Care in Canada – 
Canadian Health 
Coalition – 
November 2001 
Maintain 
Current 
Regulations 
New 
Democratic 
Party 
“We must also maintain 
our ban on direct-to-
consumer drug advertising 
(DTCA)—a practice 
prohibited in almost all 
countries outside the 
United States and New 
Zealand.”  (p.14) 
New Democratic 
Party Submission 
to the Romanow 
Commission 
Less 
Regulated 
DTCA 
Association of 
Medical 
Advertising 
Agencies 
(AMAA) 
“I manage an Agency that 
creates advertising and 
content spanning various 
mediums, including the 
sales representative, print, 
digital, online, radio, and 
TV. My objective, to cross 
media disciplines with staff 
who can tackle everything 
from, tablet details to print 
to radio to TV, all with the 
smart thinking and rigor 
Bio-Pharmaceutical 
Advertising requires by 
law” (para. 1). 
 
https://www.linked
in.com/in/terrycull
y/ 
 
Power High Canadian 
Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Association 
11 high-income 
pharmaceutical companies 
members, these members 
forming the executive 
http://canadiangen
erics.ca/about-
us/committees/ 
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committee of the CGPA 
(coalition of generic 
industry companies) 
 
http://canadiangen
erics.ca/about-
us/our-member-
companies/ 
 
Medium Canadian 
Medical 
Association 
“Today the CMA has more 
than 85,000 members, and 
advocates on behalf of both 
members and their patients 
— on Parliament Hill, 
during federal election 
campaigns and in the 
media. The CMA also 
takes the lead on public 
health issues.” (Para. 3) 
 
Assets > 35,000,000. 
Revenues > 46,000,000 
https://www.cma.c
a/En/Pages/history
-mission-
vision.aspx 
 
 
https://www.cma.c
a/Assets/assets-
library/document/e
n/about-us/2013-
CMA-Financial-
Statements.pdf 
 
Low Canadian 
Women’s 
Health Netowrk 
“In March 2013 we, along 
with the Centres of 
Excellence for Women’s 
Health and the Réseau 
québécois d’action pour la 
santé des femmes, lost our 
main source of funding 
from Health Canada. This 
major change has been 
both a loss and an 
opportunity to develop new 
strengths and direction 
while continuing to focus 
on what Canadian women, 
researchers and policy 
makers expect from us—
objective, trustworthy and 
topical information about 
the health issues that matter 
most to Canadian women.” 
(p.3) 
http://www.cwhn.c
a/sites/default/files
/PDF/Annual_Rep
ort_2012-13.pdf 
 
 
Interests Benefit  Innovative 
Medicines 
Canada 
“We work tirelessly to 
further our members’ 
interests as outlined in our 
Strategic Objectives.” 
(Para. 3) 
http://innovativem
edicines.ca/about/o
ur-mission-and-
vision/ 
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Neutral Canadian 
Women’s 
Health Network 
The Canadian Women’s 
Health Network (CWHN): 
“Establishes a visible 
national presence for 
women’s health in Canada. 
• Provides user-friendly and 
reliable health information, 
resources and research. 
• Works to change 
inequitable health policies 
and practices by 
contributing women’s 
voices and expertise. 
• Acts as a knowledge broker 
for researchers, clinicians, 
decision makers, media and 
the public. 
• Encourages community-
based participatory 
research. 
• Monitors emerging issues 
and trends affecting 
women’s health. 
• Acts as a forum for debate 
on women’s health 
research and policy issues.” 
(Para. 3). 
 
http://www.cwhn.c
a/en/aboutus/missi
on 
 
Loss  “May strain the 
relationship between 
patients and providers, for 
example if a patient’s 
request for an advertised 
prescription drug is 
refused” (Para. 3). 
 
http://policybase.c
ma.ca/dbtw-
wpd/PolicyPDF/P
D03-01.pdf 
 
Influence 
(able to 
assert 
position on 
a national 
level) 
High New 
Democratic 
Party 
“Major Canadian political 
party with official 
opposition status and 103 
MPs” (Para. 6). (Post-2015 
election the NDP has 44 
MPs in the house of 
commons). 
http://www.ndp.ca/
about-ndp 
 
Medium  Canadian 
Medical 
Association 
Several submissions to 
government for policy 
changes. 
https://www.cma.c
a/En/Pages/submis
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sions-to-
government.aspx 
 
Low Ottawa Health 
Coalition 
“The Ottawa Health 
Coalition brings together 
people across the Ottawa 
region to protect and 
improve public healthcare 
for all. We work to stop 
cutbacks and privatization, 
and promote democratic 
debate about healthcare 
policy that affects all of us” 
(Para. 1) 
 
https://ottawahealt
hcoalition.ca/about
/ 
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Appendix B: Full List of PAAB Constituent Members 
PAAB 
Association 
Constituent Members Number of 
Constituent 
Members 
BIOTECanada AbbVie Canada, Accel-Rx Health Sciences, Acuitas 
Therapeutics, AdeTherapeutics Inc., Advanced Medical 
Research Institute of Canada, Aegerion Pharmaceuticals, 
Agricultural Institute of Canada, Agrisoma BioSciences 
Inc., Ag-West Bio Inc., Akshaya BIO Inc., Alethia 
Biotherapeutics Alexion Pharma Canada, AMGEN 
Canada Inc., AmorChem, Angiochem Inc., Antibe 
Therapeutics, Appili Therapeutics, Aqua Bounty Canada, 
Inc., Aquinox Pharmaceuticals Inc., AstraZeneca Canada 
Inc., Augurex Life Sciences Corp., Aurinia 
Pharmaceuticals Inc., AusBiotech Ltd., Avir Pharma Inc., 
Bayshore Specialty Rx Ltd., BELLUS Health Inc., 
BioAlberta, BioAmber Canada Inc., Biodextris , 
BioEnterprise Corporation, Biogen Canada Inc., 
Bioindustrial Innovation Canada, Bio-K Plus International 
Inc., BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc., BioNB, BioNova, 
Biopham Management Inc., BIOQuébec, Biotechnology 
Industry Organization, BioVectra Inc., Blake, Cassels & 
Graydon, LLP, Blanchard Law Office, Bloom Burton & 
Co., BMS Canada Risk Services, Borden Ladner Gervais 
LLP, Bristol-Myers Squibb Canada Inc., Canada’s 
Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, Canadian 
Seed Trade Association, Caprion Biosciences Inc., 
Cardiome Pharma Corp., CDRD Ventures Inc., Ceapro 
Inc., Celator Pharmaceuticals Corp., Celgene Inc., 
Celverum Inc., Centre for Probe Development & 
Commercialization, Centre for the Commercialization of 
Antibodies and Biologics, Chelation Partners, CO2 
Solutions Inc., Contextual Genomics Inc., CQDM, 
Critical Outcome Technologies Inc., CTI Life Sciences 
Fund, Cyclenium Pharma Inc., Cynapsus Therapeutics 
Inc., Dalton Pharma Services, Del Mar Pharmaceuticals, 
Drug Development and Innovation Centre, Eisai Limited, 
Eli Lilly Canada Inc., Encycle Therapeutics, Gene Inc. 
Ernst & Young LLP, ESSA Pharmaceuticals Inc., Farris, 
Vaughan, Wills & Murphy LLP, Fasken Martineau 
DuMoulin LLP Folia Biotech Inc., Formation Biologics 
Inc., Genentech, GenePOC Inc., Genome Canada, 
Genzyme Canada, Global Public AffairsGMD Pharma 
Solutions, Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP, Grifols 
Highland Therapeutics, Hoffmann-La Roche, iCo 
Therapeutics Inc., Immunovaccine Inc., ImStar 
Therapeutics Inc., Innovation PEI, Innovative Targeting 
Solutions Inc., InnovoXL Inc. Institute for Research in 
Immunology and Cancer-Commercialization of Research, 
InSymbiosis Management Inc., Intercept Pharma Canada, 
International Centre for Infectious Diseases, Intrinsik 
Health Sciences Inc., Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals Canada 
Inc., iTP, Biomedica Corp., Janssen Inc., Johnson & 
Johnson – JLABS, Kairos Therapeutics, KalGene Pharma 
Inc., Kane Biotech Inc., KMT Hepatech Inc., Korea 
209 
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Biotechnology Industry Organization, KPMG, Laurent 
Pharmaceuticals Inc., Life Sciences, Association of 
Manitoba, LifeSciences Ontario (LSO), Life Sciences 
British Columbia, Linnaeus Plant Sciences Inc., MaRS 
Discovery District, Marsala Biotech Inc., McKesson 
Canada, MEDEC MedGenesis Therapeutix Inc., 
Medicago Inc., Medicure Inc., Mēdunik Canada, Merck 
Canada Inc., Milestone Pharmaceuticals, MSI 
Methylation Sciences Inc., National Research Council 
Canada, Neomed Institute, NeoVentures Biotechnology 
Inc., Neurodyn Life Sciences Inc., New Zealand Biotech, 
Newfoundland and Labrador Association of Technology 
Industries, NoNO Inc., Northern Biologics Inc., Norton 
Rose Fulbright LLP, Novartis, Pharmaceuticals Canada 
Inc., Novicol International Holdings, Novo Nordisk 
Canada Inc., Okanagan Specialty Fruits Inc., OncoGenex 
Technologies Inc., Oncolytics Biotech Inc., Ontario 
Bioscience Innovation Organization, Pangaea Group, Pan-
Provincial Vaccine Enterprise, Patient Access Solutions 
Inc., PBR Laboratories, Pfizer Canada Inc., PlantForm 
Corporation, POS Bio-Sciences, Precision NanoSystems, 
Inc., Prevtec Microbia Inc., PricewaterhouseCoopers 
LLP, Prince Edward Island BioAlliance, Pro Bono Bio 
Inc., ProMIS Neurosciences, ProNAi Therapeutics 
Canada, PROOF Centre of Excellence, Protagenic 
Therapeutics Canada Inc., Proteocyte Diagnostics Inc., 
Qu Biologics, Raptor Pharmaceuticals , Renaissance 
Bioscience Corp., RepliCel Life Sciences, Replikins Ltd., 
Research Canada, Resverlogix, Royal Bank of Canada, 
Sanofi Pasteur Limited, SemiosBio Technologies Inc., 
Sequence Bio, Sernova Corp., Shire Pharma Canada 
ULC, Shoppers Drug Mart Specialty Health Network, 
SignalChem Lifesciences Corporation, SinoVeda Canada 
Inc., Sirona Biochem Corp., Smart & Biggar 
Fetherstonhaugh LLP, Sobi Inc., SolAeroMed Inc., 
Soricimed Biopharma Inc., Sound Insurance Services 
Inc., SPharm Inc., Taiga BioActives Inc., Takeda Canada 
Inc., TEC Edmonton, Teralys Capital Fund of Funds L.P., 
Teva Canada Innovation, Therapure Biopharma Inc., 
Thrasos Inc., Transition Therapeutics Inc., Trillium 
Therapeutics Inc., UCB Canada Inc., University of 
Guelph, University of Manitoba, University of Waterloo, 
Vaccine and Infectious Disease, Organization-
International Vaccine Centre, Valeant Canada LP, 
Valneva Canada Inc., VBI Vaccines, Versant Ventures 
Canada Ltd., Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc., Viable 
Healthworks Corp., viDA Therapeutics Inc., Viventia 
Biotechnologies Inc. VWR International, Wex 
Pharmaceuticals Inc., Wilson Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, 
Xagenic Canada Inc., Xenon Pharmaceuticals Inc., Zenith 
Epigenetics Corp., Zymeworks Inc. 
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PAAB 
Association  
Constituent Members of Association   Number of 
Constituent 
Members 
The 
Association of 
Faculties of 
Medicine of 
Canada 
Western University/Schulich School of Medicine and 
Dentistry, University of Toronto, University of 
Saskatchewan, University of Ottawa, University of 
Manitoba, University of Calgary/Cumming School of 
Medicine, University of British Columbia, University of 
Alberta, Université Laval, Université de Sherbrooke 
Universiteé de Montréal, Queens University, Northern 
Ontario School of Medicine McMaster University, McGill 
University, Dalhousie University 
16 
The 
Association of 
Medical 
Advertising 
Agencies 
Terry Cully No 
constituent 
organization 
members 
Canadian 
Association of 
Medical 
Publishers 
Canadian Medical Association (CMA), Canadian 
Urological Association (CUAJ), The College of Family 
Physicians of Canada, Healthcare Media Partners Inc., 
JLS Media, Keith Communications Inc., Parkhurst 
Publishing, Pulsus Group, Rogers Healthcare Group  A 
Division of Rogers Media, STA Healthcare 
Communications 
10 
Canadian 
Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Association 
Actavis Pharma Company, Apotex Inc., Fresenius Kabi 
Canada Ltd, Mylan, Pharmascience Inc., Sandoz Canada 
Inc., Taro Pharmaceuticals, Teva Canada Limited, ACIC 
9 
Canadian 
Medical 
Association 
Canadian Physicians  Information 
Not Available 
Canadian 
Pharmacists 
Association 
Canadian Pharmacists Information 
not available 
Best 
Medicines 
Coalition 
Arthritis Consumer Experts, Asthma Society of Canada: 
Better PharmaCare Coalition (BC), Canadian Arthritis 
Patient Alliance, Canadian Breast Cancer Network, 
Canadian Epilepsy Alliance, Canadian Hemophilia 
Society, Canadian Pain Society, Canadian Skin Patient 
Alliance, Canadian Society of Intestinal Research, 
Canadian Treatment Action Council, Cancer Advocacy, 
Coalition of Canada, Canadian Association of Retired 
Persons, Creating Synergy Health Coalition (AB), 
Gastrointestinal Society: 
Hepatitis C Council of British Columbia, Kidney Cancer 
Canada: , Lymphoma Foundation Canada, Ovarian 
Cancer Canada: Monique Beaupré-Lazu, Tourette 
Syndrome Foundation 
20 
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Consumer 
Health 
Products 
Canada 
Bayer Healthcare, Consumer Care, Blistex Corporation, 
Boehringer Ingelheim Canada Ltd., Church & Dwight 
Canada Combe Incorporated, Delivera, Dormer 
Labratories Inc, GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare, 
Johnson & Johnson Inc. Lallemand Health Solutions, 
Pendopharma, a Division of Pharmascience Inc., Pfizer 
Consumer Healthcare, Procter & Gamble Inc., Purdue 
Pharma, Reckitti Benckiser 
15 
Innovative 
Medicines 
Canada 
Amgen, Astellas , AstraZeneca, Bayer, Boehringer 
Ingelheim Bristol-Meyers Squibb Canada, Brunel , 
Ceapro, Charles River Labratories, Conundrum Solutions, 
Council for continuing pharmaceutical education, Eli 
Lilly Canada, Eisai Limited, EMD Serono Canada, EC 
Endoceuticals, Ferring Pharmaceuticals Genome Canada, 
Gilead, GlaxoSmithKline, GlyPharma, Roche Innoviva, 
JSS Research, Janssen, KalGene, Leo Pharma, MedicaGo, 
Merck, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, Nucro Technics Otsuka 
Canada pharmaceutical inc., Paladin, Pediapharm inc. 
Pfizer, Proteocyte diagnostics, Promometic, Purdue, 
Ropack, Sanofi, Sanofi Pasteur, Servier, Shire, Sunovion, 
Takeda, Therapure, Thera technologies, Vantage biotrials 
 
48 
Canadian 
Association of 
Retired 
Persons 
300,000 individual members across Canada No 
constituent 
organization 
members 
Consumer 
Council of 
Canada 
Canadian Fuels Association, Canadian Life and Health 
Insurance Association, Credit Union Central of Canada, 
Electrical Safety Authority, Enbridge Gas Distribution, 
Interac, Investment Funds Institute of Canada, Ontario 
Motor Vehicle Industry Council Procter and Gamble 
Canada, Real Estate Council of Ontario, RESCON, Retail 
Council of Canada, Technical Standards and Safety 
Authority, Visa Canada 
14 
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Federation des 
medecines 
omipracticiens 
du Quebec 
Association of General Practitioners of the Lower St. 
Lawrence, Association of General Practitioners in the 
Mauricie, Association of General Practitioners Bois-
Francs, Association of General Practitioners of Montreal, 
Association of Quebec CLSC doctors, Association of 
Northwest General Practitioners of Quebec, Association 
of General Practitioners of the South Shore, Association 
West of General Practitioners of Quebec, Association of 
General Practitioners North Shore, Association of General 
Practitioners of Quebec, Association Estrie of General 
Practitioners, Association Richelieu-Saint-Laurent general 
practitioners, Physicians working in psychiatric facility, 
Association of General Practitioners in the Saguenay / 
Lac St-Jean, Association Gaspésie of General 
Practitioners, Association of Southwest General 
Practitioners, Association of General Practitioners 
Laurentides-Lanaudière, Association of General 
Practitioners of Yamaska, Association of General 
Practitioners Laval 
19 
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Appendix C: Alternative Position & Strengths of Position Diagram 
 
Source: Stakeholder DTCA policy documents and websites. 
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Appendix D: Stakeholder’s DTCA Positions & Strengths of Those Positions From 
PAAB & Romanow Submissions 
Strength 
of 
Position 
Less Regulated 
DTCA 
Maintain Current 
Regulations 
More Regulated 
DTCA 
No Official 
Position 
High 
 
The Association 
of Medical 
Advertising 
Agencies 
Canadian Labour 
Congress; Canadian 
Autoworkers Union; 
New Democratic 
Party; Canadian 
Generic 
Pharmaceutical 
Association; 
Innovative 
Medicines Canada 
Canadian Health 
Coalition; Ottawa 
Health Coalition; 
Canadian Women's 
Health Network; 
Prince Edward 
Island Health 
Coalition; British 
Columbia Nurses 
Union; The 
Association of 
Faculties of 
Medicine of Canada 
None 
Medium None BIOTECanada 
 
Canadian Medical 
Association; 
Canadian 
Pharmacists 
Association; 
Federation des 
medecines 
omipracticiens du 
Quebec 
None 
Low None Canadian 
Association of 
Medical Publishers; 
Consumer 
Healthcare Providers 
None Best Medicines 
Coalition; 
Canadian 
Association of 
Retired Persons; 
Consumer 
Council of 
Canada 
Source: stakeholder policy documents and websites 
Notes:  High = a strong statement on DTCA policy and policymaking actions that 
further their position. Medium = strength suggests either a strong statement on DTCA 
policy or policymaking involvement to advance their position. Low = A weak policy 
statement with respect to their position or that the position had to be inferred, and that 
there was few or no policymaking involvement to advance their position. 
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Appendix E: Cases, Intervener Briefs, Docket References 
Case Reference  Intervener Brief Reference Docket Numbers 
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v 
Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199 
Reference re RJR-MacDonald 
Inc. v Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199 
(Factum of the Intervener the 
Attorney General of Ontario court 
file no. 23460 and 23490) 
 
Reference re RJR-MacDonald 
Inc. v Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199 
(Dockets of the SCC, 23460 and 
23490) online: 
http://www.scc-csc.ca/case-
dossier/info/dock-regi-
eng.aspx?cas=23490 
and 
http://www.scc-csc.ca/case-
dossier/info/dock-regi-
eng.aspx?cas=23460 
Reference re RJR-MacDonald 
Inc. v Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199 
(Factum of the Interveners: The 
Canadian Cancer Society, The 
Canadian Council on Smoking 
and Health, The Canadian 
Medical Association, The Heart 
and Stroke Foundation of 
Canada, The Canadian Lung 
Association, court file no. 23460 
and 23490) 
 
Apotex Inc. v Wellcome 
Foundation Ltd., 2002 SCC 
77, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153 
 
NA Reference re Apotex Inc. v 
Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 153 (Docket of 
the SCC, 28287) online: 
http://www.scc-csc.ca/case-
dossier/info/dock-regi-
eng.aspx?cas=28287 
 
Janssen-Ortho Inc. v 
Novopharm Ltd., 2005 SCC 
33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 776 
 
NA Reference re Janssen-Ortho Inc. v 
Novopharm Ltd., 2005 SCC 33, 
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 776 (Docket of th 
SCC, 30900) online: 
http://www.scc-csc.ca/case-
dossier/info/dock-regi-
eng.aspx?cas=30900 
 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v 
Canada (Attorney General), 
2005 SCC 26, [2005] 1 
S.C.R. 533  
 
Reference re Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney 
General), [2005] 1 SCR 533 
(Factum of the Intervener Pfizer 
Canada, court file no. 31881) 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v 
Canada (Attorney General), 
[2005] 1 SCR 533 (Docket of the 
SCC, Court file no. 31881). 
Online: http://www.scc-
csc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-
regi-eng.aspx?cas=29823 
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Case Reference  Intervener Brief Reference Docket Numbers 
Reference re Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney 
General), [2005] 1 SCR 533 
(Brief of the Intervener Canadian 
Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association, court file no. 31881) 
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v 
Canada (Minister of 
Health), 2006 SCC 49, 
[2006] 2 S.C.R. 560 
 
Reference re AstraZeneca Canada 
Inc. v Canada (Minister of 
Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560 
(Factum of the Intervener 
Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association, court file no. 30985) 
 
Reference re AstraZeneca Canada 
Inc. v Canada (Minister of 
Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560 
(Docket of the SCC, court file no. 
30985). Online: http://www.scc-
csc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-
regi-eng.aspx?cas=30985 
Reference re AstraZeneca Canada 
Inc. v Canada (Minister of 
Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560 
(Factum of the Intervener 
Canada’s Research-Based 
Pharmaceutical Companies, court 
file no. 30985) 
 
Apotex Inc. v 
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada 
Inc., 2008 SCC 61, [2008] 3 
S.C.R. 265 
Reference re Apotex Inc. v 
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., 
[2008] 3 S.C.R. 265 (Factum of 
the Intervener BIOTECanada, 
court file no. 31881) 
Reference re Apotex Inc. v 
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., 
[2008] 3 S.C.R. 265 (Docket of 
the SCC, 31881) online: 
http://www.scc-csc.ca/case-
dossier/info/dock-regi-
eng.aspx?cas=31881 
Reference re Apotex Inc. v 
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., 
[2008] 3 S.C.R. 265 (Factum of 
the Intervener Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association, 
court file no. 31881) 
Reference re Apotex Inc. v 
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., 
[2008] 3 S.C.R. 265 (Factum of 
the Intervener Canada’s 
Research-Based Pharmaceutical 
Companies, court file no. 31881) 
Nu-Pharm Inc. v Canada 
(Attorney General), 
2010 SCC 65, [2010] 3 
S.C.R. 648 
 
NA Reference re Nu-Pharm Inc. v 
Canada (Attorney General), 
2010 [2010] 3 S.C.R. 648 
(Docket of the SCC, 32830) 
online: http://www.scc-
csc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-
regi-eng.aspx?cas=32830 
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Case Reference  Intervener Brief Reference Docket Numbers 
Celgene Corp. v Canada 
(Attorney General), 
2011 SCC 1, [2011] 1 
S.C.R. 3 
 
NA Reference re Celgene Corp. v 
Canada (Attorney General), 
[2011] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Docket of the 
SCC, 33579) 
 online: http://www.scc-
csc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-
regi-eng.aspx?cas=33579 
Merck Frosst Canada 
Ltd. v Canada (Health), 
2012 SCC 3, 
[2012] 1 S.C.R.  
 
Reference re Merck Frosst 
Canada Ltd. v Canada (Health), 
[2012] 1 S.C.R. (Factum of the 
Intervener BIOTECanada, court 
file no. 33290 and 33320) 
 
Reference re Merck Frosst 
Canada Ltd. v Canada (Health), 
[2012] 1 S.C.R. (Docket of the 
SCC 33290 and 33320) online: 
http://www.scc-csc.ca/case-
dossier/info/dock-regi-
eng.aspx?cas=33290 
and 
http://www.scc-csc.ca/case-
dossier/info/dock-regi-
eng.aspx?cas=33320 
Canada v GlaxoSmithKline 
Inc., 2012 SCC 52, [2012] 3 
S.C.R.  
NA Reference re 
Canada v GlaxoSmithKline Inc., 
[2012] 3 S.C.R. (Docket of the 
SCC, 33874) online: 
http://www.scc-csc.ca/case-
dossier/info/dock-regi-
eng.aspx?cas=33874 
Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer 
Canada Inc., 2012 SCC 60, 
[2012] 3 S.C.R. 625 
Reference re Teva Canada Ltd. v 
Pfizer Canada Inc., [2012] 3 
S.C.R. 625 (Factum of the 
Intervener Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association court 
file no. 33951) 
Reference re Teva Canada Ltd. v 
Pfizer Canada Inc., [2012] 3 
S.C.R. 625 (Docket of the SCC, 
33951) online: http://www.scc-
csc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-
regi-eng.aspx?cas=33951 
Reference re Teva Canada Ltd. v 
Pfizer Canada Inc., [2012] 3 
S.C.R. 625 (Factum of the 
Intervener Canada’s Research 
Based Pharmaceutical Companies 
court no. 33951) 
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex 
Inc., 2015 SCC 20, [2015] 2 
S.C.R. 136 
Reference re Sanofi-
Aventis v Apotex Inc., [2015] 2 
S.C.R. 136 (Factum of the 
Intervener Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association court 
file no. 35886) 
 
Reference re Sanofi-
Aventis v Apotex Inc., [2015] 2 
S.C.R. 136 (Docket of the SCC, 
35886) online: http://www.scc-
csc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-
regi-eng.aspx?cas=35886 
Reference re Sanofi-
Aventis v Apotex Inc., [2015] 2 
S.C.R. 136 (Factum of the 
Intervener Canada’s Research-
Based Pharmaceutical Companies 
court file no. 35886) 
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